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Macroeconomic volatility effect on labour market performance has been detected for 
OECD countries during the years of 1985-2011. Current research adds a number of 
improvements to the subject field. Labour market performance incorporates a large number 
of associative indicators rather than simple unemployment rate.  Variety of performance 
indicators has been used in attempt to underpin the system mechanism.  Advanced 
techniques are used for volatility estimation. Distinct volatility measures are used for 
exchange rate, inflation and interest rate series according to their stochastic properties. For 
long memory inflation series ARFIMA-GARCH models have been used, for interest rates 
that bare asymmetry due to Central Bank and market interventions QARCH, GJR-GARCH 
and PARCH models have been fitted. Exchange rate series have been modelled using 
ARIMA-GARCH and EGARCH.  In estimation of volatility effect on labour market 
performance either random or fixed effects models have been used. Standard errors of the 
models have been tested and corrected for serial correlation, heteroskedasticity and cross-
sectional dependence. For the robustness of the results panel time series methods have 
been used where possible due to its advantages for macroeconomics models (Eberhardt 
(2012)). Where use of these methods has been restricted by the nature of the models, 
Arellano-Bond (1991) and Bruno (2005) models have been fit.  Hybrid (Allison (2009)) 
and Correlated Random effects models (Mundalak (1978) have been used where 




Chapter 1. Introduction 
The focus of the thesis is to study the effect of macroeconomic volatilities on labour 
market performance. However, due to the vague nature of the volatility concept, measuring 
macroeconomic volatility has been confined to a secondary role in this work. So the 
answer to the question that has been flagged by this study really consists of two steps. 
Before moving on to the main question in step two, the question on how to measure 
macroeconomic volatility has to be answered.  
 
Macroeconomic volatility, and its effect on economic aspects such as trade, investment, 
and growth, has always puzzled researchers. Evidence of that can be seen from the number 
of studies that has been attributed to this particular area of research.  Every study is unique. 
However, one distinctive characteristic divides all the previous literature into two groups. 
This is tightly associated with the names of Robert F. Engle and Tim Bollerslev and their 
invention of parametric volatility models (Engle (1982), Bollerslev (1986)). The new 
edition of “Econometrica” Journal in 1982 has given second breath to the academic 
discussion and truly revolutionised it. Not only historic volatilities could now have been 
estimated but also using the new type of models gave an opportunity to calculate implied 
volatilities. The model initially created by Engle (1982) and generalised by Bollerslev 
(1986) quickly found its applications and extensions. Bollerslev’s “Glossary to ARCH 
(GARCH)” chapter in “Essays in honour of Robert F. Engle” is the best evidence of that 
(Bollerslev (2010)). A dozens or more model variations are described there. 
 
 It is no surprise with such wealth of new generation of volatility models that this area of 
research has attracted lots of interest. However, despite such richness in alternative areas of 
research, it was felt that labour market economics has definitely been missing out on the 
innovations. A preliminary literature review of macroeconomic volatility effects on labour 
market performance (Chapter 2 of this research) has returned with modest results. The 
exchange rate volatility effect on unemployment has appeared to be the most popular topic 
out of three.  GARCH (1,1) and GARCH-M models have been used there. In case of 
inflation volatility, no parametric models of volatility have been previously used. The 
theme of interest rate volatility effect on labour market performance has still not been 
developed and no previous studies concerned with it have been found. Being in labour 
market research group with special interest in econometrics felt like this is the gap in 
literature that has to be filled. 
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The analysis covers twenty OECD economies during the period of 1985-2010. This period 
of time has been rich in historical events for the countries considered here. They are 
Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Finland, 
France, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, 
United Kingdom and the United States. 
 
In 1985 most OECD economies started to recover after the 1980s recession caused by oil 
price shocks of the 70s. The period of time that is central to this study is characterised by 
the decline in unionisation. Let’s recall for instance the case of the UK. In 1979 Margaret 
Thatcher has lead the government as a Prime Minister. During her rule many unions have 
lost their power, as a result of her policies. Even though UK government’s war against 
unions’ extensive powers has been an extreme example in history, gradual unpopularity of 
unions became a trend in other countries too.   
 
Not only were there changes at the country levels, but also the political economy has 
evolved during this period of time and geographical borders within Europe have changed. 
In 1989 the Berlin wall was destroyed, and later, in 1990, a new country has been created 
on the European map – a Unified Germany. The following year, in 1991 Soviet Union has 
fallen and subsequently 15 smaller independent republics have been created. Contrary to 
disintegration to the East of Europe, European Union ties became stronger with the fall of 
communism. Over the 25 years, since 1985 it has expanded from 10 member countries to 
28. Closer integration of the countries has been reflected in common law framework 
introduced to make a single market, customs union, free movement, and monetary union.  
 
In 1985 most of European countries still were part of the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM), which has been introduced in 1979. The concept behind ERM lies in 
fixed values of European currencies against European Currency Unit (ECU) with the 
allowance for small fluctuations within established corridors. The corridors were 2.25% for 
all countries’ currencies except for Portugal, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom. These 
countries had a right to exercise larger currency revaluations of 6%.  Even though 
nominally peg values were against the ECU, practically values of ECU were close to the 
German Deutsche Mark. This has been a result of forming the ECU based on the bilateral 
trade weights between countries.  Not all countries joined the ERM simultaneously. For 
example, UK was the last to enter the monetary union in 1990 and left it shortly in 1992. 
European Central Bank has been established in 1998. Common currency – the euro has 
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been introduced in 1998, however banknotes and coins went into circulation only in 2002.  
So technically, Eurozone has superseded ERM system in 1999. However it still does not 
include all of its 28 member countries but is limited to only 19. 
  
Rise of the technology era has left its imprint on financial markets not less than political 
events. In 1980s computerisation has reached stock traders and their operations have been 
done using program trading. Program trading later has been blamed for Black Monday of 
1987. The consequent fall of share prices and indices values has been observed from Hong 
Kong to Europe and USA without bypassing Australia and New Zealand. 
 
This has been not the only shock to global financial system in the period of 1985 -2010. 
The incidences of financial shocks (bank insolvency crisis and currency crises, speculative 
bubbles) started to happen locally in different world regions. But they still were quite 
isolated and limited to one geographical region. For example, Japan’s bubble of 1990 when 
Nikkei index lost almost half its value in a year, Scandinavian bank crisis of 1992.  
Increased economic and financial integrity with time made the consequences more severe 
to world economies as they were falling like dominoes. So the need for regulation has 
arisen.  As a consequence, Basel Committee has been created which produces suggestions 
for banks capital formation. Despite the advisory nature of these suggestions in some 
countries, for example G-10, they have been implemented into National Banks’ regulating 
systems. Organisations, such as G-10 and G-20, became much more frequently used to 
solve the global financial issues. This has been especially obvious in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis of 2007. It has affected all of the economies that this study is 
concerned with and far beyond them. Crisis of 2007 has stemmed up from mortgage 
lending that has been based on misjudgement and violations of prudency concepts. As a 
consequence many banking institutions in the financial system experienced solvency 
problems. This has brought the new wave of recession but this time it has been truly 
global.  
 
All of the historical events previously listed have to be accounted for in the regression 
analysis so the outliers produced by these incidents will not distort the results. If ignored, 
the effect of described events will be partially included in volatility coefficients. In 
solution to that, regressions will be tested for time effects. 
 
The macroeconomic variables, for which volatilities will be considered here, are the 
exchange rate, inflation and interest rate. From the variables’ observations plots in 
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Appendix A1, volatility patterns may be observed. What immediately emerges is the 
interest rates series composition. After 1990s, series became a much better behaved where 
volatility remains but to a notably lesser extent. This could be a consequence of Central 
Bank’s trend of interest rates control. Similarly, other individual characteristics of 
macroeconomic variables have to be accounted for when modelling volatility of the series. 
For example, persistence of inflation series, asymmetric response to shocks in exchange 
rates (Bailie et. al. (1996), Gray (1996)). All of the historical events during 1985-2010 
mentioned earlier can have impact on volatility measures as well. If not controlled, 
misleading results will be produced by unit root tests. So in order to account for them 
Andrew-Zivott tests will be performed where needed.  
 
Advanced volatility models are not the only novelty that this thesis brings into the research 
field, as there are other dimensions to consider. Previous studies have been concerned with 
typical labour market indicators such as employment or unemployment series. Here 
additional variables to consider include activity rates, structural unemployment, duration of 
unemployment and the number of discouraged workers. All of these complementary 
considerations bring clarity into the mechanics of the effect.  
 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. As has been noted previously, the literature review 
on the direct link between macroeconomic volatility and labour market performance is 
very modest. However, Chapter 2 tries to gather as much of the relevant research as 
possible, including direct and indirect links (e.g. trade), looks at the question from a 
microeconomics perspective of firm organisation. Then a labour market model is built 
based on Nickel (1998) and Bassanini and Duval (2006 a and b). Chapter 3 describes in 
detail dataset construction and its sources. Core chapters to the research are chapters 4 to 6 
that are subdivided into two sections of volatility derivations and empirical findings on the 
macroeconomic volatility effect on labour market performance. Chapter 7 briefly 
summarises findings of the thesis and lists their limitations together with some further 
research suggestions.    
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
There is a lack of literature on the direct link between macroeconomic volatilities and 
labour market performance. This might have been expected, as one is a macroeconomics 
phenomenon whereas the other is a microeconomics attribute. It makes it hard to tie in the 
two concepts in one framework setting. Departing from microeconomics fundamentals in 
the next section we consider how volatilities indirectly affect firm behaviour under 
uncertainties that they create. In the following sections, we explore how exchange rate 
volatility is indirectly connected with labour market performance through the trade, 
investment and job creation links. In the last section we will review all recent empirical 
findings on macroeconomic volatility effect and labour market performance.   
 
2.1. Indirect links between macroeconomic volatilities and labour market 
performance. 
 
2.1.1 Theoretical foundations 
2.1.1.1 Firm’s behaviour under price and demand uncertainty 
 
Macroeconomic volatility affects the economy at a firm and industry level by introducing 
uncertainty into its optimisation objectives. Papaioannou (2006), based on Shapiro (1996) 
and Madura (1989), summarises three types of exchange rate risk that firm’s are facing- 
transaction, translation and economic risks. All of these risk components are as well 
applicable to interest rates and inflation risks for entrepreneurs.  Transaction risk is 
associated with the liquidity of a firm. Tight contractual obligations to cover receivables, 
payables and dividends pay out in line with contractual agreements makes firms more 
sensitive to macroeconomic volatilities and the risk that they carry. Translation risk is a 
balance sheet risk, i.e. consolidation of current domestic and foreign assets and liabilities 
on the balance sheet and its misalignment values due to associated variables’ volatilities. 
Economic risk is related to the value of a firm’s operating cash flows. Future cash flows 
can change on a regular basis because of uncertainty effects on production inputs and 
outputs. Macroeconomic volatility brings in uncertainty into price and demand functions, 
thus, alters the optimal equilibrium conditions. 
 
Using a static one-period model of a firm’s behaviour, whose objective is profit 
maximisation and risk attitude is described by Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, one 
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derives optimal first and second order conditions in a search for the optimality. The 
difference in the uncertainty case assumed to be that firm has to make optimal output, price 
or sometimes both decisions ‘ex ante’ - based on expectations of price level or demand 
function rather than on the actual known values of them. The effect of uncertainty on 
output determination, pricing strategy, and demand for factors of production, increase 
fixed costs and taxation are discussed in the theoretical framework. From outlines of static 
one –period model one concludes that this is rather a short run model of firm behaviour so 
there are further restrictions on the model with no allowances for inventories assumed.   
 
Aiginger (1987) in his general propositions compares results of analogous certainty and 
uncertainty case and finds an additional component to marginal cost in uncertainty case. 
Depending on the sign of the additional component it may result in lower optimal 
production.  Economic rationale for the finding as justified by the author is driven by the 
fear of overproducing and not meeting the actual demand or making potential losses on 
deficient supply. Previous studies in the field are differentiated based on the assumption of 
the firms’ utility functions, risk attitude, market structures where they operate, and 
uncertainty sources. This all will be determinable by the sign of the marginal cost 
component and its additive effect on the optimal output.   
 
Sandmo (1971) considers a model similar to the one discussed with addition of perfect 
competition assumption and assumes uncertainty comes from price level. Contrary to usual 
certainty case, solution for optimal competitive output lies where expected price exceeds 
marginal cost, this comes in line with the Aiginger(1987) finding of an additional 
component to marginal cost. Sandmo (1971) criticises the primitivism of profit maximising 
objective as market share expansions, investments are of no less importance to firms. 
Further assuming Arrow-Patt utility functions, decreasing sensitivity of the firm to even an 
infinitely small rise in fixed costs (tax rates) has been established as it departs from 
absolute risk aversion to a relative one.  Baron (1970) finds that risk attitude of a firm is 
central to determining the firm’s behaviour under uncertainty as it affects its short-run 
supply function structure, changes fixed costs and tax level effects on output. He was one 
of the first to derive the additional component to marginal cost in the uncertainty scenario. 
As risk attitude is central to his research model, he associates this component to the risk 
premium part of marginal cost. The risk premium becomes a larger positive addition to 
marginal cost once a firm becomes more risk averse, thus increasing the price level and 
decreasing output production. Further, he derives that under risk aversion firms’ market 
clearing output is below its efficient level. Under the assumption of risk neutrality, firms 
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would produce at a Pareto optimal level in the uncertainty case, once we depart from this 
assumption output level changes.   Aiginger (1987) further generalises perfect competition 
case analysis by adding more restrictions to the utility function. His research distinguishes 
between risk neutral, loving and averse behaviour of firms’ under uncertainty. He finds 
that a risk neutral firm’s output level is equivalent to the certainty case, but a risk loving 
firm’s output will be larger than market clearing output under perfect competition. Risk-
averse scenario analysis and outcomes are consistent with the ones of Baron (1970) and 
Sandmo (1971).  
 
The optimal output solution will differ in the case where uncertainty is coming from 
demand side fluctuations. It should be noted that this uncertainty scenario has more realism 
as a fixed price level can be explained by price rigidities, then firms have to decide how 
much to produce without prior assurance of the demand level.  Hymans (1966) discusses 
firm’s supply of output, by building a set of optimal output response functions to changes 
in price level. Adapting Lerner’s Index to the uncertainty case of a price taking firm with a 
non decreasing marginal cost function, he derives function of output whose values lie 
within unity interval and output ranges from 0 to infinity. Based on the novice index 
interpretation, Hymans (1966) proves that optimal output in the uncertainty case is bound 
by the competitive certainty output independently of the nature of marginal utility function.  
Further this result together with Lerner’s framework has been used to describe demand and 
optimal supply response functions’ behaviour in the uncertainty case. Aiginger (1987) 
results are built on Hymans (1966) model and are guided by an individual’s expected 
utility function. An additional positive component to marginal costing has been derived 
therefore proving that certainty optimal production output is higher than in uncertainty 
case, which is similar to Hymans (1966) result. Distribution of the optimal output results 
according to risk attitude is as follows – risk loving, risk neutral, risk averse firms. 
 
The theories that have been considered here are sometimes criticised for their theoretical 
framework consistency. The assumption of uncertainty coming from demand side 
fluctuations seems contrary to the fundamentals of perfect competition, as it violates the 
postulate of the competitive model – producers can sell all of their produce at marginal 
cost price (Hey (1979)).  So a natural choice will be to turn to a monopoly model under 
uncertainty.  
 
Mills (1959) considers a single commodity market, where output and price decisions are 
made simultaneously “ex ante” based on a demand function that includes a stochastic 
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uncertainty intercept. It has been derived that monopolist behaviour would be largely 
dependent on marginal cost curve structure. Under constant marginal costs, price charged 
by a monopolist in uncertainty case is lower than in certainty case, assuming no price 
discrimination exists. Once marginal cost behaviour changes - it is harder to generalise 
results, as price behaviour will be dependent on output, expected demand and realised 
demand interrelations. Intuition behind short run scenario is extended to cover longer 
horizon cases and it has been concluded that monopolist pricing behaviour would be more 
modest in the uncertainty case. However, this conclusion is not universal and will be 
invalid once monopolist production is at its capacity level then price level in uncertain case 
may be well above the certainty case price level.    
 
Baron (1971) reconsiders Mills (1959) model and supports his results. It has been 
underlined that assuming total linear cost function monopolist firm would sustain its 
production under uncertainty as long as the price it charges exceeds marginal cost. This 
explains why a monopolist would consider maintaining production at a lower price level 
under uncertainty and defines price level boundaries.  In addition, he finds that risk 
aversion in this model affects both price and production level. However, if we hold price 
fixed then optimal output will be inversely related to the risk aversion index. 
 
Baron (1971) introduced two alternative models of monopolistic behaviour under 
uncertainty to consider. The first strategy, called pricing strategy, is where price is set fixed 
by the monopolist and output is produced once the demand is known. Second strategy 
mechanism is similar to the first one, but instead of price - quantity is fixed and price 
charged is determined by equilibrium once demand function is known. Defining quantity 
elasticity of expected demand function and using Taylor expansion series optimal 
conditions were found. Results for pricing strategy are in line with previous studies on the 
firm’s behaviour under uncertainty, and an additional term to marginal cost has been 
found. This additional term in the marginal cost, if total cost function is non-linear, causes 
divergence of optimality results in certain and uncertain cases. Analogously, production 
strategy optimal conditions have been derived using Taylor series expansion and price 
elasticity of expected demand. Here, no divergence in optimality conditions has been 
found as expected profits and output levels are the same in both certain and uncertain 
cases. Even more to add, first order conditions of a monopolist firm using production 
strategy discussed above are the same as for a perfectly competitive firm under 
uncertainty.  Choice of a strategy to employ by the monopolist will be guided by his risk 
attitude, as will be dependent on expected profits-utility functions. 
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Leland (1972) builds his analysis on behavioural modes constructed in Mills (1959) and 
Baron (1971). In contrast to the previous studies he uses a more general definition of 
uncertain demand function where an uncertainty term can exhibit either the additive or 
multiplicative nature. The paper’s technical side relies on the principle of increased 
uncertainty (PIU).  It has been used to derive the results discussed here.  Monopolistic firm 
behaviour under uncertainty will be dependent on the strategy followed and the firm risk 
preference. Leland (1972) introduces additional determinant to the list - dispersion of profit 
caused by alterations in price level or demand function. The study illustrates combinations 
of different conditions for which output and price under uncertainty will depart from the 
certainty optimal output and price levels.  Output level will not be altered by uncertainty 
only for a quantity-setting risk-neutral firm, and in the case of price setting monopolistic 
firms - price level will not be affected by uncertainty in a case of risk neutral firm with 
constant marginal cost. Firms will not be indifferent in their mode of preference. If choice 
is given, they will be willing to make price and quantity setting decisions ex post, once 
more information is available. This gives intuition behind firms’ choice in favour of price 
or quantity setting behaviour rather than Mills (1959) strategy, as they will try to reduce if 
not eliminate uncertainty components from the decision making process.  Validity of PIU 
property of demand function has been questioned and led to polemics in the literature. 
Korkie (1975) using random coefficients model of risk proves that PIU property of the 
demand function does not hold. Leland (1975) in his reply to Korkie (1975) shows that 
many linear stochastic demand functions do follow PIU property consistent behaviour. His 
rethinking of Korkie (1975) comment concludes that rather than PIU property 
questionability one should reconsider the linearity assumption of the stochastic demand 
function. More recent study of Hau (2004) on example of quantity setting firm under 
Leland type of uncertainty shows that PIU assumption of demand curve can be easily 
violated and derives necessary and sufficient conditions for the Leland (1972) optimisation 
results to hold.  
 
The theoretical findings of studies discussed above suggest that in most cases output 
decisions and pricing behaviour changes under uncertainty. If firm’s objectives align with 
the ones of their shareholders, who are asset holders, then risk aversion is more realistic 
assumption about a firm’s utility function. Under the assumption of risk aversion output 
per firm declines under uncertainty. So how is it translated to industry as a whole? 
Lippman and McCall (1981) considered a static model of uncertainty effect on the 
 10 
competitive industry. It has been found that as output per firm declines, additional free 
capacity in the market arises and it would accommodate new firms into the industry.      
 
From the studies considered so far, one concludes that uncertainty distorts equilibrium 
price and output levels in most cases of perfectly competitive and monopolistic firms.  Not 
only will the absolute levels of optimal conditions change, but also the whole mechanism 
behind a firm’s operation shall be reconsidered. The impact of fluctuations in fixed costs 
and level of taxation/subsidy on firm’s operations will differ compared to the deterministic 
case (e.g. Sandmo(1971),  Leland (1972) and Baron (1970)). This is the only general 
consensus that has been agreed by the studies. Unfortunately no more generalisations can 
be highlighted, as further firm’s decision-making is individual and can be characterised by 
many other factors.  The magnitude and direction of change in a firm’s behaviour will be 
guided by firm’s objectives, risk attitude, properties of demand function and how 
uncertainty enters it.  
 
A one period static model gives useful framework to consider short-term behaviour of 
firms under uncertainty. The validity of the results in the longer run and the firm’s 
production process is as well of interest, especially once restrictive assumptions of no 
inventories and adjustment costs have been lifted.  
 
Uncertainty effect on optimal output and price determination will be translated to factor 
input choice. For risk averse firms, a decrease in output will be followed by a decrease in 
demand for factors of production, if firms are risk neutral then there will be no effect on 
output level or input choices. (Sandmo(1971)). Zabel (1973) develops a multi-period 
discrete model of a competitive firm’s production process, where capital and labour inputs 
are not substitutable. Assuming that both factor inputs choices are done prior to actual 
sales price is realised, then associated uncertainty leads to higher capital stocks, if storage 
is accounted for. This comes through as the result of an expected profit maximisation 
problem, as higher capital stock would be accounted for higher expected profit. 
 
Hartman (1976) offers an alternative model to discuss the uncertainty effect on factor 
demand. He assumes a price taking risk neutral firm whose labour input is variable but 
whose capital is quasi-fixed. Decisions on the amount to produce and number of workers 
to hire are done once the market price has been realised, but decisions on how much capital 
to employ is done under output price uncertainty. This model of firm’s behaviour is more 
flexible as firm has one variable input, in particular labour, that can be freely adjusted 
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according to market conditions. It can be used to compensate for ‘ex post’ bad decision 
making for the choice of capital input.  Demand for capital input will be linearly guided by 
behaviour of partial derivative of short run profit function to capital. So an increase in the 
partial derivative will result in an increase for capital input. The effect of uncertainty on 
demand for labour inputs will be indirect - passed through a firm’s decision for optimal 
capital level.  It will depend largely on the degree of substitutability between labour and 
capital inputs in the production process. Once capital has been installed there is no 
flexibility in substitution between capital and labour inputs, so Kon (1983) restricts the 
model by fixing the capital to labour ratio. Ex ante, capital-labour ratio has been chosen 
together with capital level and only then ex post labour input level determined. It has been 
derived that under uncertainty firms will tend to use more labour intensive capital, as there 
are no labour adjustment costs due to the flexibility assumption. However this will come at 
the expense of lower expected wages.    
 
Pindyck (1982) goes further in the field and extends the existing model of Hartman (1976) 
by not only introducing adjustment costs but also giving an option for inventories. 
Uncertainty comes from a stochastic future demand function that is constructed in a way 
that uncertainty grows with an increase in time horizon of events. The analysis is built on 
the construction of the phase diagram of investments and capital by the means of solving 
partial differential equations using stochastic calculus. Phase diagram captures production 
process mechanism and its deviation from equilibrium once conditions change.  The results 
suggest that the level of adjustment costs will guide behaviour of firms. If marginal 
adjustment cost is rising at an increasing rate then target capital stock and output level will 
be higher under uncertainty.  If marginal adjustment cost is rising at a decreasing rate then 
uncertainty will have supressing effect on capital stock. Capital stock and output levels 
will be the same in both uncertain and deterministic cases under the condition of marginal 
adjustment cost rising at a constant rate. Deviation of the results from deterministic model 
arise as marginal adjustment cost rising rate of change becomes non-constant as 
continuous adjustment to stochastic demand fluctuations leads to continuous alteration in 
firm’s cost functions. In a case where marginal adjustment cost is rising, quasi-fixed cost 
of capital adjustment creates incentive in firms to opt for more capital stock. From one side 
increase in capital stock will help firms to buffer the uncertainty effects in the market and 
will force them to produce more. However, due to on-going maintenance costs, the 
associated profits will be reduced. The use of inventories can slightly reduce the impact of 
uncertainty on firms in absolute values, but generally speaking, the results, in terms of 
mechanism of relationship between variables of interest, will not change. It has been 
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shown that firms will still tend to use inventories even when their capital is at the optimal 
level.  
 
In terms of uncertainty in the production process, it is common for uncertainty to come not 
only from output price level or demand function, but also from input prices i.e. capital cost 
or wages level. Pindyck (1982) addresses this issue by reconsidering his production model 
for price for input uncertainty. He concludes that wages uncertainty effect on a firm’s 
operations is the same as that of demand uncertainty. Once uncertainty is correlated and 
coming from both production inputs it will magnify its impact on output, as adjustment 
costs will proportionally increase.         
 
 
2.1.1.2 Investment decisions under uncertainty: entry and exit conditions 
 
So far the primary focus of discussion has been operations of firms under uncertainty in 
existing market conditions. However, there are other not less important decisions managers 
and shareholders would be concerned with. For instance, the size of firm’s market share 
increase can be achieved by entering a new market or just by gaining a larger market share 
in the current one by means of investment. However, there are cases when a shutdown 
option would be more desirable.  
 
Dixit (1989 a) discusses the concept of adjustment costs and its importance in market 
entry- exit decisions. Studies draw parallels between investment options valuation and 
labour market decisions. Decisions regarding choice of a particular option/strategy are 
guided by the Net Present Value rule (NPV). NPV criterion to invest implies that expected 
discounted profit from investment should at least cover the initial sunk costs used to set up 
investment. The idea behind this is that due to a project’s fixed costs firms experience 
some lags in their adjustments followed by news. This behaviour is explained by the sunk 
cost recurrence after withdrawing from a current project. If an investor is willing to 
undertake it again. If an investor has not undertaken the project yet, then he is more likely 
to choose an option to restrain in the presence of increased uncertainty. High adjustment 
costs imply larger required returns to investment in order to choose the option of entry and 
much lower returns to leave the project once in. Therefore, in a case of increased 
uncertainty required values of return to investment for entry and exit conditions will have a 
wider wedge than in a general case.  This argument is straightforward as for bearing 
additional risks investors will require higher returns to undertake investment, and it pushes 
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up criterion for entry. On the other side, increased exchange rate volatility lowers the 
criterion for decision to exit investment as it increases the probability of currency 
arbitrage. Therefore, exchange rate uncertainty has an adverse impact on the firm’s 
decisions to enter into an investment project. The result is idiosyncratic and we cannot 
make any industry wide conclusions based on it.  
 
Spencer and Brander (1992) consider a discrete model of Stackelberg and Cournot 
equilibrium changes in a duopoly under uncertainty. Standard deterministic models of 
oligopolistic behaviour have been replicated assuming additive demand uncertainty to see 
how uncertain case equilibrium deviates from the Marshallian case. Further restrictions on 
the model of linear demand function, identical and constant marginal cost curve structure, 
and positive output by both firms have been assumed. The Stackelberg model gives a first 
mover advantage to the leading firm to enter the market, only once the leader has been 
assigned a market niche in the first period will the follower make entry into the market. 
However, if neither of the firms choose to commit in the first period then the solution of 
the Stackelberg model is reduced to a Cournot scenario. The choice in strategy in a 
duopoly has been viewed as a trade between commitment that the Stackelberg model 
presents and flexibility that the Cournot model offers. Under uncertainty the leader’s 
output and expected profit are not affected by uncertainty, but realised profit is. Under 
Cournot conditions, uncertainty enters both output and expected profit functions. However, 
Cournot option is viewed as a more valuable option under uncertainty than in the 
deterministic case as expected value of profit is an increasing function of uncertainty. This 
is a result that has been expected, as under imperfect information firms may be reluctant to 
enter, since a “wait and see” strategy offers the option of more informative decisions, 
especially in a market with higher volatility. Authors derive a benchmark volatility value 
that will make firms indifferent between the options of precommitment and “wait and see”. 
Further analysis show that under uncertainty both firms will not deter from entering the 
market, as marginal costs are identical for both firms and both firms are profit maximisers. 
Introduction of shutdown probability only forces a strategy preference towards a Cournot 
behaviour solution.  These results will only be amplified if we lift the assumption of risk 
neutrality of agents in favour of risk aversion.  
 
We have looked at a strategic interaction of two firms under uncertainty, but are the results 
of Spencer and Brander (1992) universal or dependant on the number of firms in the 
market. Smit and Ankum (1993) use a game theory approach to derive optimal investment 
strategies for firms operating under conditions of monopoly, duopoly and perfect 
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competition market structures.  Under assumptions similar to that of Spencer and Brander 
(1992) their findings are in line with the previous studies. Additionally, they find that in 
duopoly where the net present value of a project is low and cooperation is an option both 
firms will defer their investment and invest simultaneously once uncertainty is resolved.  If 
cooperation is not an option, firms will enter the market simultaneously before uncertainty 
is resolved, even though this strategy does not produce a Pareto efficient outcome and it is 
second best to a coordinated strategy output.  Results of monopoly and perfect competition 
scenarios are contrasted, as in monopoly exclusive market power rights give advantage of 
no market share loss associated with investment deferment. Under uncertainty a 
monopolist will benefit from postponing entry to the market and making a more 
informative choice if the project value is small. The postponement of investment under 
perfect competition can result in pre-emption of the market by the rival firms. So 
uncertainty and fierce competition will force firms to invest early so that the project value 
would not be eroded.  
 
The results will change once we alter investment characteristics from assuming 
incremental outflows to one lumpy sum sunk cost with consequent payoffs in the future. 
Bouis et. al. (2009) uses continuous-time investment model to describe investment 
behaviour of three symmetric risk neutral firms in oligopolistic competition under 
uncertainty. Uncertainty is modelled by assuming exogenous multiplicative demand shock. 
Market share impact on profits is passed through demand function that is non-negative and 
decreasing in the number of firms operating in the market. The problem of the strategic 
interactions has been solved following backward induction and concludes with the 
existence of two equilibriums. For sequential equilibrium to exist there should be 
investment trigger values for all firms that will give them incentives to enter sequentially. 
A rise in uncertainty leads to higher required levels of investment triggers, as firms will 
refrain from entering the market when volatility is sufficiently high. In case of the third 
firm investment trigger levels is inversely related to market share when three firms are 
operating. This is explained by the assumption that a rise in market share is reflected in 
demand function and this in turn projects onto profit function. Not surprisingly, higher 
returns associated with investment lead to lower investment triggers. Following the same 
logic, the investment trigger level for a second firm to enter the market is inversely related 
to market share payoffs in a case where there are two firms operating. What about 
investment trigger function of market share payoff when three firms are present in the 
market? If market share payoff increases when three companies are at the market, it 
becomes closer in value to market share payoff when two companies are present at the 
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market. This convergence in value will make second firms more indifferent between 
entering the market second or third as payoffs will be converging to unique value and pre-
empting threat of the market by third firm will be viewed as less credible. Thus, in contrast 
to “devaluation” of the commitment option, investment deferment becomes a more 
valuable alternative, thus increasing the value of the investment trigger.  Identically, first 
mover investment trigger level function will be inversely related to market share payoff 
when one firm is present in the market, and will be decreasing function of market share 
payoff when there are two companies present in the market. How is the investment trigger 
of the first mover related to the market share payoff when there are three firms in the 
market?  It is decreasing. If profitability of a market share with three agents increases then 
a second firm will delay its entry into the market, as a higher investment trigger value is 
required.  Thus, the first mover will enjoy its exclusive rights to the market for longer, 
higher expected profits will lead to a decrease in investment trigger. This effect of 
investment threshold levels moving in one direction between first mover and third entrant 
and in opposite direction between first mover and the follower has been defined by the 
authors as an “accordion effect”. Simultaneous equilibrium implies strategy where the first 
two firms invest simultaneously followed by the third. Existence of multiple equilibria has 
been blamed on the “accordion affect” that arises as a consequence of uncertainty. 
Departing from the oligopolistic case by increasing the number of firms, results are 
generalised to N-firms in the market.  A generalised “accordion effect” creates an 
asymmetric impact on the investment threshold values among odd and even market 
entrants in uncertainty. It has been confirmed that for N firm case all investments will be 
delayed with increased uncertainty, but the number of firms will have an impact on 
investment entry due to the “accordion effect”. First mover will be willing to commit to 
investment sooner if the market is characterised by an even number of potential entrants. 
Another implication of the effect is that fierce competition will not force firms to enter the 
market immediately instead it increases the option value of refraining. Thus, markets with 
a smaller number of firms will have lower investment triggers and earlier entry to the 
market. These results are of opposite direction to the results of studies where investments 
are assumed to be incremental. Will the monopolist behaviour change when investment is 
a lump sum rather than incremental?  
 
A further study of Siddiqui and Takashima (2012) uses a model very similar to Bouis et. 
al.(2009) with one innovation of investment structure. Investment is to be done in two 
sequential periods. Sequential model gives an option of flexibility to economic agent, 
where firms may enter the market by investing in the first period and then expand its 
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market share by making a further irreversible investment. Alternatively one can make lump 
sum investment in one go, rather than in two steps, and get a larger market share directly. 
This particular strategy is referred to as a direct approach and is a setting of Bouis et. 
al.(2009). It has been found that monopolist firm investment trigger in the direct approach 
is an increasing function of uncertainty and investment cost.  So, monopolist’s value of 
waiting is higher under uncertainty.    
 
2.1.1.3  Trade 
 
 Exchange rate volatility – trade link 
 
Debates regarding the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade flows have been in the 
literature for a while. However, no general consensus was achieved regarding the matter. 
One of the early papers is by Clark (1973) who proposes a theoretical model for the 
analysis. A perfect competition model is assumed with a single export-orientated firm 
producing a homogenous product that cannot be sold on the domestic market. Therefore, it 
adapts price-taking behaviour and obviously has no impact on the foreign price of a good 
or exchange rate. A fixed non-stochastic production function is assumed that is 
independent of imported inputs, thus there is no currency risk involved in the production 
process. The only uncertainty, that firms face, is the exchange risk component of output 
price, which is translated to profits function. It has been argued previously that the 
availability of forward markets eliminates the uncertainty associated with exchange rates.  
However, it is not always the case. Clark (1973) compares models with imperfect and 
perfect forward markets and finds that the uncertainty component persists in both 
variations if one assumes that the utility function is quadratic. Assuming entrepreneurs are 
risk-averse, Clark (1973) proves that for them to sustain an original supply of exports 
under greater exchange rate volatility, a compensation for the higher risk is required, i.e. 
higher price for exports. This is achieved by decreasing production output, thus reducing 
export volumes as a consequence. 
 
The author points out that foreign exchange risk exposure can be diversified if to introduce 
import prices into production function or extend firm activities to domestic market 
operations. The presence of an imports component in the production process will reduce 
exchange rate exposure. If domestic currency appreciates, even though output price 
decreases, input prices will decrease proportionally to the reduction in import prices. 
Therefore, the reduction in costs will reduce the rise in output price effect on profit and 
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revenue functions. If to remove the output market restrictions and consider the case of 
operations in multiple markets, including domestic market, entrepreneurs will have an 
option to switch between markets and diversify the currency risks (Akhtar and Hilton 
(1984), Cushman (1986)).   
 
Ethier (1973) reiterates the arguments from previous studies on why forward markets are 
not fully clearing the risk. These relate to the poor development of the forward markets, 
risk premium associated with the forward cover and the gaps in export, as well as import 
prices perceived by exporters and importers (Ethier 1973, p.494). A model where objective 
is an importing firm that faces uncertainty through input component prices is assumed. In 
contrast to previous studies (i.e. Clark (1973)) Ethier (1973) relaxes the assumption of 
perfect competition therefore letting a firm choose its pricing strategy. Additionally it is 
assumed that the utility function the firm faces is that of Von Neumann-Morgenstern 
nature. The study supports the conclusions of Clark (1973) that exchange rate volatility 
reduces trade flows, in this particular example of imports. It extends previous conclusions 
by proving that this statement disregards the risk nature of the entrepreneur. Risk nature 
influences only decision of how much forward cover to purchase in order to hedge the risk 
but not the volume of trade. De Grauwe (1987b) divides the uncertainty effect on profits to 
income and substitution effects. He claims that some entrepreneurs can be attracted by 
higher volatility of exchange rate as it can yield higher expected returns and would choose 
not to purchase any cover. Brol and Hansen-Averlant (2010) demonstrate that once the 
degree of risk aversion is less than unity and firm employs a strictly concave production 
technology, it will be sufficient for a positive relationship to exist between exchange rate 
volatility and domestic production (and consequently labour demand). Condition of risk 
aversion being less than unity is sufficient for substitution effect to prevail the income 
effect.  
 
Further studies in the area by Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978) are built on the model of 
previous ones, but with a number of modifications. They bring together importer and 
exporter sides into the analysis to account for the general trade flows in the economy and 
control not only for volumes of trade but for its prices too. Derived equilibrium conditions 
for price and quantity are dependent on the exporters’ and importers’ exposure to currency 
risk. Further theoretical investigation has shown that distribution of the effects among price 
and volume of trade depends on importer’s elasticity of demand and differs depending on 
the risk nature of entrepreneurs.  
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According to studies described so far, the volatility of exchange rates has adverse effects 
on trade flows, which are invariant to the invoicing currency. Under the assumption of risk 
aversion, an importer’s demand for goods will be less the more volatile are the exchange 
rates and they will try to switch to alternative domestic supplies, thus reducing the trade 
flows. If invoicing currency is the domestic one then foreign exporting firms will bear the 
exchange rate risk.  Thus under risk aversion, they will be more reluctant to export goods 
in the same quantities and would opt to reduce the volume of exports and produce more for 
the domestic market. The use of forward markets to hedge for the currency risks will 
distort the equilibrium, as they are costly to business. Adding costs to operations firms will 
have to charge the premium prices to consumers thus reducing the volume of trade.  
 
 
The need for adapting a long-term time horizon approach in the studies can be justified by 
the presence of sunk costs in the business operations. Firms are more sensitive to the long-
term variations in the exchange rates, rather than short-term variations due to adjustment 
costs. Dixit (1989a) defines general market entry-exit rules. For a company to enter the 
market expected turnover should exceed the sum of variable cost and interest, for the exit 
company’s revenue should be less than variable cost deducted by the interest on exit. 
Kroner and Lastrapes (1993) support the view of Dixit (1989a), and suggest that in the 
presence of relatively large sunk costs potential market participants will choose not to enter 
the market under exchange rate volatility. However, what if the firm is already in the 
market and its current turnover falls in the gap between the exit and entry barriers, and 
covers only the variable costs? If each time to enter the market company has to pay some 
fixed costs to set up operations, firms will be better off by opting for the wait and see 
strategy. According to Dixit (1989b) this creates “hysteresis” in the trade that gives rise to 
unintentional dumping strategies. Under exchange rate volatility, there can be 
misalignment between costs of production and cost of the good to the market. As there is a 
time wait for the good to be manufactured before it actually reaches the market, two costs 
have to be accounted for in separate periods.  
 
Franke (1991) develops the established model by adding the rigidities of transaction costs, 
i.e. entry and exit costs to operations. Model and economic setting is very close to the Dixit 
(1989a) “option value of waiting” model however it assumes that volatility follows a mean 
reverting Ito process rather than a Wiener process. Under these assumptions, trade volume 
and capital mobility have a deterministic impact on the exchange rate. The paper considers 
the option of entering and exiting foreign markets for firms with comparative advantage 
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and disadvantage under the assumption of risk neutrality. Firms operate under no 
administrative barriers and in a continuous time horizon, i.e. long-run model. Then 
according to Franke (1991), the law of one price failure creates misalignment in relative 
prices and gives arbitrage opportunities for the firms depending on the cost of entry and 
exit barriers. Exchange rate volatility widens the gap between relative prices. Thus 
disadvantaged firms may be better off if their expected value of profits grows with 
exchange rate volatility at a higher rate than transaction costs. This is not necessarily the 
case for advantaged firms. If this was the case for all firms then the volatility of exchange 
rate would induce positive effects on trade by prolonging the period of firms operations 
and increasing the number of firms. 
 
Sercu (1992) looks at a short-term model where the rigidities to operations are created by 
tax duties, tariffs and transportation costs rather than entry-exit barriers. No deterministic 
impact of trade volumes on the exchange rate is assumed. It is a two period decision 
model. In the first period a decision is made regarding the production function, and in the 
following period a decision is made to operate in domestic or foreign markets. The analysis 
of the model author differentiates between importing and exporting sectors and assumes 
there is no switching from one sector to another. Surprisingly for the competitive and pure 
monopolistic models, analysis yields two similar results. Exchange rate variability will 
have a negative impact on production and prices in the importing sector, whereas the 
exporting sector effect of variability will be inverse in nature. This result is explained by 
the presence of an “autarchy price cap” (Sercu (1992, p.584). Prices cannot be pushed 
higher than the autarchy ones in the importing case and cannot be pushed down lower than 
the autarchy ones in the exporting sector. Since then the opportunity cost of trading 
increases in favour of domestic market operations. Despite strong results for the two 
extreme cases, for the intermediary case author’s findings were rather mixed.                           
 
 Trade-unemployment link 
 
It is hard to underpin the trade unemployment relationship directly to one of theoretical 
fundamentals, as the first one is viewed as an attribute of microeconomics and the latter as 
a macroeconomic phenomenon. Conventional trade models are based on the assumptions 
of a competitive model and are valid only under the assumption of full employment. 
Therefore, for a long time economists neglected the link. However, recently some studies 
tried to modify the orthodox models by relaxing the assumptions of full employment. (e.g. 
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Davidson et. al. (1999)).  Unfortunately, existing literature on trade-unemployment 
relationship is not as rich as one would like.   
 
Kruse (1988) looks at the problem from the idea that open trade brings higher competition 
to the domestic market participants. Layard et.al (2005, p.391), in their wage-price setting 
model, show that under increased competitiveness wage-setting and price setting schedules 
are shifted backwards, therefore lowering employment level and wages in the long run. 
The study of Kruse (1988), however, is more concerned with the following labour force 
adjustment to increase in unemployment through increased competitiveness. He identifies 
in his study three hypothesises on how the adjustment process of those who became 
unemployed through increased trade will differ from the rest. They are “demographic 
selection”, “unemployment congestion” and “industry decline” (Kruse (1988, pp.402-
403)).  
 
The first hypothesis is straightforward as for some sectors the outlay of labour will be 
demographically specific. For example, redundancies in labour intensive metallurgy 
production are usually associated with increase in male unemployment. In turn male low-
skilled employees generally could have longer tendency to adjust to the new market 
conditions.  Unemployment congestion hypothesis implies that unemployment may be 
specific to geographic areas. This can be shown by the example of a town that is 
characterised by a large dominant employer, like a metallurgy producer. Then due to high 
redundancies in the plant it will be harder for the unemployed to find alternative sources of 
employment and they will be facing tougher employment competition. Third argument, 
“industry decline” hypothesis raises the issue of depreciating human capital. When some 
part of the sector, largely outsourced overseas, the unemployed who posses specific skills 
to production lose their human capital due to the loss of demand for their skills.  
 
Ravenga (1997) studies the effects of free trade on unemployment and wage levels for the 
Mexican case during its transitional years to open economy of 1984-1990. The author uses 
a bargaining model as a foundation for the analysis where employment will be determined 
by the firms labour demand function. It is assumed that the trade will affect the 
employment level in the model by shifting output and through wages, where higher wages 
are associated with higher unemployment. The study concludes that trade liberalisation had 
a depressing effect on the employment level and wages by reducing production, and rents 




Davidson et. al. (1999) extends the conventional Ricardian trade model to include an 
equilibrium unemployment rate. On this assumption authors modify Stolper-Samuelson 
Theorem and Specific Factors model relative to employment factors. A two-country 
bilateral trade model is assumed where one of the partners is a larger, capital abundant 
economy with a lower aggregate unemployment. The authors prove that under the 
framework described larger country will suffer welfare losses from trade in terms of lower 
aggregate employment but will experience gains in terms of higher idle capital.  
 
 
2.1.2 Empirical foundations: Facts of macroeconomic volatility effecting firm’s 
operations. 
 
 Pricing behaviour, output determination and borrowing. 
 
The direct impact of volatility on a firm’s production and operation decisions results in 
production, price and cost levels uncertainty. Output price uncertainty will have impact on 
charging margins determined by resellers and will alter their behaviour.  Schroeter and 
Azzam (1991) in their study of US hog packing industry over the period of 1972-1988 
found that the impact of output price uncertainty was higher on firms behaviour than 
market structure or power. It has been found that the uncertainty element has a depressing 
effect on margins and can even swing pricing behaviour towards a competitive outcome 
under an oligopolistic environment. Demir (2009), using the example of Turkey during a 
10 years period from 1993, concludes that volatilities have a negative effect on profits – 
10% increase in inflation volatility reduces operating profits by 2.1%. The effect of 
exchange rate volatility on operating profits is positive, but insignificant. However, in a 
case of total profit function, both variables have the same directional negative impact and 
high significance.  The presence of financial assets softens the unfavourable outcome.  
 
Most equilibrium pricing models (i.e. Cournot, Dixit-Stiglitz and Competition on the 
Circle) predict that import prices are sensitive to currency appreciation. However, the 
strength of the effect depends largely on the degree of competition and the number of 
domestic and foreign firms in the market (Dornbusch (1987)). Prasertnukul and Kakinaka 
(2010), in their study of exchange rate effects on price level for Indonesia, South Korea, 
Philippines, and Thailand, found that the volatility of exchange rate is largely passed to 
producer, rather than consumer prices. Caldentey and Haugh (2009) in their study of the 
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supply chain between two firms (supplier and producer using Stackelberg game model) 
find that producers are likely to charge premium prices to liquidity-constrained retailers. 
Another result of the analysis implies that under flexible contracts with hedging, the 
supplier is likely to shut down the supply chain by charging abnormal prices. Strategy for a 
firm to keep its operations is to switch its budget from low demand to high demand states. 
However, this opportunity is not valid under financial constraints.  
 
Kandil (1992) extends model of output and pricing behaviour to include empirical research 
on 11 industrial countries (Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, UK and the US). It has been found that interest rate volatility has a 
negative effect on real output in all countries being researched. Results are significant for 
all countries except for the Netherlands call money rate, and the government bond yield of 
Switzerland. In line with a depressing effect on output for some countries (Canada, 
Denmark, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden and the US) interest rate volatility had a 
cumulative effect on the price level. Findings of Fountas et.al.(2006) on the inflation 
uncertainty effect on output  growth are in line with the general Friedman hypothesis. 
Inflation uncertainty has a negative effect on output growth in the G7 countries except for 
France and Italy, where output is approximated as industrial production index.   
Furthermore, the study of Aghinon et.al (2009) examines productivity growth in eighty-
three countries during the period of 1960-2000. Research shows that exchange rate 
volatility has a depressing effect on productivity growth in countries with weak financial 
development. 
 
Macroeconomic volatilities destabilise the banking sector and impose financial constraints 
on firms’ operations and developments. Elyasani and Mansur (1998) in a study of fifty-six 
commercial banks, whose stocks are traded on New York and American stock exchanges, 
have found an inverse relationship between interest risk and stock returns. This result 
contradicts financial market theoretical postulates of higher risk association with higher 
returns, but this can be the case in real world. An example could be investors during 
uncertain times making investment into assets with prospects of value growth rather than 
yield generating. A further research of Kasman et.al. (2011) confirms a negative 
relationship between interest rate volatility and bank stock returns on a sample of fourteen 
banks whose stocks are traded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. Interest rate volatility has 
significant negative effects on bank stock returns in six cases, whereas positive significant 
relationship with bank stock returns volatility has been confirmed for all fourteen banks. 
Exchange rate risk effect on stock returns is of a lesser power, as negative significant 
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relationship has been suggested only for five banks. Similarly positive impact of exchange 
rate risk on stock return volatility has been confirmed for nine out of fourteen commercial 
banks. Adverse conditions in the banking sector affect their ability to borrow translating it 
to consumers through the supply of credits. Valencia (2013), using data on US commercial 
banks from 1984 to 2010, suggests that uncertainty leads to lower loan growth with smaller 
size of capitalisation banks being hit hardest.    
 
Volatility adversely affects profits, pricing strategy, investment, cash flow, balance sheet 
activities, and borrowing. The distortion of optimal equilibrium conditions reflected in 
amendments to capital/labour input decisions altering employment level. Firms facing 
uncertainties would prefer hedging options where they are available, but they are costly 
creating extra cost components and market rigidities.  Current trends dictate that even 
small sized firms are actively managing exchange rate risks where possible (Papaioannou 
(2006)). Solakoglu and Demir (2009) show for a Turkish case that most firms successfully 





The impact of exchange rate uncertainty on export and import functions determination has 
been identified by a number of studies under conditions of open economy and free trade 
(Arize et.al (2008), McKenzie and Brooks (1997), Pozo (1992), Qian and Varangis (1994), 
Sauer and Bohara (2001)).  Continuous adjustments in export or import functions imply 
variability in demand schedule, costs of production and changes in pricing behaviour.  
 
Empirical results of exchange rate volatility effect on trade are sensitive to the type of 
volatility measures, nature of exchange rate measure, number of countries and framework 
model used.  
 
The study of Akhtar and Hilton (1984) used the standard deviation of daily observations of 
effective nominal exchange rate index within three months periods. Effective exchange 
rate index was obtained by trade weighting bilateral exchange rate of nine trading partners 
for the US and thirteen for Germany. It has been fount that, during the period of 1974 to 
1981, exchange rate variability has reduced the volume of trade.  Gotur (1985) used 
standard deviation of daily observations within each quarter to measure volatility of 
exchange rate. He extends Akhtar and Hilton (1984) study to include bilateral exchange 
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rates for 18 industrial countries over the period of 1973-1984. Findings question the 
robustness of previous results, as no adverse effects of volatility on German import 
volumes or export/import prices have been found. However, adverse effects of volatility on 
German export levels have been recorded together with positive effects of volatility on the 
US export volume. Similarly, positive effect of exchange rate volatility on the US export 
prices has been found that could indirectly lead to decrease in export volumes.  
 
The study of Bailey et. al. (1986) looked at the relationship between exchange-rate 
variability and trade performance of the big seven industrial countries (Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, U.K., and the U.S.) during the period of 1973 Q1 to 1984 Q3. The 
choice of the data period is not random, and has been done because of two reasons.  First, 
1973 is the official abandonment of Bretton-Woods system. Second, as some of the 
countries already allowed their exchange rate to float prior to the breakdown of the fixed 
exchange rate system, there were no data points lost during the derivation of the volatility 
measure. Volatility measure used was absolute value of the quarterly percentage change in 
the nominal effective (trade-weighted) exchange rate. Contrary to the findings of Akhtar 
and Hilton (1984), this study has not found any evidence for the negative effect of 
exchange rate variability and trade. Authors explain it by the time period that has been 
chosen, and blame adverse effects of trade on exchange rate regime rather than volatility of 
it. 
 
Kenen and Rodrik (1986) proposed three measures of short-term exchange rate volatility 
based on the assumption that economic agents are risk averse (i.e. all of the measures are 
quadratic). First they use moving sample standard deviation of the monthly percentage 
change in exchange rates. Second and third measures are based on residuals collected from 
a log linear trend equation and a first order autoregressive equation respectively. All of the 
measures have two variations for 12 and 24 months and employ the real effective exchange 
rate index, derived by deflating bilateral rates by consumer-price indexes. The ten 
countries covered by the study are: US, Canada, Japan, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK in the quarterly range of 1975 Q1 through to 
1984 Q3. When deriving the exchange rate indices countries are treated symmetrically and 
depend on a common in sample set of bilateral rates. Depressing effect of exchange rate 
variability on trade volumes has been found where 24 months based measures gave more 
significant results than the 12 months ones.  
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Perée and Steiner (1989) used a volatility measure based on the maximum and minimum 
values of nominal exchange rate alone, with an improved measure that uses the integral of 
misalignment, and thus takes into account the duration of spread. For the equilibrium value 
of exchange rate they used equilibrium rates computed by Williamson (1985). The 
empirical estimation of export equations for the industrial countries (Belgium, Germany, 
Japan, UK, USA) is based on the annual data for the period of 1960 through to 1985. 
Maximum and minimum values are computed for backwards periods of 10, 5 and 3 years. 
Study concludes that it did not come up to a “proper” measure of uncertainty as none of the 
proposed measures denominate. However, this underlines the importance of past peak 
values in the measures and invites further research into the area for the measures to be 
improved.      
 
Cho et al. (2002) used two volatility measures in their panel data research of agricultural 
trade determinants covering ten developed countries in the period of 1974-1995. The ten 
sample countries are: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Switzerland, UK, and the US. Volatility of exchange rate was approximated by the moving 
sample standard deviation of the first difference of the real exchange rate over the prior ten 
years. A second measure used was a Perée and Steinherr proposed measure of volatility, 
Vt, where the equilibrium exchange rate was defined as mean value of exchange rate over 
the past 10 years. The measure is calculated using the bilateral exchange rates on a yearly 
basis with a memory of 10 years prior to observation. Regressions using both measures 
gave similar results - uncertainty has a negative impact on trade. However, the results 
based on the Perée and Steinherr (1989) measure were weaker in terms of significance and 
magnitude of coefficients. 
 
Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978) studied the effect of exchange rate uncertainty on trade on 
the case of the US and German exports to a set of their trading partners – France, Japan, 
U.K., and Canada during the period of 1965 Q1 through to 1975 Q4. They used three 
volatility measures. First and second measures are 13 weeks moving standard deviation of 
the spot rate and forward rate.  And third one is average absolute difference of the current 
spot rate and its previous period forward within the 13 weeks period. The latter one 
appeared to be the best indicator for risk, as it yielded the largest number of both the 
significant estimation coefficients and best-fit equations. Empirical results suggest that 
currency risk had a significant impact on price of tradables.  However, this appeared to be 
insignificant in determining volumes of trade. One of the explanations for unexpected 
result could be presence of inelastic demand for imports and exports then changes in price 
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would be associated with almost negligible changes in quantity. Thursby and Thursby 
(1987) in their study of 16 OECD countries and South Africa find that exchange rate 
variability adversely affects volume of trade. The volume of trade is significantly affected 
in most cases with its magnitude depending on the elasticity of demand and supply 
functions. As well, recent studies of Hudson and Straathof (2010) proved the negative 
effect of volatility on trade. However, they claim that after 1985, the negative effect of 
uncertainty on trade is diminishing because of developments in financial derivatives 
especially over the counter currency swaps.    
 
Diminishing effects of uncertainty could be as well a consequence of production cost 
structures.  Aabo et. al (2010) find that for medium sized manufacturing firms in a small 
open economy (here Denmark) imports play the role of substitutes for financial hedging. 
Furthermore, studies by Greenaway et al. (2010) for the UK during 1989-2004 find a 
negative effect of exchange rates on exports that is lighter in industries that import their 
production inputs. 
 
Cushman (1983) extends the model of Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978) by enlarging the time 
span by adding the floating period. Negative effect of exchange rate variability on trade 
volume is found. The difference in results of the studies is attributed either to the use of 
real rather than nominal exchange rate or to the measure of volatility used. The studies of 
Thursby and Thursby (1987) found that mostly test results are indistinguishable between 
real and nominal volatility measures. Cushman (1983) finds that exchange rate effects on 
trade parameters tend to be lagged and uses a more long-term volatility to account for 
them. Akhtar and Hilton (1984) argue that it is not only the direct effect of uncertainty on 
trade that should be considered, and emphasise the need to consider the long-term indirect 
effects of exchange rate variability as well. De Grauwe (1987a) supports the view of 
Akhtar and Hilton (1984) and believes that exchange variability has prolonged effects on 
trade through its impact on protectionist policies. The more adverse is the effect of 
exchange rate variability on an economy’s output and unemployment the higher will be the 
tendency to implement protection policies.  Study uses long-run exchange rate variability 
to account for the changes in trade flows and demonstrates its negative effect on bilateral 
trade growth. It was found that around 20% of international trade slowdown from 1973 to 
1984 is due to exchange rate variability. 
 
Chowdhury (1993) used moving sample standard deviation of the growth rate of the real 
exchange rate, with lag length of 8 months. For the robustness test he also used alternative 
 27 
leg lengths of 4 and 12 months. Results based on both nominal and real exchange rates 
have been estimated. Study covers period of 1973Q1 to 1990Q4, after all the sample 
adjustments the estimation sample was reduced to 1976Q2 – 1990Q4. He finds negative 
effect of exchange rate variability on trade by the means of error correction models. They 
also blame the lack in previous studies of results significance for ignoring time series 
stochastic nature of the variables, for example not accounting for cointegration of series 
and stationarity.  
 
Pattichis (2003) argued the legitimacy of previous results on long run relationships 
between exchange rate variability and trade. His argument is based on the difference in the 
econometric nature of the variables that permits them only to cointegrating short-run 
dynamics in special cases.  De Vita and Abbott (2004 b) addressed the cointegration issues 
in their paper by employing the Johansen procedure and appraised the importance of the 
long-term volatility of exchange rate. The study finds that the volatility has a significant 
impact on the export function of the US to the rest of the world.  However, the magnitude 
and direction of the effect is heterogeneous across different market destination. 
 
A further argument on exchange rate variability effect on trade took a more technical 
aspect in the later literature. Major concerns are about the methodology of volatility 
estimation, addressing potential simultaneity bias and causality problems.  
 
More advanced models have been used to address the volatility. For example, Qian and 
Varangis (1994) used a multivariate ARCH-M model to test the relationship of exchange 
rate volatility on trade (i.e. if changes in the exchange rate volatility directly affect the 
trade volume) to escape the spurious regressions critique. ARCH-M model was 
constructed using real exports, real export’s price and exchange rate reduced form 
equations. In the first two equations, the exchange rate is included without any lag 
structure. It follows a random walk model and allows conditional variance measure to 
capture the unexpected volatility changes in exchange rate. The function of the conditional 
variance of one-step ahead exchange rate is included as an explanatory variable for real 
exports and price equations. Here the estimation is done using the iterative method rather 
than conditional log-likelihood functions and follows the Berndt et al. (1974) algorithm. 
The study covers data for Australia, Canada, Japan, UK, Netherlands and Sweden. It has 
been found that invoicing currency plays an important role in the direction of exchange 
rate volatility effect on trade. Exports invoiced in domestic producer’s currency are 
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positively affected by the exchange rate volatility, however once the invoicing currency 
changes to importers’ then effect becomes negative.  
 
Pozo (1992) studied exports from Britain to United States to analyse the effect of exchange 
rate volatility on trade in annual period range of 1900 to 1940. As a proxy to exchange rate 
volatility employed rolling standard deviation alongside with GARCH conditional 
variance. The first measure has been derived using monthly percentage changes in the real 
exchange rate during a period of one year. For the GARCH specification used the log 
difference of the exchange rate from the period of t to t-1. Interesting thing was that ARCH 
and GARCH effects were both present in the data, however as mentioned by Baillie and 
Bollerslev (1989) it is usually a privilege of series with a higher frequency like 
daily/weekly. Both measures produced similar results, indicating that exchange rate 
volatility adversely affects trade volumes. 
 
Dell’ariccia (1999) used three proxies for exchange rate variability in the panel data survey 
covering EU15 (data on Belgium and Luxembourg is combined in one whole observation) 
and Switzerland during a twenty-year period from 1975. The choice of panel data and 
instrumental variable techniques is not random. If OLS technique had to be used it will be 
hard to distinguish whether the results are due to agents’ risk aversion or central bank’s 
intervention. All the volatility measures in the paper are replicated using both nominal and 
real monthly end of period exchange rate data. The following methods are used in 
constructing the measures:  standard deviations of the first difference of the logarithmic 
exchange rate, the sum of squares of the forward error, the percentage difference between 
maximum and minimum of the nominal spot rate. Results are indicative of negative effect 
of exchange rate volatility on trade, and these results are robust after controlling for 
simultaneity bias. 
 
Sauer and Bohara (2001) have chosen panel data on ninety-one countries during the period 
of 1973-1993 for their study of exchange rate volatility effects on export. As a proxy for 
volatility of exchange rate, they used three alternative measures. ARCH (1) process was 
used to model volatility in logged real effective exchange rate, the choice of specification 
was justified as in the panel at least 64% had ARCH (1) effects. The other two models are: 
moving standard error from fitting AR (1) and quadratic trend model of logged real 
effective exchange rate, where rolling period for both models is 8. It was found that 
developing countries have much higher real exchange rate uncertainty than the developed 
ones, and among the less developed ones the highest volatility is found in Latin America 
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and Africa, the lowest in Asian countries. Fixed and random effects models have been used 
in the analyses. It has been found that the exchange rate volatility effect on exports is not 
uniform across geographical regions. For Asian, less developed countries, and 
industrialised countries there was no evidence found on the significance of the relationship. 




 Even though the nature of the relationship between exchange rate volatility and trade has 
not been universally established in the literature, most of studies would agree on the 
significance of such a relationship.  
 
What about trade-unemployment link?  Hungerford (1995) proposes a short run theoretical 
model based on the contract theories concept of worker attachment to the firms. In a model 
he assumes that equilibrium conditions are determined by domestic and foreign demand 
supply functions. Shifts from equilibrium will occur in the presence of shocks that include 
trade tariffs, exchange rate fluctuations, consumers’ preference changes and input prices 
variability. Firms will hire or lay off workers depending on the nature of shocks. The 
methodology of the paper is based on an endogenous switching probit model to study the 
incidence of layoffs in US manufacturing industry between 1980 and 1985. He finds that in 
the short run there is no impact of trade on unemployment. This is viewed by the author as 
a domestic phenomenon.   
 
Ribeiro et. al (2004) studies the impact of trade liberalisation on employment in Brazil 
during the period of 1991-1998. Following trade liberalisation at the beginning of 1990s 
employment in manufacturing industries decreased significantly. Studies have found that 
trade liberalisation had a net negative impact on aggregate employment growth as it 
triggered only job destruction. Devaluation of domestic currency had a significant positive 
impact on net aggregate employment by increasing job creation. However, it is not strong 
enough to offset the import penetration impact. A 10% increase in current value of import 
penetration leads to decrease in employment growth of 0.57% whereas a 10% decrease in 
value of currency implies increase in net employment by only 0.27%.   
 
The literature review on the trade – unemployment link gave rather mixed results. Still 
based on the empirical findings of the studies we would assume that employment level is 
negatively affected by free trade and its interaction with other policies (i.e. minimum 
 30 
wages policy Davis (1998)). It was decided to rely on the results of the studies based on 
the long-run models as due to market rigidities (such as sticky wages, hiring, firing costs) 
labour markets will need time to adjust.  
 
Concluding, trade is one of the possible channels for explanation on how exchange rate 
variability can affect the unemployment level. Exchange rates having a significant impact 
on trade will alter the unemployment level. Due to the unambiguous effect of exchange 
rate variability on trade we can only assume that the relationship between the variables 
exists. However, based on the previous studies no conclusion s can be drawn on the 




Investment decisions are affected by uncertainty. Pindyck and Solimano (1993) estimated 
the effect of exchange rate variability on investment as a proportion of GDP by using a 
fixed effects panel regression. Low inflation and high inflation countries are considered 
during the period of 1960-1990. In a case of low inflation countries (France, Germany, 
Japan, Netherlands, UK and US), the exchange rate volatility had a significant negative 
effect on total investment in two out of three specifications, and on private investment in 
three out of six specifications. For high inflation countries (Latin America and Israel) 
exchange rate variability had a significant effect on total investment in all three of the 
specifications illustrated in the paper and significant negative effect on private investment 
only in one specification out of six possible ones. Aizenman and Marion (1999) find that 
the volatility of exchange rate is highly negatively correlated with private investment, 
which is measured as a share of GDP, for 46 countries during the years of 1970-1992. 
Results of the analysis (sample restricted to 43 countries) suggest that exchange rate 
volatility has negative significant effect on private investment, and positive significant 
effect on public investment. Results are not significant for regressions where the dependent 
variable is total investment.   
 
Goel and Ram (2007) on a sample of 12 OECD countries show that the uncertainty effect 
is different for different types of investment. Their study uses stock return volatility as a 
proxy for uncertainty. The degree of irreversibility of investment matters for the 
significance and magnitude of the impact.  Investments with higher irreversibility (fixed 
capital formation) are more affected by uncertainty than with less  (inventory investment). 
As well private investments are more adversely affected by an increase in volatilities.   
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Authors conclude that investment types should be differentiated in search of uncertainty 
effect otherwise conclusions will be washed off. Lensink and Murinde (2007) study gives 
rise to nonlinear relationship between uncertainty and investments for the UK market. 
They introduce a threshold level of uncertainty that is critical to investors’ behaviour and 
gives support for the U shape hypothesis.  Schmidt and Broll (2009) analyse the impact of 
exchange rate uncertainty on FDI flows in the US. Their study covers nine US industry 
FDI outflows to Japan, Germany, UK, Canada, France and Italy during the period of 1984-
2004. Adverse effect of exchange rate uncertainty on FDI outflows was estimated using a 
standard deviation based measure of volatility. When using alternative measure of 
volatility, the estimated effect is still negative for manufacturing sectors but positive for 
non-manufacturing ones. Furthermore, the empirical result of Wang et. al. (2011) using the 
Dow Jones Index companies is evident that they will decrease investment under increased 
uncertainty. However, where there is a lower exchange rate and interest exposure 
,companies tend to draw their finances from overseas entities by debt issuance in order to 
finance their investment projects.       
 
Kandilov and Leblebicioglu (2011) estimate the effect of exchange rate volatility on plant-
level investment for Colombia during the period of 1981-1987. They find that using 
GARCH and standard deviation based measures of exchange rate volatility there is a 
highly significant negative relationship between the variables of interest. Using a GARCH 
based measure, their research revealed that a 1% increase in conditional volatility reduces 
investment by 0. 39%. And a one standard deviation decrease in volatility induces an 
increase in investment level by 12%. Whereas using alternative measure of volatility it was 
estimated that 1% increase in volatility leads to 0.18% decline in investment levels.     
 
Escaleras and Kottaridi (2014) study the effect of macroeconomic uncertainty on private 
investment using a panel of 37 developing countries during 1970-2000. Macroeconomic 
uncertainty in the research is presented by exchange rate and inflation volatilities. They 
find strong evidence of an adverse effect of exchange rate volatility on private investment, 
whereas evidence for inflation volatility is much weaker. Similar results are obtained for 
non-linearity where quadratic forms of uncertainty are assumed. 
 
2.1.3 Summary of theoretical and empirical findings on the indirect links. 
 
Both theoretical and empirical reviews have been evident of uncertainty having impact on 
a firm’s fundamental decisions. Theoretical findings assume that uncertainty creates an 
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additional component to the cost function. This, then, translates into pricing strategy, and 
distorts optimal price and output level. Empirical findings suggest that it affects a firm’s 
cash flows and its value. This in turn affects its borrowing, investment and trade activities. 
All of these leads to alteration in optimal capital labour ratio, thus changing unemployment 
level.  
 
However, neither theoretical nor empirical studies reach consensus on the nature of this 
amendment to the unemployment level. The reason for this lies in theoretical assumptions 
behind the models considered. So, direction of the effect will depend on source of 
uncertainty, risk nature of the shareholders, market conditions, elasticity of demand, 
market rigidities and nature of a firm’s operations.  
 
2.2 Macroeconomic volatilities effect on unemployment. 
 
2.2.1 Theoretical foundations: investment theory approach 
 
Dixit (1989a) draws parallels between decision in financial market to invest and in labour 
markets to hire. Before any decision is made he assumes in both cases analysis is made on 
the basis of option valuation. Similarly to set up costs in investment - hiring a worker 
implies fixed and variable costs. Sunk costs are associated with recruitment, training and 
redundancy, and wage is a variable cost whereas return to investment is related to 
individual’s productivity. Belke and Setzer (2003) take Dixit’s (1989a) idea further and 
develop a model explaining exchange rate variability impact on job creation. They 
introduce a 3-period fixed model where an export-orientated firm decides whether to create 
a job. Once a working place is created, a worker will be recruited for the consecutive 
period(s) and the output will be realised. There is no firing of a worker before the date of 
contract termination. We will follow Belke and Setzer(2003), Belke and Kaas (2004), and 
Belke (2005) model here. However, for comfort we use different notation from the 
original. It is assumed that firms are risk-neutral and therefore bear all the exchange rate 
risk. Now we can derive the expected profits if a firm decides to enter a project at the first 
or second period, starting with the earlier case. Expected return to project in any of the 
periods 2 and 3 is the difference between price, p*, and variable costs, w. Expected net 
profit for project is the sum of expected returns on project in both periods adjusted for 
firms bargaining position, 1-β, and sunk costs:  
 
 𝐸(𝑃1) = 2𝜋(1 − 𝛽) − 𝑐𝑠, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜋𝑖 = 𝜌𝑖
∗ − 𝑤𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 = 2, 3.             
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If firm takes the option to wait and enters project only in the second stage then there should 
be some benchmark value of the exchange rate that should be fulfilled. This value can be 
found at a point where firm will be indifferent between undertaking the project in period 2 
or not, i.e. firm’s expected profits will be zero: 
 
𝐸(𝑃𝑐) = (𝜋 + 𝑒𝑏)(1 − 𝛽) − 𝑐𝑠 = 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛  𝑒𝑏 =
𝑐𝑠
1−𝛽
− 𝜋.  
 
If actual volatility in period 2 is the benchmark level of volatility only then a job will be 
created potentially adding ((𝜋 + 𝑒2)(1 − 𝛽) − 𝑐𝑠) value to a firm and a one period wage 
pay to employee. If expectations are not realised then a job is not created and nothing is 
gained.   
 
Expected unconditional return to the project is based on sensitivity analysis and includes 
the probabilities of realisation of expected exchange rate volatility in period 2, σ2: 
 
𝐸(𝑃2) =  





Firms will be more reluctant to hire and prefer to wait until more information is gathered 
on exchange rate behaviour if expected net profits in period 2 will be larger in contrast to 
the first period. That is where 𝐸(𝑃2) > 𝐸(𝑃1). Thus, estimated value of a decision to enter 
is directly related to volatility of exchange rate implying that with high volatility in place 
firms are better off deterring from actions in period one. Firms will be indifferent in which 
period to enter at the point where expected profits from two decisions are the same:  
 
𝜎2








If the realised volatility of the exchange rate in period 2 is greater than the threshold value 
estimated above then firms will be reluctant to hire. From the threshold value we can see 
how exchange rate volatility theoretically interacts with other micro indicators. The 
negative effect of volatility on job creation will be amplified in cases where employees are 
dominant in bargaining power, high hiring and redundancy costs, and high reservation 
 34 
wages. Even though wages are not directly present in the equation, recall from assumptions 
that profit in any period is the change in prices and wages: 
 
𝜎2
𝑏 = 3(𝑝 − 𝑤) −
𝑐𝑠
1 − 𝛽





Dominant employee bargaining power is usually associated with the presence of strong 
trade unions power. Whereas high wages are created on the basis of high unemployment 
benefits and minimum wages, high sunk costs arise in places with strict employment 
protection legislation policies. We need to underline one of the major findings of the Belke 
and Setzer (2003) study is that firms in their decisions will be sensitive to short-term 
volatilities, i.e. period 2 volatility. This is very important as short-term volatility can 
induce long-term fallbacks in the system.    
 
OECD countries being the focus of a study mostly employs strict EPL policies, 
unemployment benefits, some having wages set in collective bargaining by unions and 
some by the means of minimum wages.  
 
However OECD (2010c) research showed that in OECD countries characterised by tough 
employment controls during crises companies, facing a need for more flexible labour, 
increased their labour shares in part-time employed. This structure allows being more 
flexible and efficient in cost cutting during periods of adjustment to economic 
disturbances. So the assumption of Belke and Setzer (2003) labour force being fixed for 
the whole period is very crude. 
 
Later studies of Belke and Kaas (2004) extended their initial model by relaxing the 
assumption of fixed labour force and redundancy barriers. Now firms sign binding 
agreements with employees only for one period. Under new model assumptions the 
expected return if firm enters in period one is given by the function: 
 
𝐸(𝑃1) = {
















If volatility of exchange rate in the second period is within the expectations, i.e. less than 
the profits from period one, then the firm is expected to keep its operations running into the 
third period. In this case expected value that a firm could gain during three periods of 
business is the same as in the general case. If volatility changes in period 2 are not 
plausible then it becomes unprofitable for both parties to keep the contract. However, the 
expected value of a firm in this case changes from the extended model. This is due to the 
fact that now firms can choose whether to keep the labour force, or to terminate the 
contract. Therefore, the expected value of a firm will be the sum of potential profits from 
period 2 and the weighted average of two options.          
 
In the case of a second strategy, where a firm decides to wait and see what happens with 
the volatility, expected firm’s profits are given by: 
 








































If volatility does not overweight profits adjusted to a share of fixed costs then firms are 
willing to hire if expected profits are positive. However, if volatility is greater in 
magnitude than the profits deducted by a share of fixed costs, then expected profits would 
be largely subject to volatility. 
 





| : Here firms will choose to hire an employee for two contractual periods (2 
and 3). This result is justified by comparison of expected payoff values from available 
options. In this case firm will be willing to create job and will have no incentive to destroy 
it in the next period.  
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| < σ2 < 𝝅: here a job is always created in period one by firms, however it is not 
clear whether it will be kept for the third period.    
 
𝐸(𝑃1) > 𝐸(𝑃2) 
 
2π(1-β) − 𝑐𝑠 > (1-β) [







Equation holds at endpoints of the interval as well σ2< |𝜋 −
𝑐𝑠
1−𝛽
| is concave. Therefore, it 
should hold for the whole interval. So here firms will keep their labour force for the two 
consequent periods after recruitment. 
 
σ2 > 𝝅: Here companies are willing to hire in period one however there is a probability of 
𝜎2−𝜋
2𝜎2
 that job destruction takes place after period 2.  
 
Summing up, Belke and Kaas (2004) show that in the presence of minimal fixed costs, jobs 
are always created independent of exchange rate volatility levels. However, exchange rate 




employees becoming redundant. 
 
 
2.2.2 Empirical results of macroeconomic variables effect on unemployment. 
 
Belke and Gross (2001) estimate the impact of exchange rate volatility on employment, 
unemployment and investment levels during the period of 1973-1996 for 11 EU countries 
(Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (West Germany), Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and United Kingdom). Results of baseline regressions, using 
OLS technique and for unemployment rate being a dependent variable, are in line with 
expectations for all countries. Coefficients of the level of exchange rate variability are 
significant at least at the 10% significance level for all countries. However, the same 
technique applied to employment rate shows different results. In case of Ireland a positive 
sign is obtained instead of the expected one and in case of Denmark significance of the 
result is lost. Authors interpret unforeseen result for Ireland by the fact that its national 
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currency was fixed to British pound until 1979. An attempt to correct the sample by 
limiting it to the floating period of 1980-1993 came successful, and the result became 
insignificant. Robustness tests were performed using OLS to check the validity of the 
results. Regressions are limited to employment being dependent variable only and control 
variables are extended to include intra-ERM exchange rate volatility, interest rate spread, 
GDP growth, and change in short-term interest rate. Intra-ERM exchange rate volatility 
appeared to be statically significant (at least 10% significance level) for all countries 
including Ireland and Denmark. In line with previous results negative impact of exchange 
rate volatility on employment is estimated for all countries except Italy. Results for the 
inclusion of further control variables are less universal but are still strong for some 
countries in accordance with specifications. Once SUR technique is used, exchange rate 
volatility impact on unemployment becomes highly significant (1% significance level) 
with expected sign direction in all cases except for the unemployment rate in Italy. 
Employment and investment regressions under SUR estimation reveal more significant 
results as well. Significance of the latter is evident for investment being one of the pass 
through channels between exchange rate volatility and unemployment. Further studies of 
Belke and Gross (2002) extend the sample across the Atlantic to include US data in 
addition to “Euroland” countries. “Euroland “countries comprise Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany (West Germany), Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and 
Finland. Data range for the analysis varied slightly depending on the measures of volatility 
used, but in general it gives picture for the period starting with 1980 for the first 
observation at the latest and ending with year 1999. Baseline specifications show that 
impact of exchange rate variability has long-term effects on employment in Euroland 
countries but not for the US. In Europe, an increase of one percentage point in variability 
of exchange rate reduces employment rate by 1.01% in first year, 0.93% in the second 
year, and further 1.44% in the third year. Results are striking especially if we take into 
account their high statistical significance (1% significance level.). Analogous, 
specifications for the US gave no similar result, as exchange rate variability is not 
significant. For unemployment rate results differ, as in the case of US reduction in 
exchange rate variability by one percentage point reduces employment in the first year by 
0.57% (result is significant at 1% level). European unemployment is more long-term 
sensitive to exchange rate variability where a one percentage point increase in exchange 
rate variability is associated with only a 0.47% rise in unemployment level in the first year 
(10% significance level) and is followed by a further 0.9% in the third year (1% 
significance level). The difference across Euroland and the US can be explained by the 
difference in labour market policies and rigidities (i.e. recruitment and redundancy costs 
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levels). The study of Belke and Setzer (2003) uses a panel of Visegrad countries during the 
years to see whether the established exchange rate volatility – labour market performance 
relationship holds. Visegrad countries include Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the 
Slovak Republic. Data covers a 10-year period of monthly observations during the years 
1991-2001. The regressions account for business cycle variations and are estimated using 
either feasible GLS or SUR techniques. Exchange rate volatility has a significant impact 
on unemployment in a majority of regressions. Fixed effects estimation reveals that short-
term volatility of exchange rate has an impact on the long-run values of unemployment 
rate with economies of Poland and the Slovak Republic being mostly affected. Belke and 
Kaas (2004) expand previous research implications further eastward and add to the sample 
of four Visegrad countries of Belke and Setzer (2003), six Central and Eastern European 
countries. These are Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovenia. Baseline 
results suggest that exchange rate variability enters equations with a two-year lag, 
indicating that labour market rigidities (i.e. labour contracts) slow the adjustment process. 
Exchange rate variability estimated coefficients exhibit expected sign in all regressions and 
yield significant results in a majority of equations. According to the specification, Baltic 
States labour markets are the most sensitive to exchange rate variability. CEEC countries 
are a too heterogeneous group to have a common coefficient for exchange rate volatility, 
and researchers use a more generalised specification. Heterogeneity among countries can 
arise due to differences among labour markets or historical exchange rate volatility. Under 
new specification it was found that exchange rate volatility has impact on labour market 
with one lag, except for Slovenia. The Slovenian labour market shows no signs of 
exposure to exchange rate variability. 
 
The study of Jung (1996) examines if there is a causal relationship between exchange rate 
volatility and unemployment using Granger causality tests. West Germany case is used for 
the period of 1977 to 1995 to avoid potential structural breaks associated with Germany 
reunification. Results of Belke and Gross (1996) were not confirmed and inverse causal 
relationship was found between exchange rate volatility and unemployment. Volatility was 
derived using daily standard deviation of exchange rate. Unexpected results can be 
explained by the misspecification of regression equation, as relationship is more complex 
involving a number of fundamentals.  
 
Buscher and Mueller (1999) investigate models proposed by Belke and Gross (1996) and 
Jung (1996) and extend them in search of a universal conclusion. Drawing on potential 
limitations of previous studies they use a number of volatility measures on a monthly and 
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annual frequency data. Volatility of German Deutsche Mark is at the heart of the analysis 
with its bilateral weights against five representative currency groups – EU14, EMS, 
Representative countries, Peripheral countries and Core countries. Evidence in favour of 
positive relationship between volatility of exchange rate and unemployment rate was 
found, using annual and monthly data from 1973-1997. However, using annual data yields 
specifications with lesser magnitude of volatility on labour market performance.  
 
Chang et. al. (2007) extended the research area in two ways. First, list of countries studied 
includes Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea. This is contrary to developed economies that 
have been previously employed by researchers. Second, on a technical part of the analysis 
they use bivariate GARCH-in-Mean structure to model unemployment exchange rate 
volatility relationship. It is found that the lagged exchange rate has no impact on the 
unemployment rate in all three countries under consideration. The positive impact of 
exchange rate uncertainty on the unemployment rate has been found for all three countries. 
However, for the Singapore economy it is the weakest of all. Chang and Shen (2011) have 
come back to the question of exchange rate volatility and unemployment interrelationships 
for the three Asian economies. GARCH-in-mean structure with GARCH (1,1) has been 
used again, but this time analysis is relied heavily on Generalised Impulse Response 
Functions. It has been shown that exchange rate uncertainty shock is persistent for the 
Taiwan economy, quickly dies out in the case of South Korea and has powerful initial 
impact on Singaporean economy that decays with time.           
 
The study of Demir (2010) examines exchange rate volatility effects on employment 
growth in Turkey. The novelty of the research is in two details. First of all, the country of 
interest is Turkey that has not been considered before for this problem. Secondly, 
employment growth regression is based on Cobb-Douglas production function, as this 
study looks at question of employment from a microeconomics perspective. Findings 
suggest that exchange rate volatility has a negative impact on employment growth in the 
manufacturing sector for the years 1983-2005. Furthermore at firm level it was found that a 
rise in export share operations and leverage ratios increases the magnitude of adverse 
effects associated. 
 
Feldmann (2011) discusses exchange rate volatility effect on unemployment for 17 
industrial countries. GARCH (1,1) volatility measure of exchange rate is being used. 
Estimators based on fixed effects or random effects are suggestive of volatility having 
positive effect on unemployment.  
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Feldmann (2012) studies inflation volatility effect on unemployment of 20 industrial 
countries. This is the front page of the research on the area as it is the first one afield. 
Inflation volatility has been approximated by rolling standard deviation by the means of 
two distinct short-run and long-run measures that are used simultaneously in the regression 
analysis. Results indicate that inflation volatility has small, but persistent effect on the 
unemployment rates.  
 
2.2.3 Summary of previous findings on macroeconomic volatility and unemployment level.  
 
In general, empirical findings of previous researches are evident of macroeconomic 
volatilities increasing unemployment level. Belke and Setzer (2003), pioneers in 
theoretical framework in the field, explain lower unemployment levels by exchange rate 
volatility dumping job creation levels. All of the previous studies agree on the small 




Based on previous empirical results it is expected of macroeconomic volatility to increase 
unemployment level. Regarding other labour market performance indicators, we built the 
hypothesis based on theoretical findings of Belke and Setzer (2003). They state that 
volatility decreases job creation rates. Fewer jobs to offer at the labour market are to be 
associated with longer unemployment spells, higher number of discouraged workers, and 
lower labour force participation rates. 
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Chapter 3. Data Construction and Sources.  
Labour market performance model has been built following the intuition of Nickel (1998) 
and Nickel and Layard (1999). In cases of group specific labour market performance 
composition suggestions of Bassanini and Duval (2006b) additional variable construction 
has been adapted for the current research. While almost all of the dependent and control 
variables’ construction and sources are described in this chapter, volatility measures 
derivations are discussed in great detail in chapters 4 to 6 of the thesis. Not all of the 
variables as initially planned have been included in the analysis. Main reasons behind the 
decision are low data availability rates and change of variables definitions.  
 
3.1 Dependent variables:  labour market performance indicators 
 
 Employment Rate measures 
 
We included a number of variables to measure labour market performance. One of the 
orthodox ways to measure labour market performance is to control directly for the 
employment situation. Here we used aggregate employment, total and civilian 
unemployment indicators.  Aggregate employment data has been obtained from OECD 
Labour Force Statistics (LFS) by sex and age where it is calculated as the employment to 
population ratio. According to the LFS definition employed persons are those who work at 
least one hour per week, disregarding whether they paid for it or not (i.e. this includes 
unpaid family workers).  
 
Data availability for employment rate is poor.  It does not cover the whole period 
considered here of 1985 onwards. Extent of this can be seen from Table 3-1, where 
summary statistics for the variables is present. There are only 339 observations available 
for employment rate. One can compare it to unemployment rate series, which data sample 
has 572 data points. Average employment rate among the series is 58.14%. Observing 
employment rate country plots can give more detail (Appendix A2.2). Highest employment 
rate is found in Norway (71.9%), it is of no surprise, as this is the country with highest 
average employment rate. Country with the lowest rate of employment is Italy. It has both 
– minimum employment rate observation and lowest employment rate on average. 
Looking back at the graphs, France is the country with lowest variability in employment 
rate and New Zealand with the highest. But these results are very biased as they are subject 
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to data points available. France has only eleven points representing the more stable period 
in labour markets of 2000s. New Zealand’s sample number of observations is 28. 
Hopefully, unemployment rate series would bring more clarity to the labour market 
description questions as they have more observations. 
 
In relation to the unemployment data, LFS defines unemployed persons as those who are 
currently unemployed but economically active. The importance of the above is that 
discouraged workers are not included in the series as unemployed as they are classified as 
economically inactive. Thus care should be taken in discussion of the results of 
institutional policies that affect a labour market performance to avoid misleading 
interpretation. For example, a decrease in both of the rates of taxation and unemployment 
benefits increases incentives of job search for discouraged workers. Thus, increasing 
numbers of the economically active in the short term. This will lead to an increase in the 
unemployment rate when institutional policies change, at the same time this link could 
have been erroneously interpreted as a negative relation between the variables. Aggregate 
unemployment data were taken from OECD LFS by sex and age and is measured as 
unemployed to labour force ratio in percentage units. Civilian Unemployment rate was 
obtained from the OECD Annual Labour Force Statistics, where it is defined as the rate of 
unemployment as a share of civilian labour force for those of working age, 15-64 years. 
Civilian Labour Force is a better indicator, as it does not include armed forces. Army 
personnel are generally less sensitive to the disturbances in institutional policies and 
macroeconomic indicators.  
 
Contrary to employment rate series, there is a better data availability for unemployment 
rate series for all countries. On average unemployment rate for 20 OECD countries is at 
7.4% (Table 3-1).  Looking at the unemployment rate series plots (Appendix A2.1), it can 
be seen that this mean value is not true for all the countries. For economies of Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, Germany, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, UK and US average 
unemployment rate values lie within the range of 6.14%-8.4%. Austria, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland economies are characterised by low unemployment 
rates. Minimum value in the dataset of 0.5% of unemployment rate belongs to Switzerland, 
country with smallest average unemployment rate at 2.84% among twenty countries 
considered here.  However, lowest standard deviation value attributes to Austria. So, 
according to standard deviation, there is less variability in unemployment rate of Austria 
among the twenty OECD countries.  
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Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy and Spain are characterised by higher 
unemployment rate on average. Unemployment rate plots (Appendix A2.1) would help to 
see whether this is a consequence of outliers or is it genuinely higher unemployment rates. 
For Belgium, France and Italy unemployment rates always varied around 10% mark. For 
Spain, Ireland and Finland unemployment rates picture is different, its much more volatile. 
Spain is the country with highest average unemployment rate of 17.38%. Not a surprise, 
maximum value of unemployment rate of 26.2% belongs to Spain as well as this is the 
country with highest volatility of unemployment. Unemployment rate there has always 
been high during the period except in 2000s when it was gradually reduced on average by 
10%. However, after the crisis of 2008 control over unemployment rates was lost and rates 
shoot of.  Second most volatile unemployment rates are in Ireland. This country is 
characterised by high unemployment rates on average at 10.8% during the period. Similar 
to Spain, country experienced reduced rates in 2000s but after the financial crisis 
unemployment rates increased. Contrary to Spain, unemployment rates in Ireland have 
been reduced after 2012. Finland’s economy experienced high unemployment rates and 
volatility. However, once they were reduced in 2000s it managed to control them even 
through the financial crisis.   
 
But, using LFS data series for panel data is not always beneficial for the research where 
international comparison is at the centre of the analysis. Disadvantage of the above 
described LFS data variables is difference in timing of data collection and its publishing 
across countries. The best way to treat this problem is to use the seasonally adjusted 
Harmonised Unemployment Rates available from OECD employment database, LFS – 
MEI (Main Economic Indicators). Unemployment rate is given as a percentage share of 
unemployed to civilian labour force. Harmonised unemployment rates are calculated by 
Eurostat for EU member countries and Norway, Canada, US, Australia, Japan, New 
Zealand and Switzerland. The OECD uses data from the National Statistics Offices (NSO). 
Definitions of unemployment series follow ILO guidance with one exception - surveys 
covered only include household members and do not take into account those living in 
institutions.   
 
Appendix A2.1 represents comparative graph of both of the series – unemployment rate 
(ALFS) and harmonised unemployment rate.  Initial observation is that not for all countries 
there is difference between the two indicators. For Australia, Canada, Japan and US, series 
have similar number of observation and very close statistical properties. Contrary to that, 
number of observations available for Switzerland changes dramatically once ALFS derived 
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indicator is changed to the harmonised unemployment rate. Loss of observations is equal 
to twenty-five points out of twenty-nine. Observations loss for other countries is 
comparatively less (e.g. Austria loses seven observations and Germany six). As well, from 
the graph it can be seen that major divergence of the series’ plots is attributed to the period 
of 1985 to 2000.  After the 2000s the differences between the series are minimal and series 
converge to one value. This convergence can be explained by development of better data 
collection skills. Thus, with time there is higher quality data available irrespective of which 
indicator is being used.   
 
Another point worth to mention is that variability of harmonised unemployment rate series 
is smaller than in the case of its alternative. However, it could be a consequence of 
harmonised unemployment rate series covering less data points that lie at the beginning of 
a sample. And, from data plots, it can be seen that unemployment rates towards 1985 end 
were more volatile.  
 
 Labour force participation rate 
 
Another way to control for labour market performance is to look at the changes in the 
Labour Force participation rate (LFPR).  It provides an opportunity to see how 
macroeconomic variables or institutional policies stimulate labour supply and their effect 
on voluntary unemployment. Low participation rates reduce labour inputs in the economy, 
thus reducing overall economy output. Meanwhile the unemployment rate indicator may 
not signal any critical disturbances in the labour market. However, dynamics of LFPR 
variable in this case can be evidence of continuous labour force withdrawal. For the 
robustness checks, using labour force participation rate in conjunction with unemployment 
rate results, it will be a good idea not to miss any labour force hysteresis effects. Data 
series were obtained from OECD LFS by sex and age, where it was calculated as a 
percentage ratio of labour force to population.  
 
Activity rates are another alternative to LFPR variable. It is found as a ratio of active 
population that is defined as a sum of numbers of employed and unemployed to workforce 
that is defined as a sum of active and inactive population. This variable contains in the 
relatively new dataset provided by OECD called Short-term Labour Market Statistics. It 
provides data similar to ALFS based on 34 countries. Activity Rates variable has been used 
where possible as it is also available for different labour market participating groups 
according to their age and sex. But in cases where the number of observations available is 
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significantly lower or missing, LFPR variable has been used instead (e.g. for older and 
retiring population groups statistics).  
 
Activity rates series have plotted in Appendix A2.3. 
 
 Duration of unemployment 
 
Unemployment duration provides a good indicator of how long unemployment spells are 
and how quickly do market participants exit unemployment. It is a particularly useful 
instrument in examining active and passive labour market policies and in drawing up 
consequences of economic shocks. For the research OECD the duration of unemployment 
variable has been used. This variable is subdivided into 5 groups according to the 
unemployment duration period- less than one month, 1-3months, 3-6 months, 6-12 months 
and more than 12 months. For the analysis variables with duration of unemployment up to 
6 months have been accumulated to get a variable of unemployment duration less than 6 
months. Please note that unemployment variable sums up across all of the periods up to 2 
years to 100%. As variables are complementary to 100%, then effect on those in 
unemployment for less than 6 months is opposite on those who are in employment for 
more than 6 months (but less than 2 years). Primary data was obtained from OECD ALFS 
dataset and is expressed as a percentage of unemployed. Series are plotted in Appendix 
A2.5. 
 
 Structural unemployment 
 
Non-accelerating inflation rate unemployment (NAIRU) variable was chosen to control for 
structural unemployment dynamics. Structural unemployment measure is crucial in 
assessing success of Active Labour Market Policies as they intend to reduce deterioration 
of the skills of unemployed and assist them with retraining. Total factor productivity 
shocks aftermath can be well studied by its effect on structural unemployment as well. 
NAIRU variable is available from OECD Economic Outlook database. 
 
Data availability for the NAIRU indicator is best as it has 589 observations (Table 3-1). 
Still, standard deviation of the series is much less than for the other unemployment 
indicators. Overall graphs in Appendix A2.4 look more flat with inflation adjustment than 
without. All of this is reflected, in the other data statistics, i.e. lower mean value and 
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smaller interval between minimum and maximum values. Lowest minimum value of 
0.99% belongs to Switzerland and highest value of 21.5% to Spain.    
 
 Discouraged workers. 
 
The number of discouraged workers indicator is firmly linked to labour force participation 
rates. While LFPR rates of workforce give us dynamics in numbers of active population, 
some of that population goes into employment but some of that population withdraws from 
the job search process. So to understand the case of crowding out effect in activity rates, 
one should have a look at discouraged workers indicator. It provides the number of people 
who involuntary left the labour market due to the jobs mismatch and their belief that 
employers in the labour market no longer require their skills. This variable and its 
importance have been first highlighted in OECD (1995) and since then have been regularly 
included into statistics supplements. Now it is available from the Labour Force Statistics of 
OECD. Here, indicator used compromises number of discouraged workers as a share of 
extended labour force that includes both active workforce and discouraged workers. Series 
have been plotted in Appendix A2.6 
 
3.2 Control variables: policy and institutional indicators 
 
 Tax wedge. 
 
Theoretical foundations. The tax wedge is a gap between the cost of labour to employer 
and actual wage income of the employee.  Tax wedges decrease purchasing power of 
employees, increase expected wages thus reducing labour force participation rates. This 
effect deepens in cases where there are high unemployment benefits present because they 
provide direct exit from employment and tend to prolong unemployment spells. Taxation 
will decrease the purchasing power of the employee and increase the reservation wages of 
the market participants. This will reduce labour supply, create inefficient job search and 
matching process. All of the above attributes to unemployment growth.    
 
Progressive and uniform taxes have different effect on unemployment. In the case of 
progressive taxation higher marginal utility of labour decreases with higher productivity, 
thus there will be diminishing returns for employees per extra hour of work taken. From 
the point of view of efficiency wages theory firms could increase wage levels so to 
increase productivity of employees. However, the desired effect will not be reached, as 
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associated increase in marginal cost of labour will not be matched by the same rise in wage 
pay. The competitive models mechanisms will not apply any longer as taxation drives a 
wedge between relative prices perceived by the market participants. Therefore, wages will 
have to go down as productivity will decrease and companies will have to employ more 
labour force in order to match the change in productivity of employees. This will increase 
employment in the economy but decrease labour costs and purchasing power of wages. 
(Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), p.764). 
 
In case of uniform taxation employees’ marginal utility of labour will be increasing 
uniformly with higher productivity, as there will be the same level of tax at all levels of 
productivity. Labour supply will still decrease with the tax incidence having negative 
effect on income, i.e. purchasing power of wages will decrease, and associated substitution 
effect will be still negative. Therefore, in contrast to the previous case employees will be 
motivated to take extra hours of work in order to compensate for the income loss due to tax 
incidence. Firms will not be willing to increase labour demand due to productivity gains of 
the existing labour force. However, they will increase wages to match the increase in 
productivity. Summing up the changes in labour supply schedule and increase in 
productivity of labour, steady state of the economy will appear at a lower employment 
level and higher wages, than the initial one (Salanie, 2003). 
 
The effect of taxation on unemployment is ambiguous and it depends mostly on the 
balance of income and substitution effects of taxation. Increase in taxation can generate 
income effect and increase labour supply, as households’ income will decrease. However, 
if taxes are great enough then they will contribute to large substitution effect that would 
decrease labour supply, as opportunity cost of options will go down. Taxation effects on 
the welfare of society including labour markets as one of the indicators cannot be 
considered in isolation of passive labour market policies, i.e. benefit system, as they are 
closely related by the dynamics of the economy and could imply indirect effects.   
 
Variable construction and sources.  
 
“Taxing Wedge from Taxing Wages Database”. Here we combined two sets of OECD 
data. First set is historical data series on total tax wedge inclusive of employer payroll 
taxes that goes back to 1977 (varies largely depending on country) but stops at 2004. It 
gives data for average tax rate for a married couple with one of the partners at work and 
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two kids. Second set used is a new dataset that goes back to 2000 and has all the most 
recent data observations. Definition of a family type for the new series is the same. 
 
The primary difference among definitions lies in the definition of the average worker. 
Historical data series assume that the average worker is a full-time manual worker in 
manufacturing sector, whereas an updated version recognises average wages as a 
combination of full-time manual, non-manual workers working in a range of sectors in the 
industry. Such a substantial change in definition has driven a dramatic difference across 
series of gross wage earnings. According to OECD (2005), the new definition implied 
change for the year 2004 observations of more than 20% for Austria, France, Portugal and 
United Kingdom, 15%-20% for Germany and Sweden, more than 15% for US, and more 
than 5% for Canada and New Zealand.       
 
Assuming that more recent data show the overall trend for the workers in the industry, we 
will splice up more recent dataset with the original data set from the year 2004. Splicing up 
will be done by normalising series of a more recent dataset by the difference value of the 
2004 for both data sets. 
 
Following Bassanini and Duval (2006 b) methodology additional marginal tax rates have 
been derived for the group specific labour market regressions. First, “relative marginal tax 
rate on second earners” should be considered. This variable is effectively a tax wedge for 
second earners. Assuming a couple with two kids and first earner receiving average wage, 
the main concern is how motivated is second earner to go into full time employment. 
Comparing net income between two situations when second earner receives average wage 
or is unemployed relative to appropriate difference in gross income between the two 
scenarios. Similarly, “relative marginal tax rate for an individual to go from part-time 
employment into full-time” has been estimated. Assume single earner without children who 
earns average wage in full-time and only 67% of average wage in part-time work. Now, 
the marginal tax rate will be calculated as the net income differential between the two 
scenarios (full-time versus part-time employment) as a proportion to net income of part-
time employment.  All the data for variables construction is taken from Tax, Benefits and 






 Employment protection legislation. 
 
Theoretical foundations. Employment Protection Legislation creates rigidities in 
company’s labour turnover mechanism by adding firing costs to its profit optimisation 
problems. With the introduction of firing costs firms cannot adjust its labour force 
instantaneously during demand or supply shocks to the economy. Firm’s decision to keep 
or fire an employee will be directed by the reservation productivity. Reservation 
productivity is a productivity level of the employee at which employer is indifferent to 
keeping or firing the employee (Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004)). It is where profit from 
keeping an employee, determined by employee’s productivity, is the same as profit from 
making him redundant, determined by profit of having workplace vacant inclusive of firing 
costs deductions. If employee’s individual productivity is less than the reservation one he 
will be fired. Similarly if it overwhelms reservation productivity then he keeps the job. 
Therefore, according to theory, a rise in firing costs will decrease reservation productivity, 
thus lowering job destruction rate. This in turn may smooth the effect of economy 
fluctuations on labour market activity by restraining the unemployment rate from 
overshooting in the short-run. In long-run lowering job destruction rates will increase 
current employees’ confidence in the wage bargaining process so they would demand 
higher wages. Upward pressure on wages should result in higher unemployment. However, 
firms tied up by EPL policies will suffer temporary losses until they will be able to 
decrease a firm’s employment level to the competitive one through pausing recruitment 
and by voluntary quits.   
 
An increase in labour turnover costs will decrease the exit from employment, consequently 
reducing labour demand. Meanwhile it will increase hiring costs as companies would 
induce probability of firing an individual and all subsequent costs in profits optimisation 
analysis. A rise in hiring costs allied with a decrease in labour demand would lower job 
creation rates in the economy. Lower job creation rates and job destruction rates would 
simply mean lower labour market flows. This implies prolonged unemployment spells, 
especially for the new entrants to the market. Long durations of unemployment would 
decrease reservation wages of the market participants. A downward push on wages will 
stimulate an increase in voluntary unemployment, and reduce the costs to firm’s profits. 
This should be an incentive for firms to recruit, thus in long term this could increase 
employment rate depending on the replacement cost of insider to outsider. However it is 
necessary to keep in mind that long unemployment spells have negative effects on the 
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human capital, i.e. quite often the level of skills of those searching for jobs decreases with 
the search time. 
 
Net effect of EPL policies on unemployment rate would depend on the difference in the 
rates of job destruction and job creation. The economy aggregate rates of jobs turnover will 
be dictated by labour demand conditions and will depend on the nature of downturns, i.e. 
whether they are aggregate or idiosyncratic to a particular sector.  
 
There will be a difference of the EPL policy effects on unemployment among different 
labour market groups – insiders and outsiders.  As we have seen above, for those in 
employment, stricter EPL will increase the unemployment rate in the long-run and 
stimulate a rise in wages. For those willing to enter the labour market it will increase 
employment in the long-run at the cost of decreasing wages, if the required conditions are 
met. 
 
Variable construction and sources.  
 
In measuring EPL strictness we use OECD synthetic indicator relative to overall labour 
force, regular contractors and temporary ones. EPL indicator for employees on temporary 
contracts is a weighted sum of indicator on types of work, restriction on number of 
renewals, maximum cumulated duration of successive work. EPL indicator for employees 
on regular contracts is a weighted sum of indicators on employee dismissal - notification 
procedures, delay involved before notice can start, length of notice at periods of 9 months, 
4 years and 20 years of tenure, severance pay levels at 9 months, 4 years and 20 years of 
tenure, definition of justified or unfair dismissal, trial period length, compensation for 
unfair dismissal and possibility of reinstatement after unfair dismissal.  EPL overall 
employment indicator is an unweighted average of the above sub indicators for regular and 
temporary contracts. The motivation to choose the earlier version among OECD indicators 
comes from the highest range of data availability. Data Source: OECD Stat.Extracts. 
 
 Minimum wage. 
 
Theoretical foundations. Effect of minimum wages on unemployment will vary according 
to the value of minimum wages imposed in relation to current market equilibrium wages. If 
the minimum wage is above the market-clearing wage then theoretically it will give rise to 
classic unemployment.  Higher wages will push the supply of labour and labour force 
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participation rates upwards, as it will cumulate population with higher reservation wages 
who will enter the market directly as unemployed. The more elastic is the labour demand - 
the wider is the unemployment gap created by the imposition of minimum wage. However, 
if minimum wage is lower than the reservation wage, then it could have a positive impact 
on employment and even improve labour market efficiency. This is the case when 
monopsony power or any other models where the settled wage is below the competitive 
wage. 
 
According to efficiency wages theory higher wages should imply higher productivity. 
Higher standards of productivity required could push the labour force into additional 
training and education, and in short run this could decrease unemployment partially. In the 
long-term this can cause an increase in aggregate labour productivity, as payoffs for 
acquiring additional education levels increase.  Higher productivity implies higher revenue 
and profit margins for the firms so this will give them a motive to increase labour factor 
within the firm. Higher demand for labour could imply clearing the classical 
unemployment created by the minimum wage.   
 
Setting floor for wages, demanding higher rates of productivity could imply high impact 
differentials of the policy among different groups. Higher positive impact of the policy 
would be expected on low skilled labour and less on the high skilled labour. Skills level is 
usually attached to educational attainment level. However, firms view skills level signal as 
a combination of work experience and education level. So even if new entrants to the 
market could have a high level of education they still could be viewed as disadvantaged, 
due to a lack of work experience.  New entrants to the market (usually age group of 16-24 
graduates) could be affected by the minimum wage more than the other groups. 
 
Variable construction and sources.    
 
Only seventeen out of twenty countries of interest that we study have minimum wage 
legislation in place. However those countries where minimum wages regulation was not 
passed (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland) 
balance with a help of union bargaining power in the wage setting process. 
 
The OECD indicator “minimum relative to average wages of full-time workers” was used 
to measure the minimum wages across countries. This is a more universal measure for the 
cross-country comparison. It is found as a ratio of minimum wage to average earnings of a 
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full-time worker. All the wages data used are measured in national currency units and at 
current prices, to get a percentage rather than a ratio we multiply all the series data by 
100%. Average earnings can be defined in two ways, either as median earnings or as mean 
earnings. For our research objectives both variations of the indicator are employed. Source: 
OECD.StatExtracts. 
 
 Product market regulation 
 
Theoretical foundations. There is no general consensus on the effect of product market 
regulation on unemployment. Market regulation is associated with government 
intervention into the market. For classic economic theories government intervention is 
associated with market inefficiencies that may results in departures from market clearing. 
Moving away from market clearing conditions means altering equilibrium with the 
consequential alteration of the capital-labour ratio. That equally might imply an increase or 
a decrease in unemployment rates.  
 
Variable construction and sources. 
 
Product market regulation indicator has became recently available from OECD database. 
Unfortunately, that is the reason for its short time-series dimension. The indicator’s 
observations run up only to year 1998. It is also not continuous, so interpolation option has 
to be used to smooth out the series. Bassanini and Duval (2006) research accompanying 
dataset has been used to enlarge the series range. Simple rescaling has been used to 
combine the two datasets. Please note that data has been taken from papers’ accompanying 
website where it has been made available for public use.  
 
 Trade unions. 
 
Theoretical foundations. Trade Unions affect labour market processes in a number of 
ways. One of their primary aspects is their role in the wage setting process between the 
employee and employer. In a unionised firm employee will have more bargaining power 
and this will push the wages bargained over upwards. Higher wages would create labour 
market inefficiencies and cause additional involuntary unemployment. However, as we 
assume that unions’ main objective is welfare of its members this should not affect their 
decisions. Unions divide labour market into insiders and outsiders depending on their 
affiliation to trade union. Even though unions do not set wages directly for outsiders they 
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still affect them. While unions may negotiate higher wages for insiders, outsiders hit by 
unemployment will be willing to work at lower wage rates. Union members will increase 
wages cyclically even though it could create some unemployment for union members; 
once they are unemployed they are not considered in the objectives of the union wage 
setting function. Union behaviour in the wage setting process will also be guided by 
unemployment conditions of the labour market as a whole.  In periods of economic 
downturns they will not be that demanding as they are likely to be during the periods of 
high economic growth (Blanchard and Summers (1986)).  
 
The coordination of bargaining processes is crucial to the wage setting process and its 
effect on economic efficiency.  If bargaining is done at higher levels like the economy 
wide level, then unions no longer distinguish between insiders or outsiders, as their 
objective is to improve labour market conditions of the overall labour force. Therefore, 
their objective will be national employment level rather than wage level of a group of 
people. In this case unions will tend to increase employment level but would lower the 
wage rates.          
 
In practice wage levels are not the only objective over which unions bargain. They are 
usually involved in enforcing firing costs, unemployment benefits, featherbedding and 
decreasing hours worked. 
 
Variable construction and sources.  
 
Two OECD variables are used to measure impact of unionism on unemployment – union 
density and union coverage. Both of them were sourced from OECD Labour Statistics 
database.  
 
 Public expenditures on active labour market policies. 
 
Theoretical foundations. Active Labour Market Policies are concerned primarily with 
government-run programs designed to improve employment conditions of the individuals. 
These programmes compromise public employment services, training, and subsidised 
employment. All of these programs have different effects on labour market dynamics. 
Dataset descriptive statistics for ALMP variable by OECD together with accompanying 
Grubb and Puymoyen (2008) paper helps to familiarise us with the long-time series of 
public expenditure on ALMP. Summary of the policies provided is listed below.  
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Public Employment Services programme (PES) is introduced to ease the job search 
process by providing a free flow of information in labour markets. The programmes 
usually offer help and support for jobseekers to find matching jobs and motivate them to 
exert effort in the process. It is initially aimed at enhancing the efficiency of the matching 
process and removing possible crowding-in effects. Enhanced efficiency of the matching 
process will affect firm activity through two channels. Firstly, it would lower labour 
turnover costs of the individual firms thus will lead to increased hiring rates consequently 
pressing upward aggregate labour demand schedule. Secondly, wage signalling will lose its 
importance and would result in a decrease in wage rates so labour supply curve will move 
downwards. Both of the above described shifts in labour supply-demand schedules will 
lead to a decrease in unemployment. Therefore, according to theory PES programme 
should reduce frictional unemployment associated with search and matching process.  
 
The PES programmes are not commonly available for all the public but are targeted at 
more vulnerable groups like youths, women or the disabled. This would have impact on 
our analysis as this indicator is expected to have more influence on demographic specific 
employment variables rather than the aggregate ones. 
 
Training Programmes (TP) are equally targeted at both employed and unemployed 
members of the public. They provide opportunity for some to gain new skills and for 
others to enhance existing ones to match labour market needs. It would increase labour 
productivity of employees, thus create additional supply of labour to match the required 
demand. 
 
However, an increasing “quality” of labour may have adverse effects on the labour market. 
Firstly, it can raise expected wages of the individuals. Thus, a positive effect of the policy 
on employment could be offset and labour market steady state will be characterised by 
higher reservation wages and higher unemployment rates. Secondly, the rise of the lock-in 
effects can create labour market rigidities resulting in a rise in frictional unemployment. 
This happens when participants of training either reduce their job search efforts or are tied 
up by the training programme and not able to enter employment until the training is over.    
 
Subsidised employment is used for the additional job creation. This can be done by 
subsidising hiring in the private sector, directly creating new working places in the public 
sector or by assisting the unemployed in becoming entrepreneurs themselves.  This policy 
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would stimulate demand of labour, and thus improve employees’ position in the bargaining 
process resulting in the pay rise. The magnitude of unemployment reduced corresponding 
to the wage rise will depend on the wage elasticity of supply side. If labour supply is 
completely inelastic, as it is usually common for the short term, then at the cost of wage-
rise no unemployment changes will be observed. On the other extreme in the long run with 
labour force being more flexible and supply being completely elastic, theoretically 
unemployment will be reduced without any change to wages. 
 
Variable construction and sources.  
 
Public expenditure on ALMP variable was obtained from OECD, Economic Outlook 
Statistics, 86 and is expressed as a percentage of the GDP. In addition to the general 
variable, expenditure on ALMP for early retirement has been added to the data sample 
with the later use for group specific labour market performance regressions.   
 
 Unemployment benefits 
 
Theoretical foundations. In a competitive model unemployment benefits would increase 
individual reservation wages, and would therefore improve employees’ position in the 
wage bargaining process. Wage push would increase unemployment in the labour market.  
It is argued that unemployment benefits prolong unemployment, as they do not provide an 
incentive for jobseekers to look for vacancies and they also overstate their earnings 
expectations. It is argued that a rise in unemployment benefits would permanently affect 
the natural rate of unemployment (i.e. bring it to a new lower level). 
 
However “unemployment benefits” is not a uniform variable, not everyone is entitled to 
the same amount of benefits pay out. The actual eligibility or the size of benefits entitled 
depends on a range of individual conditions (sex, age, number of children, previous 
working status, duration of unemployment etc.). Here the unemployed are differentiated 
according to their eligibility for benefits and this will cause ambiguous effects on the 
labour market. Those not eligible for benefits will have lower reservation wages associated 
with a rise in unemployment benefits, as the risk of exiting employment will look less 
desirable. In the meantime for those eligible for benefits reservation wages will be 
growing.   
 
Variable construction and sources.  
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Average benefit replacement rate. OECD summary measure of benefit entitlements is 
used. It is defined as the average of the gross unemployment benefit replacement rates for 
two earnings levels (100% and 67% of average per week earnings), three family situations 
(single, married one income earner, married both partners at work) and three durations of 
unemployment (1 year, 2-3 years, 4-5 years). Data are available only for odd years so we 
will linearly interpolate it in Stata using the “ipolate” command. 
 
Further two variables construction methodology is based on the method described by 
Bassanini and Duval (2006 b). Family cash benefit is concerned with the difference of net 
income for a married couple with two children or without relative to income in the later 
case. It is assumed that both of the partners earn at 100% of Average Wage. Estimation of 
second variable “part-time unemployment benefits” is very similar to the family cash 
benefits variable derivation. It simply compares benefits entitlement in the case of second 
earner moving to part-time work from being unemployed. Source of data for the variables: 
Benefits and Wages: OECD Main Tax Benefit Indicators Database.  
 
3.3 Control variables: macroeconomic variables. 
 
 Output gap. 
 
Theoretical Foundations.  Output contractions or expansions are evidence of economic 
growth and directly indicate job creation/destruction in the economy. Okun’s Law 
describes an inverse link between change in unemployment and output variables. From the 
point of view of production function output and employment are positively related. 
However, marginal product of labour is diminishing over the employment rate. This 
implies that depending on what level of the technology development country currently is, 
its rate of output – employment dynamics may slow down over the time under the 
assumption of no exogenous shocks to the system. 
 
Output gap is the difference between the potential and actual outputs of the economy. It is 
a procyclical fraction of the GDP and measures disturbances in business cycle due to 
supply or demand shocks to the economy.      
 
Variable Construction and Sources.  
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The output gap is a difference between full capacity output level of economy and the actual 
output level.  Full capacity output level theoretically implies output level of the economy 
when all the production factors are employed: full labour force, optimal levels of the total 
factor productivity and capital fully employed.  However, as potential output is more of an 
abstract variable it is hard to define.  Usually, it is associated with the output where no 
inflationary pressures are being exerted on the economy.  We used output gap variable 
from OECD database where estimated potential GDP is found by the means of production 
function. Variable Source: OECD Economic Outlook database. 
 
3.4 Control variables: Macroeconomic volatility measures 
 
 Exchange rate volatility  
 
Exchange rate volatility variables detailed derivations are discussed in Chapter 4. Level 
variables for the estimation have been obtained online from Thomson Reuters 3000 Extra 
Database. Real effective exchange rate has been used for the analysis. Volatility series 
compromise 5 alternative variables: 
Exchange rate volatility 1 (EV1): rolling standard deviation with lag length of 6 months 
Exchange rate volatility 2 (EV2): rolling standard deviation with lag length of 12 month 
Exchange rate volatility 3 (EV3): rolling standard deviation with lag length of 18 month 
Exchange rate volatility 4 (EV4): ARIMA-GARCH models 
Exchange rate volatility 5 (EV5): EGARCH models 
 
 Inflation volatility 
 
Inflation volatility variables derivations are discussed in detail in Chapter 5. Inflation series 
have been approximated by percentage change in GDP deflator series. GDP deflator has 
been obtained from Economic projection of Economic Outlook database, OECD. Resulting 
volatility series compromise three alternative measures: 
Inflation volatility 1 (PV1): rolling standard deviation with lag length of 4 months 
Inflation volatility 2 (PV2): ARFIMA(0,d,0) –GARCH(1,1) models 
Inflation volatility 3 (PV3): ARFIMA(0,d,1)-GARCH(1,1) models 
 
 Interest rate volatility 
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Estimation of interest rate volatility is described in more detail in Chapter 6. Interest rate 
series for the analysis have been approximated by money market rate. This has been 
obtained mostly from International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics 
database. 
Australia: 19360BZF, average rate on money market from IMF, IFS. 
Austria: 12260BZF, money market rate (according to IMF, IFS - one day maturity so 
combined with EU(A) - 16360AZF from IMF as closest to maturity) 
Belgium: 12460B.ZF, Call money rate from IMF, IFS based on 3 month EURIBOR, so 
combined with EU(B) - 16360BZF from IMF as closest in maturity 
Canada: 15660BZF, Overnight money market rate from IMF, IFS 
Denmark: 12860BZF, Call money rate from IMF, IFS  
Finland: 17260BZF, average cost of Central Bank debt from IMF, IFS 
France: 13260BZF, call money rate combined with EU(B) - 16360BZF from IMF as 
closest in maturity 
Denmark: 13460BZF, call money rate from IMF, IFS 
Ireland: 17860BZF, one month fixed rate from IMF, IFS 
Italy: 13660BZF money market rate from IMF, IFS 
Japan: 15860BZF, call money rate from IMF, IFS. 
Netherlands: 13860BZF, call money rate from IMF, IFS and combined with 16360BZF 
from IMF as the two are closest in maturity 
New Zealand: 19660BZF, money market rate IMF, IFS 
Norway: 14260BZF, call money rate from IMF, IFS combined with NIBOR1W, as two 
are closest in maturity. The later variable taken from Norges bank database 
Portugal: 18260BZF, up to 5 days interbank deposit from IMF, IFS combined with 
EU(A)- 16360AZF from IMF, as two are closest in maturity  
Spain: 18460BZF, call money rate from IMF, IFS 
Sweden: 14460BZF, call money rate from IMF, IFS 
Switzerland: 14660BZF, money market rate from IMF, IFS 
United Kingdom: 11260BZF, overnight interbank min from IMF, IFS 
United States: 11160BZF, FED funds rate from IMF, IFS 
 
In some cases variables had to be combined to get longer span in terms of time series 
observations. Any combination has been done by the principle of rescaling. Then volatility 
measures have been obtained based on the series. Vector of volatility measures consists of 
four alternative variables: 
Interest rate volatility 1 (IRV1): rolling standard deviation with lag length of 12 
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Interest rate volatility 2 (IRV2): either GARCH model or GJR-GARCH 
Interest rate volatility 3 (IRV3): either GARCH or QGARCH models 
Interest rate volatility 4 (IRV4): either GARCH or PARCH models 
  
3.5 Other additional control variables considered 
 
 Life expectancy. 
 
Longer life expectancy results may result in later retirement and thus higher occupational 
rates. With the higher life expectancies in Europe many reforms have been passed in order 
to increase the retirement age. In some of our regression, it has been decided to account for 
this effect and include the life expectancy variable for the older and retiring age groups.  
Variable data are obtained from Health Status dataset online form OECD.Stat. 
 
 Homeownership rates. 
 
Homeownership rates may play a crucial part in labour market performance. People not 
owing their home may be more motivated to find employment in order to own their home. 
However if the homeownership rates are high this can lower job mobility create additional 
mismatch in labour market and depress employment rates (Blanchflower and Oswald 
(2013)). 
 
For some of the regressions home-ownership variable has been included to account for the 
restrictive job mobility affect that has been identified by Oswald (1999). Homeownership 
rates have been collected from a number of sources. Where gaps in the data observations 
occurred they have been interpolated to induce continuous series.  
 
Australia homeownership rates have been obtained online from 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/1301.0Main+Features1292012 
 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Finland, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland homeownership rates are available from 
EUROSTAT database. Variable name: ilc_lvho02. 
 




Japan Homeownership Rates: Statistical Survey Department, Statistics bureau, ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications. Available online at 
www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/1431-18.htm  
 
New Zealand Homeownership Rates have been obtained online from NZ.Stat from Census 
data for the years of 2001, 2006 and 2013.  
 
United Kingdom Homeownership data has been obtained online from Office for National 
Statistics (http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census-analysis/a-century-of-home-
ownership-and-renting-in-england-and-wales/short-story-on-housing.html ). Unfortunately, 
it covers only England and Wales. 
 




 Number of kids and childcare costs  
 
These variables have been previously used by many labour market studies especially those 
with implications to females participation (e.g. Bassanini and Duval (2006b)).  
 
“Number of kids” variable has been computed following Bassanini and Duval (2006 b) 
suggestion as number of children per women. For that, population statistics has been 
obtained from OECD Demography and Population Statistics database that covers data 
from Eurostat or United Nations. Number of children has been found as a sum of children 
among age groups of 0-14 years. Number of Women has been found as sum of females 
among age groups of 25-54 years old. Resulting variable of interest has been found as a 
proportion of two: number of children and number of women.  
 
“Childcare costs” variable is a ready-made variable available from OECD Benefits and 
Wages database - Work Incentive statistics. Rather than using public expenditure on 
childcare costs, as in Bassanini and Duval (2006b), this research is concerned with 
childcare costs as share of average wages. This is because here the main idea is to capture 
the work incentive that childcare costs translate onto females’ employment rates. 
Furthermore by default family is assumed to include a couple that are in full-employment 
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earning average wage (100%). Data has been available only for the years 2004, 2008 and 
2012. When incorporated into data sample, some observations have been interpolated to 
create a continuous sample.  
 











Employment rate 339 58.14 42.18 71.90 5.90 
Unemployment rate (ALFS definition) 572 7.39 0.50 26.20 3.96 
Harmonised Unemployment Rate 532 7.52 1.56 26.12 3.63 
Activity Rates 339 62.28 47.83 73.78 5.14 
NAIRU 589 6.97 0.99 21.50 2.99 
Number of Discouraged Workers 221 0.65 0.02 9.56 1.05 
Duration of unemployment 542 51.42 11.47 100.00 18.81 
Tax Wedge 558 29.35 -1.07 49.95 11.10 
Employment Protection Legislation 575 2.09 0.26 5.00 0.93 
Minimum Wage 307 0.40 0.24 0.59 0.08 
Product Market Regulation 575 2.10 0.91 4.10 0.74 
Trade Unions 554 36.27 7.55 83.86 20.37 
Public expenditures on ALMP 453 0.80 0.13 3.04 0.50 
Average benefits replacement rate 540 29.92 0.10 70.95 14.51 
Output gap 589 -0.21 -10.49 10.51 2.77 
Life expectancy 558 78.27 73.00 83.20 2.20 
Homeownership rates 377 68.50 43.80 92.00 8.76 
Number of kids 561 0.88 0.63 1.69 0.15 
Childcare costs 171 23.59 14.22 3.38 58.15 
Exchange rate volatility (EV1) 520 1.00 0.17 4.87 0.62 
Exchange rate volatility (EV2) 520 1.15 0.22 4.69 0.70 
Exchange rate volatility (EV3) 520 1.12 0.20 4.67 0.68 
Exchange rate volatility (EV4) 520 1.98 0.17 15.57 2.08 
Exchange rate volatility (EV5) 520 2.06 0.16 14.34 2.10 
Inflation volatility (PV1) 564 0.50 0.02 4.19 0.46 
Inflation volatility (PV2) 561 0.82 0.01 21.21 1.67 
Inflation volatility (PV3) 564 0.82 0.01 22.77 1.74 
Interest rate volatility (IRV1) 519 0.66 0.07 6.30 0.88 
Interest rate volatility (IRV2) 519 29.25 0.37 1687.59 129.49 
Interest rate volatility (IRV3) 519 29.00 0.37 1626.12 127.44 




Chapter 4. Exchange rate volatility effect on labour market performance. 
4.1 Derivation of exchange rate volatility series. 
 
Based on the literature review of volatility measures, two methodologies have been 
selected to estimate exchange rate volatility. These techniques are based on moving 
standard deviation and conditional heteroskedasticity models. Primary data for volatility 
measures are obtained from Thomson Reuters 3000 Xtra Database. The OECD real 
effective exchange rate series start for most countries from the year 1970. However, for 
some countries starting date may vary so please consult Data and Methodology chapter for 
more detail.  
 
The monthly exchange rate series were chosen as an optimal compromise frequency of 
observations for estimating long-run orthodox measures (based on moving standard 
deviations) and short-run stochastic measures (GARCH based models). The major 
advantage of higher frequency data is fewer observations are lost during estimation of the 
final measures.  Monthly frequency in financial data enables additional seasonality checks 
to eliminate such nuisances as “January effect”. Monthly dummy variables have been 
constructed and regression analysis have been used to test series for any seasonality. The 
coefficients of OLS regression and their t-test values suggest no seasonality in series.  
 
The estimation of GARCH based measures is build upon technique which steps are 
described in Brooks (2008) and Franses and Dijk (2000).  First, conditional mean has been 
modelled by ARIMA model. Using Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and its 
alternatives best-fit model has been selected. Second, following Bailie and Bollerslev 
(1992), it has been decided to fit a more broad structure of ARIMA-GARCH for the model 
rather than simpler but popular version of AR-GARCH. Asymmetric volatility models 
have been considered, but EGARCH were chosen as the most appropriate one for the 
purpose (Liu and Morley (2009)).      
 
4.1.1 Unit root tests. 
 
Stationarity of series needs to be established before any fitting of the volatility models can 
be done. Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests are the most commonly used among 
researchers with a null hypothesis of series containing one unit root against alternative of 
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no unit roots. ADF tests suggest the hypothesis of the exchange rate series containing a 
unit root cannot be rejected at 5% significance level for most of the countries except for 
Austria, France and Netherlands (in models where the only exogenous variable is a 
constant). It is highly unlikely for variables with a stochastic nature to be unit root 
stationary, so for robustness checks of unexpected results (case of Austria, France and 
Netherlands) further unit root tests are done. Philips-Perron (PP) is a non-parametric 
version of ADF test, where t-statistic is independent of serial correlation effects. PP tests 
support the ADF test results for Netherlands and France but disagree with previously 
established results for Austria.  As Philips – Perron test is a more advanced version of ADF 
test in cases where disputes arise between the two tests results, it is assumed that Philips-
Perron results are more authoritative. 
  
Both of the tests used so far assume that series are non-stationary in the null hypothesis 
and suffer type I and type II errors. Type I error implies rejecting H0 when it is true and 
type II error accepting H0 when H0 is false. So to minimise type I and type II errors, results 
robustness checks are done using KPSS tests where null hypothesis of series being 
stationary is tested against alternative of series being non-stationary (i.e. containing one or 
more unit roots). KPSS tests’ results suggest that hypothesis of exchange rate series being 
stationary cannot be rejected at 5% significance level for Belgium, Great Britain, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand and the US. In a case of Belgium ADF tests confirm 
non-stationarity of the series, KPSS tests support results of ADF tests for the case where 
intercept and trend are exogenous at 5% level and in a case where there is only intercept 
exogenous at 10% significance level. In the case of Great Britain, hypothesis of series 
being stationary is not rejected only by KPSS test with exogenous constant, but it has been 
rejected by all ADF, PP tests and KPSS test where constant and trend are exogenous. 
KPSS tests support Italy and US series non-stationarity but only at 10% significance level, 
in a case of Netherlands, Norway and New Zealand results are divided depending on the 
specification. The hypothesis of a series containing one unit root has been mostly not 
rejected by all of the tests performed here at 10 % significance level subject to the 
specification of the exogenous structure.   
 
Unit root test results for Austria, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, New Zealand, and the US still do not permit us to establish firm conclusions. One 
disadvantage of using long run exchange rate series is increasing chances of them 
containing structural breaks. For a better grasp on series stationarity nature it has been 
decided to investigate if there are structural breaks in the unit root that could cause such 
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misleading results. Zivot-Andrews’s tests for a single structural break in both trend and 
intercept have been chosen. Tests of null hypothesis of structural break in unit root against 
alternative of stationary series with a break have been conducted. Significant evidence 
gathered indicates that series are unit root stationary with structural break in the series. As 
further checks it has been decided to split each series sample into two samples in line with 
the structural breakpoint as identified by Zivot-Andrews test. Then unit root tests have 
been re-sampled to see whether the stationarity of the series still persists.  
 
For most cases there is overwhelming evidence of series containing one unit root except 
for Netherlands. In a case of Netherlands structural break in unit root has been confirmed 
and results of standard unit root tests show that series have been non-stationary before the 
year 2002, but became stationary afterwards.  
 
From the unit root analysis it can be concluded that most series are non-stationary and 
contain one unit root except for the exchange rate of Netherlands. The significance of 
structural break changing the nature of the series cannot be ignored. Additionally to 
original Netherlands exchange rate volatility variable another two will be created. One 
covering Netherlands exchange rate series up to and including May 2002 observations and 
a second one thereafter. Here and further in the analysis, the series will be referred to as 
Netherlands1 and Netherlands2.  Econometric analysis for the pre 2002 sample will be 
based on the assumption that series contain one unit root. For the second variable, 
following June 2002, assumptions of stationarity will be made. Thus three variables 
presenting Netherlands will be treated in further analysis as exchange rate for three 
different countries with different data samples. Later due course of analysis Netherlands1 
combined with Netherlands2 will be used as a substitute for the Netherlands variable.  
 
Overall Structural breaks identified by the AZ tests indicate that robustness checks should 
be run in panel regressions to control for the Bretton-Woods system collapse, the collapse 
of USSR and Germany unification, and introduction of Euro. In a case of Netherlands the 
aim is to test for the overall sample unique volatility variable and then being able to 
substitute with two volatility variables for the split samples.  
 
Table 4- 2 Unit root tests' results for exchange rate series 
Variable 
 














































Australia (AU)  -1.892613 (1)   1.065130 (1) 
Belgium (BE) 
 
Jan1970 - Jun2011 
 
Jan 1970 - Feb1980 





























Canada (CA)  -1.721124 (1)   1.243469 (1) 
Switzerland (CH)  -2.424613 (1)   1.682668 (1) 
Germany (DE)  -2.629619 (1)   0.627077 (1) 
Denmark (DK)  -2.114530 (1)   2.009292 (1) 
Spain (ES)  -2.293959 (1)   1.516075 (1) 
Finland (FI)  -1.586946 (1)   1.273660 (1) 
France (FR) 
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Ireland (IE)  -1.327699 (1)   1.566014 (1) 
Italy (IT) 
 
Jan1970 – Jun2011 
 
Jan1970 - Sep 1992 































Japan (JP)  -2.318004 (1)   1.913498 (1) 
Netherlands (NL) 
 
Jan1970 – Jun2011 
 
Jan1970 - May2002 
















































































Jan1970 - Jun2011 
 
Jan1970 - Sep 2002 





















Portugal (PT)  -1.587188 (1)   1.963449 (1) 
Sweden (SE)  -1.681040 (1)   2.392213 (1) 
United States (US) 
 
-1.044144 (1) -2.357759 (1) -2.366598 (1) -2.180764 (1) 
0.405006 (0) 
0.127529 (0) 
Exchange rate variable is log(REER) 
All of the results reported are st 5% s.l., exceptions are * that implies 1% significance level.  
ADF tests are performed for a variety of exogenous structures, whereas by default for PP and KPSS tests it is assumed that intercept is 
exogenous. In some cases there are two KPSS results present, where second line gives results for models where exogenous structure 
includes both intercept and linear trend.  
 
4.1.2 Descriptive statistics and normality tests 
 
Unit root tests confirmed that all of exchange rate variables are non stationary therefore 
I(1) variables are used instead, the actual variable that is used for the fitting of volatility 
models is percentage return of real effective exchange rate: 
 
 r = 100D[log(ER)t], where D =  log(ER)t – log (ER)t-1 
 
However please note that this does not apply to Netherlands 2 as this variable is stationary 
and does not need differencing. After all data adjustments there are 497 observations left 
for most of the countries in exchange rate set except for Australia and Great Britain with 
473 observations. Mean values from descriptive statistics table suggest that average 
percentage returns of exchange rate are negative for Canada, Germany, Finland, France, 
Great Britain, Italy, Sweden and United States implying that on average currency 
depreciated over the time period. The rest of the countries’ exchange rates, on average 
show appreciation of the currency during the period. The most volatile exchange rate series 
according to standard deviation measure (more than 2% variation) are for Australia, Japan 
and New Zealand. Percentage exchange rate return for these countries varies broadly 
within the range of approximately 22% for Australia, 17% for Japan and 25% for New 
Zealand. 
  
None of the series distributions considered here are symmetric around their mean value. 
Most of the series distributions are negatively skewed whereas percentage returns of 
exchange rate distributions for Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, Japan, 
Netherlands and Netherlands1 are positively skewed. The “most asymmetric” distribution 
around its mean is for Spain’s exchange rate observations and least asymmetric among the 
group is US observations’ distribution. Skewed distributions usually are one tail longer 
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than the other, this property is apparent in most of the distributions considered. Therefore 
third moment of all distributions considered is no close to the characteristics of Normal 
distribution where there are no asymmetries and skewness coefficient is zero. 
 
Turning to the fourth moment of Normal distribution – kurtosis, it can be stated from 
descriptive analysis table that all of the distributions considered here have fat tails. This 
result agrees with the expectations as financial data usually has fatter tails.  Extreme values 
of kurtosis coefficient are for exchange rate returns in Spain (29.04), Finland (16.99) and 
Italy (15.69). Smallest values of kurtosis coefficient and therefore closest to normal 
distribution parameter (kurtosis coefficient equals three) are in the cases of US, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Japan and Austria. 
 
From skewness and kurtosis analysis it can be concluded that distributions of exchange 
rate return considered in this study do not possess normal distribution characteristics. This 
has been proved more by Jarque-Berra (JB) Normality tests. Null hypothesis of the test is 
that distribution is symmetric around mean and has kurtosis coefficient of normal 
distribution (k=3). JB statistic reject H0 in all cases.  
 



































































































Austria (AT) 497 0.03 0.00 3.17 -1.89 0.64 0.59 4.69 88.20 0.00 
Australia (AU) 473 0.02 0.22 6.55 -15.38 2.48 -1.36 9.02 859.60 0.00 
Belgium (BE) 497 0.00 -0.02 2.45 -6.78 0.78 -1.04 13.8 2516.0 0.00 
Canada (CA) 497 -0.01 -0.01 5.85 -9.74 1.35 -0.48 8.74 700.96 0.00 
Switzerland 
(CH) 
497 0.11 0.03 5.70 -5.87 1.41 0.41 4.14 40.43 0.00 
Germany (DE) 497 -0.01 -0.07 6.25 -2.47 0.99 0.94 6.80 373.45 0.00 
Denmark (DK) 497 0.043 0.01 4.86 -5.00 0.95 0.04 8.22 564.80 0.00 
Spain (ES) 497 0.07 0.11 4.56 -13.81 1.35 -2.88 29.0 14734 0.00 
Finland (FI) 497 -0.03 0.01 5.10 -9.70 1.19 -1.82 17.0 4330.9 0.00 
France (FR) 497 -0.02 -0.01 3.49 -4.67 0.88 -0.50 6.73 308.92 0.00 
Great Britain 
(GB) 
473 -0.04 0.01 7.79 -8.46 1.80 -0.22 5.49 126.32 0.00 
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Ireland (IE) 497 0.05 0.03 6.36 -7.65 1.36 0.18 6.54 261.49 0.00 
Italy (IT) 497 -0.02 0.06 5.47 -8.99 1.28 -1.80 15.7 3617.1 0.00 
Japan (JP) 497 0.15 -0.05 10.14 -7.18 2.42 0.63 4.30 67.69 0.00 
Netherlands 
(NL) 
497 0.03 -0.01 3.46 -3.06 0.92 0.36 4.08 35.05 0.00 
Netherlands1 
(NL1)* 
388 0.02 -0.02 3.46 -3.06 0.93 0.44 4.29 39.56 0.00 
Netherlands2 
(NL2)** 
109 4.60 4.60 4.63 4.54 0.02 -0.81 2.83 12.13 0.00 
Norway (NO) 497 0.02 0.02 5.17 -5.49 1.19 -0.55 6.20 236.53 0.00 
New Zealand 
(NZ) 
497 0.03 -0.09 13.20 -12.06 2.21 -0.35 9.04 765.07 0.00 
Portugal (PT) 497 0.06 0.04 6.47 -9.59 1.54 -1.19 12.0 1813.5 0.00 
Sweden (SE) 497 -0.07 -0.01 5.77 -10.93 1.45 -1.79 14.6 3065.8 0.00 
United States 
(US) 
497 -0.08 -0.11 5.43 -4.31 1.34 -0.02 4.02 21.713 0.00 
Exchange rate series are 100D[log(REER)t]. 
All statistics have been done using EViews 7.0 software. 
*Netherlands have been split into two variables according to data sample, where * assumes Jan1970 –May2002 and ** assumes 
Jun2002-Jun2011 (in later data range variables is logREER) 
 
Netherlands sample descriptive characteristics are very similar to Netherlands 1 but are 
distinctively different from Netherlands 2 series.   
 
4.1.3 Rolling standard deviation model 
 
One of the orthodox measures of volatility is the standard deviation. In order to make it 
time varying, a rolling standard deviation technique is used. Not only does this help to 
avoid mean-variance critique (Seabra, 1995), but also accounts for periods of high and low 
exchange rate uncertainty.  
 
The determination of optimal lag length in the model specification across literature is still 
subject of dispute.  Based on previous studies optimal lag length of m=12 has been chosen 
as a primary lag length. Further m=6 and m =18 based measures of volatility has been 
selected for robustness checks of the initial model results.  
 
Even though the measure is time-varying and gives a good approximation for long run 
volatility measures it has a number of disadvantages. It is still not parametric and does not 
account for rational behaviour of economic agents, so in discussion of empirical results 
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one needs to take into account that this measure tends to underestimate the actual volatility 
of exchange rate.    
 
4.1.4 GARCH based measures 
 
Most of previous studies used GARCH (1,1) model as an optimal for modelling exchange 
rate variability in labour markets. However, it has been decided to extend GARCH models 
row from ARIMA (0,0) – GARCH (1,1) up to ARIMA (2,2)- GARCH(2,2) models. 
Modelling is performed in two steps, first ARIMA model is fitted to the series and then 
only GARCH model is adapted accordingly. 
 
Appropriate ARIMA model specification has to be established for the series. Looking back 
at descriptive analysis, in particularly guided by autocorrelations and partial 
autocorrelations correlograms, optimal lag length of 2 is fitted assumed for the ARIMA 
models.  Nine possible models were estimated for percentage return of exchange rate series 
ranging from ARIMA (0,0) to ARIMA (2,2), then guided by Akaike and Schwartz 
Information Criterions the best fit models were chosen. Guided by Table 4-3 results, it can 
be concluded that both criteria give the same model specifications for Belgium, Canada, 
Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, Finland, France, Great Britain, Ireland, 
Japan, New Zealand, Sweden and US. In cases where criterions give two different 
specifications both specifications are retained for further analysis.  Results for Netherlands 
series indicate no need to stick to three variables analysis further. Properties of Netherlands 
overall sample and Netherlands 1 are very similar according to their econometric nature as 
has been supported by statics in Descriptive analysis and ARIMA fitting models. Thus it 
has been decided to omit Netherlands 1 variable from the analysis, as model fitted to 
Netherlands variable should be of a fit to Netherlands 1 sample. 
 
Table 4- 4 ARIMA models selection for exchange rate series 
 AIC best fit model SIC best fit model 
Austria (AT) ARIMA(2,1) ARIMA(0,1) 
Australia (AU) ARIMA(1,1) ARIMA(0,1) 
Belgium (BE) ARIMA(0,1) ARIMA(0,1) 
Canada (CA) ARIMA(1,0) ARIMA(1,0) 
Switzerland (CH) ARIMA(0,1) ARIMA(0,1) 
Germany (DE) ARIMA(0,1) ARIMA(0,1) 
Denmark (DK) ARIMA(1,2) ARIMA(1,2) 
Spain (ES) ARIMA(0,1) ARIMA(0,1) 
Finland (FI) ARIMA(0,1) ARIMA(0,1) 
France (FR) ARIMA(0,1) ARIMA(0,1) 
Great Britain (GB) ARIMA(0,1) ARIMA(0,1) 
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Ireland (IE) ARIMA(1,2) ARIMA(1,2) 
Italy (IT) ARIMA(2,2) ARIMA(0,1) 
Japan (JP) ARIMA(0,1) ARIMA(0,1) 
Netherlands (NL) ARIMA(1,2) ARIMA(0,1) 
Netherlands 1 (NL1) ARIMA(1,2) ARIMA(0,1) 
Netherlands 2 (NL2) ARIMA(2,2) ARIMA(2,2) 
Norway (NO) ARIMA(1,2) ARIMA(0,1) 
New Zealand (NZ) ARIMA(2,2) ARIMA(2,2) 
Portugal (PT) ARIMA(2,2) ARIMA(0,0) 
Sweden (SE) ARIMA(0,1) ARIMA(0,1) 
United States (US) ARIMA(0,1) ARIMA(0,1) 
AIC- Akaike Information Criterion. 
SIC –Schwartz information Criterion. 
Rule for the best fit is the minimal value of information criterion. 
 
Lagrange multiplier tests for ARCH components need to be done to assure that conditional 
heteroskedasticity models are appropriate for the data. Series are tested for the detection of 
ARCH errors for a lag length of 1, 6, and 12 under the null hypothesis of no ARCH effects 
present, where the lag length is more than one then test is able to capture GARCH type 
errors. Results for ARCH LM tests are reported in Table 4-4 where conclusions on ARCH 
effects present are based on the statistical criteria at 5% significance level. 
 
For twelve out of twenty countries’ exchange rates considered here, the presence of ARCH 
effects is confirmed by ARCH LM tests at all lag lengths (1, 6 and 12) indicating the need 
for GARCH modelling. For countries like Canada, Ireland, Finland and the United States 
ARCH components are detected only at higher lag lengths signalling towards the presence 
of GARCH properties. For Austria, Norway and Sweden ARCH effects are detected at 
starting lag lengths but disappear at higher lag orders of 12 indicating the need for ARCH 
modelling. One of the core disadvantages of ARCH modelling is the exact definition of lag 
length order. Recalling that ARCH model with infinite lag length is similar to GARCH 
(1,1) model, however, gives us advantage of using GARCH modelling for the series.  
ARCH errors have been detected in most cases except for Spain and Netherlands 2 where 
all of the tests results favour the null hypothesis of no ARCH effects present. Conditional 
heteroskedasticity modelling for Spain or Netherlands 2 will not be recalled, as ARCH 
tests are not so powerful tests to draw final conclusions on.  Please remember that 
additional measure for the robustness checks is to be used (i.e. rolling standard deviation). 
Table 4- 5 ARCH LM tests results for exchange rate series 
 
K=1 K=6 K=12 
 
 













F stat TR^2 F stat TR^2 AIC SIC F stat TR^2 F stat TR^2 AIC SIC F stat TR^2 F stat TR^2 AIC SIC 
 
AT 4.55 4.53 4.55 4.53 YES YES 1.13 6.76 1.13 6.76 NO NO 0.87 10.49 0.95 11.42 NO NO 
 
AU 10.58 10.39 15.08 14.68 YES YES 2.99 17.53 3.49 20.34 YES YES 1.72 20.34 1.88 22.06 YES YES 
 
BE 17.74 17.19 17.74 17.19 YES YES 3.20 18.72 3.20 18.72 YES YES 1.70 20.08 1.70 20.08 YES YES 
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CA 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 NO NO 1.13 6.77 1.13 6.77 NO NO 4.37 48.46 4.37 48.46 YES YES 
 
CH 8.06 7.96 8.06 7.96 YES YES 4.88 28.02 4.88 28.02 YES YES 2.76 31.80 2.76 31.80 YES YES 
 
DE 101.7 84.65 101.7 84.65 YES YES 17.75 88.54 17.75 88.54 YES YES 9.20 91.93 9.20 91.93 YES YES 
 
DK 26.09 24.88 26.09 24.88 YES YES 5.28 30.14 5.28 30.14 YES YES 2.65 30.61 2.65 30.61 YES YES 
 
ES 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 NO NO 0.13 0.76 0.13 0.76 NO NO 0.07 0.83 0.07 0.83 NO NO 
 
FI 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 NO NO 2.00 11.88 2.00 11.88 YES YES 1.85 21.83 1.85 21.83 YES YES 
 
FR 15.48 15.07 15.48 15.07 YES YES 3.43 20.01 3.43 20.01 YES YES 2.12 24.84 2.12 24.84 YES YES 
 
GB 17.76 17.18 17.76 17.18 YES YES 4.90 28.08 4.90 28.08 YES YES 2.99 34.23 2.99 34.23 YES YES 
 
IE 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 NO NO 1.61 9.59 1.61 9.59 NO NO 1.79 21.07 1.79 21.07 YES YES 
 
IT 50.25 45.78 45.70 42.00 YES YES 20.30 98.63 19.37 95.06 YES YES 10.17 99.55 9.74 96.25 YES YES 
 
JP 7.06 6.99 7.06 6.99 YES YES 3.44 20.08 3.44 20.08 YES YES 1.92 22.58 1.92 22.58 YES YES 
 
NL 10.09 9.92 11.53 11.32 YES YES 2.69 15.83 3.20 18.70 YES YES 1.83 21.59 2.05 24.06 YES YES 
 





NO 8.32 8.21 8.56 8.45 YES YES 2.77 16.28 2.78 16.33 YES YES 1.42 16.95 1.44 17.08 NO NO 
 
NZ 6.58 6.52 6.58 6.52 YES YES 2.70 15.90 2.70 15.90 YES YES 1.92 22.61 1.92 22.61 YES YES 
 
PT 24.98 23.87 25.92 24.73 YES YES 6.97 39.02 8.96 49.08 YES YES 8.42 85.42 8.76 88.33 YES YES 
 
SE 2.73 2.73 2.73 2.73 YES YES 0.45 2.73 0.45 2.73 NO NO 0.26 3.16 0.26 3.16 NO NO 
 
US 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 NO NO 3.37 19.68 3.37 19.68 YES YES 2.04 23.91 2.04 23.91 YES YES 
 
                   
AIC and SIC correspond to best-fit models chosen by Akaike and Schwartz Information Criterions respectively. 
F-stat and TR2 statistics have been estimated in EViews 7.0. 
K corresponds to lag length of the model, and tests are done at 5% significance level. 
*At 10% significance level arch effects are present 
 
The next step in the analysis is to fit a suitable GARCH model. Optimal specification for a 
GARCH model is chosen from a number of alternatives by the means of forecasting 
statistics. Gaussian distribution of an error term is assumed for GARCH models settings 
with heteroskedasticity consistent Bollerslev-Wooldridge coefficient of covariance. 
Methodology of Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) is followed due to non-normality of the 
series as has been confirmed by the Jarque-Bera tests. Once GARCH models are estimated, 
then in-sample one-step static forecasts are used to compare the fit of the models similarly 
to proposed methodology of Liu and Morley (2009). There are 5-7 forecast error statistics 
estimated together with the forecasts and they are reported in Table 4-5 along with 
different GARCH based specifications. In many cases statistics give different results and 
do not reach one unique conclusion, so criteria for a superior forecast has to be defined.  
Our aim is for forecast errors to have a mean value of 0 (bias proportion close to 0) and 
small variance proportion to trade-off against a large covariance proportion that implies 
preference for larger unsystematic errors rather than systematic errors. 
 
Table 4- 6 Forecast error statistics for GARCH based exchange rate volatility models 
 RMSE MAE MAPE TIC BP VP CP 
AT: GARCH(1,1) 0.638575 0.483600 101.4812* 0.959077 0.000074 NA NA 
AT: ARIMA(2,1)-GARCH(1,1) 0.624093* 0.476794* 135.8271 0.760697* 0.000225 0.551972* 0.447804 
AT: ARIMA(0,1)-GARCH(1,1) 0.626817 0.477278 131.6684 0.780393 0.000352 0.587962 0.411686 
AT: GARCH(2,1) 0.638552 0.483809 102.7115 0.950015 0.000002* NA NA 
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AU: GARCH(1,1) 2.482679 1.791321 105.2090* 0.938041 0.003355 NA NA 
AU: ARIMA(1,1)-GARCH(1,1) 2.405114* 1.752307* 132.1682 0.745295 0.002015 0.527367 0.47619 
AU: ARIMA(0,1)-GARCH(1,1) 2.419197 1.787819 141.8832 0.738791* 0.000890* 0.487127* 0.511983 
BE: GARCH(1,1) 0.783539 0.569124 100.0969* 0.975657 0.000460 NA NA 
BE: ARIMA(0,1)-GARCH(1,1) 0.735516* 0.533165* 148.3272 0.698518* 0.000379* 0.488948 0.510673 
CA: GARCH(1,1) 1.344981 1.008173 100.4666* 0.984813 0.000101 NA NA 
CA: ARIMA(1,0)-GARCH (1,1) 1.320620* 0.989293* 140.1638 0.820333* 0.000065* 0.672381 0.327555 
CH: GARCH(1,1) 1.407114 1.064499 106.7570* 0.931713 0.000127 NA NA 
CH: ARIMA(0,1)-GARCH(1,1) 1.352253* 1.042805* 156.2387 0.740257* 0.000003* 0.554989 0.445008 
DE: GARCH(1,1) 0.991936 0.746498 99.39764* 0.986345 0.000564 NA NA 
DE: ARIMA(0,1)-GARCH(1,1) 0.951361* 0.718715* 136.1310 0.764216* 0.000391* 0.602808 0.396801 
DK: GARCH(1,1) 0.950119 0.687893 105.8973 0.940879 0.000280 NA NA 
DK: ARIMA(1,2)-GARCH(1,1) 0.924337* 0.661498* 142.9575 0.756755* 0.000157 0.552177 0.447666 
DK: GARCH(1,2) 0.950036 0.687200 101.8187* 0.965246 0.000104* NA NA 
FI:   GARCH(1,1) 1.190652 0.745995 101.5000* 0.981995 0.000083 NA NA 
FI: ARIMA(0,1)-GARCH(1,1) 1.145943* 0.711635* 145.9227 0.773707* 0.000014* 0.620745 0.379241 
FR: GARCH(1,1) 0.883371 0.622685 100.0227* 0.974735 0.000058 NA NA 
FR: ARIMA(0,1)-GARCH(1,1) 0.847956* 0.592037* 163.7052 0.724772* 0.000057* 0.496937 0.503006 
GB: GARCH(1,1) 1.801772 1.291461 101.2750* 0.990199 0.000189* NA NA 
GB: ARIMA(0,1)-GARCH(1,1) 1.720077* 1.277445* 189.2689 0.763507* 0.000221 0.617034 0.382746 
IE: GARCH (1,1) 1.364181 0.991546 112.4342 0.922163 0.002661 NA NA 
IE: ARIMA(1,2)-GARCH(1,1) 1.327827* 0.957057* 136.4848 0.766475* 0.003523 0.587244 0.409233 
IE: GARCH(1,2) 1.362926 0.990077 107.2170* 0.941213 0.000823* NA NA 
IT: GARCH(1,1) 1.283613 0.783269 107.6825* 0.962442 0.003313 NA NA 
IT: ARIMA(2,2)-GARCH(1,1) 1.191375* 0.736845* 166.2361 0.698706* 0.008868 0.536344* 0.454788 
IT: GARCH(2,2)  1.283636 0.783264 107.7794 0.962173 0.003349 NA NA 
IT: ARIMA(0,1) –GARCH(1,1) 1.211788 0.738790 146.1811 0.735532 0.002169* 0.573013 0.424818 
JP: GARCH(1,1) 2.415762 1.808122 108.9233* 0.930204 0.000158 NA NA 
JP: ARIMA(0,1)-GARCH(1,1) 2.295530* 1.765507* 138.8581 0.724852* 0.000001* 0.537468 0.462531 
NL: GARCH(1,1) 0.913420 0.689285 107.7331 0.952022 0.000511 NA NA 
NL: ARIMA(1,2)-GARCH(1,1) 0.854728* 0.660072* 181.3459 0.678646* 0.000260 0.446586* 0.553153 
NL: ARIMA(0,1) –
GARCH(1,1) 
0866468 0.667095 162.0987 0.723805 0.000507* 0.534009 0.465484 
NL: GARCH(1,2) 0.913460 0.689385 108.2177* 0.950364 0.000600 NA NA 
NO: GARCH(1,1) 1.187507 0.840713 99.02724* 0.989560 0.000084 NA NA 
NO: ARIMA(1,2) –GARCH(1,1) 1.149783* 0.830024 173.9883 0.769851* 0.000005 0.592583* 0.407412 
NO: ARIMA(0,1)-GARCH(1,1) 1.160133 0.821865* 148.4281 0.793093 0.000038 0.619083 0.380879 
NO: GARCH(1,2) 1.187457 0.840606 99.81517 0.981699 0.000001* NA NA 
NZ: GARCH(1,1) 2.204611 1.530696 101.4824* 0.984861 0.000005* NA NA 
NZ: ARIMA(2,2)-GARCH(1,1) 2.113181* 1.398728* 168.1382 0.709984* 0.000018 0.465985 0.533998 
NZ: GARCH(2,2) 2.204800 1.533410 105.1359 0.974319 0.000176 NA NA 
PT: GARCH(1,1) 1.535655* 0.948935 112.8855* 0.946782 0.000355* NA NA 
PT: ARMA(2,2)-GARCH(1,1) 1.537817 0.946839* 159.2286 0.796695* 0.000865 0.563977 0.435158 
PT: GARCH(2,2) 1.535860 0.949567 115.5632 0.941469 0.000622 NA NA 
SE: GARCH(1,1) 1.454548 0.946364 100.7221* 0.988190 0.003652 NA NA 
SE: ARMA(0,1)-GARCH(1,1) 1.400251* 0.924517* 172.2789 0.778450* 0.001831* 0.624790 0.373380 
US: GARCH(1,1) 1.334635 1.016366 111.8134* 0.940504 0.000005 NA NA 
US: ARIMA(0,1)-GARCH(1,1) 1.270449* 0.955963* 139.3733 0.716892* 0.000001* 0.509040 0.490958 
1.Optimal specification by our judgement of the forecasting test results is written in bold.   
2.RMSE- square root of mean squared error, MAE –Mean Absolute Error, MAPE – mean absolute percentage error, TIC – Theil’s 
Information Criteria, BP – Bias Proportion, VP – Variance Proportion, CP –Covariance Proportion.  
*The best specification among country’s specifications listed according to specific test.  
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Square root of mean square error (RMSE), mean absolute error (MAE) and mean absolute 
percentage error (MAPE) are measures based on the difference of forecasted and actual 
residuals. There is a need to note that mostly MAPE is a common statistic used by 
researchers (e.g. Makridakis and Hibon (1995), Brooks and Burke (1998)). The main 
drawback of these measures is that they are sensitive to scaling and measure units of the 
variable. Please recall that our variable is GARCH model of the percentage change of 
exchange rate (100*d [log (REERt)]), so it is hard to interpret the meaning of statistics 
 
The analysis will be concerned more with Theil’s Information Criteria because this is the 
only available scale free measure. However, Theil’s statistic similarly to MSE penalises 
outliers or any large errors (effect of news on the market) stronger than small errors. A 
very useful forecasting test statistic for exchange rate volatility is Z score (correct sign 
prediction). Not only the value of change matters for the exchange rate, but also most 
importantly the nature of change (i.e. appreciation or depreciation) is the vital predictor. 
Unfortunately this test is not available to us in EViews. 
 
For half of the countries present in the study (AU, BE, CA, CH, DE, FI, FR, JP, SE and 
US) model choice is easy and is where both bias proportion and Theil’s Information 
Criteria are the smallest. In other cases decision making will be harder, like in the case of 
Austria, where out of four possible models only one can be rejected according to statistics 
– ARIMA(0,1) –GARCH (1,1).  GARCH(2,2) is our choice for the best model. Even 
though it has high values of both squared residual statistics and TIC statistics, its MAPE 
value is second best and most importantly its bias proportion is very low, indicating better 
mean modelling. Since the concern is equations of first and second moments, cases where 
BP value is the smallest is preferred. Similarly in cases of Denmark, Great Britain, Ireland, 
New Zealand and Portugal, model will be chosen with the smallest bias proportion and 
MAPE values. In case of Italy and Netherlands the model with smallest bias and second 
best indicators of RMSE, MAE and TIC is picked. In the case of Norway the value with 
the smallest mean bias and second best indicator for MAPE is selected. Please note that the 
cases of Spain or Netherlands 2 are not discussed here, as there was no overwhelming 
evidence found for the presence of ARCH effects.  Still GARCH (1,1) model will be fit to 
them. 
 
4.1.5 EGARCH based measures. 
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Exchange rates have common characteristic – asymmetry that needs to be accounted for in 
heteroskedastic models, so EGARCH model will be used. Nelson (1991) technique is 
followed and GED distribution is assumed. For most of the countries EGARCH (1,1) 
model will be fit, but for Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, New 
Zealand and Portugal forecasting techniques are used to choose best fit from the 
alternatives.  
 
Results of forecast statistics are in Table 4-6. Easiest decision-making has been for the case 
of Norway where all of the forecasting test statistics agreed on one specification. Overall 
decision-making here is easier than for general GARCH models. There are only five 
statistics and a specification choice of one out of two. So decision rule is to choose 
specification with at least three statistics favouring the model, but also not to forget the 
difference in mean values (BP). And it has indeed coincided in all of the cases. Results for 
different countries can be seen in Table 4-6.  
 
Table 4- 7 Forecast errors for EGARCH models of exchange rate volatility 
 RMSE MAE MAPE TIC BP 
AT: EGARCH(1,1) 0.639340 0.483255* 99.00208* 0.999644 0.002466 
AT: EGARCH(2,1) 0.638889* 0.483328 99.47188 0.982089* 0.001057* 
DK: EGARCH(1,1) 0.950120 0.687112* 101.0231* 0.971507 0.000282 
DK: EGARCH(1,2) 0.950042* 0.687193 101.7480 0.965798* 0.000116* 
IE:  EGARCH (1,1) 1.363683 0.990944* 110.5833 0.928371* 0.001932 
IE:  EGARCH(1,2) 1.363228* 0.990410 108.6716* 0.935355 0.001265* 
IT:  EGARCH(1,1) 1.284017* 0.783206 109.3778* 0.957930 0.003939* 
IT:  EGARCH(2,2)  1.284080 0.783204* 109.6443 0.957261* 0.004037 
NL: EGARCH(1,1) 0.913191* 0.688335* 102.9625* 0.969662 0.000011* 
NL: EGARCH(1,2) 0.913204 0.688459 103.6284 0.966913* 0.000038 
NO: EGARCH(1,1) 1.187521 0.840734 98.92774 0.990805 0.000109 
NO: EGARCH(1,2) 1.187460* 0.840604* 99.58523* 0.983013* 0.000006* 
NZ: EGARCH(1,1) 2.206708* 1.524155 101.1921* 0.971175 0.001904* 
NZ: EGARCH(2,2) 2.206804 1.524107* 101.3998 0.970287* 0.001991 
PT: EGARCH(1,1) 1.535401 0.947830* 104.2686* 0.968324 0.000023 
PT: EGARCH(2,2) 1.535388* 0.948003 106.6966 0.961447* 0.000006* 
Optimal specification by our judgement of the forecasting test results is written in bold.   
RMSE- square root of mean squared error, MAE –Mean Absolute Error, MAPE – mean absolute percentage error, TIC – Theil’s Information Criteria, BP – Bias Proportion.  
*The best specification among country’s specifications listed according to specific test.  
 
4.1.6 Volatility measures descriptive statistics.  
 
Estimated volatility measures have been averaged from monthly to yearly frequency. 
Descriptive statistics describing the final estimated volatility models of exchange rate 
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series are present in Table 4-7. Additionally, in Appendix A3 different exchange rate 
volatility measures have been plotted.  
 
By looking at the appendix A3 plots, from the scaling of axes it becomes apparent that 
standard deviation based volatility measures on average are smaller in magnitude than 
those based on GARCH models. On average across countries, highest range of values 
belongs to ARIMA-GARCH based models (15.4), followed by EGARCH (14.8), and 
standard deviation measure with lag length of 6 months (4.7). The rest of the measures 
have similar data range of 4.7. As expected, standard deviation based measures not only 
correspond to smaller data range, but also to a smaller standard deviation of the data.   
 
Observing the first three sections of Appendix A3, differences within rolling standard 
deviation measures can be noticed. Technically the only difference between the measures 
lies in the choice of optimal lag length. Even though measures are in close value ranges to 
each other, shapes of the curves do differ. In the first graph of EV1 measure, the curve is 
more flat comparatively to other graphs with a smaller distinction of the peak values. In the 
second graph closer to the end of period, the peak value is 0.979. In the third graph, there 
is emergence of the two peak values - one at the start of the period, another towards the 
end. Here, graph appears as a transitory between standard deviation based measures and 
GARCH based ones, as there is clear appearance of the two sideway peaks and flattening 
of the in-between curve section. Graphs based on GARCH modelling resemble white noise 
bounded by the two value peaks.   They have similar, but not identical shapes. Asymmetric 
modelling of exchange rates by the means of EGARCH produces results with higher 
standard deviation, whereas GARCH based measure gives higher peak value. Here, it 
looks that if the lag length of the rolling standard deviation keeps increasing infinitely it 
will reach GARCH based volatility measure. 
 
These observational results are not unique and differ across countries. Similarly to 
Australia, for Canada, Finland, Italy, New Zealand, Portugal and Spain, different volatility 
models produce different characteristics of the volatility measures (i.e. peaks position, 
number and value). For the rest of the countries models produce not identical, but in 
general terms similar plot shapes without apparent differences.  
 
 Even results on range, minimum value, maximum value, mean and standard deviation are 
dependant on the country choice. However, one general conclusion can be drawn. There is 
more similarity among parametric measures (GARCH based) than between rolling 
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standard deviation ones. There are still differences within parametric models. In general, 
asymmetric models produce higher peaks, but flatter intervals in between.    
 
 
Table 4-8 Descriptive statistics and normality tests of yearly volatility measures of exchange rate series 



































































































Austria (AT)                     
MA6 40 0.530 0.519 0.875 0.173 0.171 0.147 2.691 0.304 0.859 
MA12 40 0.580 0.600 0.979 0.200 0.172 0.063 2.864 0.058 0.972 
MA18 39 0.594 0.600 1.003 0.225 0.170 -0.044 2.705 0.154 0.926 
GARCH (2,1) 40 0.415 0.424 0.669 0.166 0.125 -0.175 2.283 1.060 0.589 
EGARCH (2,1) 40 0.414 0.429 0.623 0.158 0.117 -0.276 2.456 1.001 0.606 
Australia (AU)                     
MA6 38 1.985 1.851 3.548 0.947 0.687 0.738 2.904 3.464 0.177 
MA12 38 2.188 2.055 4.580 1.006 0.822 1.118 4.357 10.837 0.004 
MA18 37 2.278 2.194 4.617 1.087 0.775 0.979 4.256 8.347 0.015 
ARIMA(0,1) -
GARCH(1,1) 
38 5.957 5.327 14.371 4.008 2.208 2.327 8.380 80.116 0.000 
EGARCH (1,1) 38 6.077 5.511 11.419 4.209 1.835 1.628 5.148 24.082 0.000 
Belgium (BE)                     
MA6 40 0.595 0.562 1.545 0.262 0.203 2.611 13.184 218.281 0.000 
MA12 40 0.671 0.632 1.817 0.298 0.242 2.659 13.831 242.656 0.000 
MA18 39 0.706 0.665 1.543 0.386 0.222 1.976 8.265 70.438 0.000 
ARIMA(0,1)-
GARCH(1,1) 
40 0.537 0.504 1.490 0.409 0.165 4.940 29.098 1297.838 0.000 
EGARCH(1,1) 40 0.598 0.570 1.580 0.421 0.184 3.892 21.492 670.894 0.000 
Canada (CA)                     
MA6 40 1.053 0.978 2.310 0.500 0.398 1.467 5.575 25.390 0.000 
MA12 40 1.161 1.065 2.920 0.673 0.452 1.954 7.566 60.194 0.000 
MA18 39 1.207 1.077 2.942 0.729 0.454 1.923 7.238 53.224 0.000 
ARIMA(1,0)-
GARCH(1,1) 
40 1.788 1.398 7.076 0.874 1.154 2.923 12.689 213.445 0.000 
EGARCH(1,1) 40 1.777 1.525 4.813 0.761 0.860 1.674 5.855 32.267 0.000 
Switzerland 
(CH) 
                    
MA6 40 1.116 1.073 2.166 0.571 0.315 0.941 4.586 10.093 0.006 
MA12 40 1.243 1.245 2.422 0.724 0.337 1.043 5.086 14.512 0.001 
MA18 39 1.302 1.260 2.633 0.846 0.340 1.560 7.209 44.595 0.000 
ARIMA(0,1)-
GARCH(1,1) 
40 1.845 1.764 3.652 1.345 0.431 2.016 8.907 85.267 0.000 
EGARCH(1,1) 40 1.972 1.923 4.179 1.347 0.491 2.264 11.307 149.191 0.000 
Germany (DE)                     




































































































MA12 40 0.869 0.827 1.909 0.433 0.284 1.585 6.602 38.379 0.000 
MA18 39 0.908 0.878 2.200 0.446 0.291 2.282 11.152 141.840 0.000 
ARIMA(0,1)-
GARCH(1,1) 
40 0.907 0.835 2.321 0.594 0.321 2.926 12.567 209.640 0.000 
EGARCH(1,1) 40 0.977 0.923 2.199 0.583 0.295 2.104 9.116 91.851 0.000 
Denmark (DK)                     
MA6 40 0.746 0.688 1.647 0.290 0.304 1.296 4.694 15.988 0.000 
MA12 40 0.832 0.766 1.873 0.349 0.330 1.301 4.704 16.118 0.000 
MA18 39 0.870 0.803 1.572 0.382 0.311 0.649 2.647 2.942 0.230 
ARIMA(1,2)-
GARCH(1,1) 
40 0.915 0.797 2.769 0.543 0.412 2.822 12.139 192.293 0.000 
EGARCH(1,2) 40 0.887 0.784 2.278 0.482 0.370 1.720 6.459 39.670 0.000 
Spain (ES)                     
MA6 40 0.950 0.748 3.107 0.479 0.557 1.949 7.177 54.397 0.000 
MA12 40 1.077 0.878 2.698 0.493 0.583 1.399 3.953 14.558 0.001 
MA18 39 1.144 0.953 3.418 0.543 0.649 1.712 5.878 32.517 0.000 
GARCH(1,1) 40 2.260 1.457 9.819 0.427 2.247 1.799 5.919 35.786 0.000 
EGARCH(1,1) 40 1.566 1.455 3.939 0.585 0.896 0.966 3.016 6.227 0.044 
Finland (FI)                     
MA6 40 0.830 0.730 2.389 0.255 0.455 1.559 5.703 28.379 0.000 
MA12 40 0.935 0.801 2.921 0.316 0.519 1.697 6.674 41.689 0.000 
MA18 39 0.992 0.845 2.825 0.345 0.510 1.537 5.756 27.688 0.000 
ARIMA(0,1) -
GARCH(1,1) 
40 1.405 1.119 5.205 0.655 0.842 2.683 11.667 173.189 0.000 
EGARCH(1,1) 40 1.369 1.071 6.116 0.500 1.038 2.835 12.699 210.395 0.000 
France (FR)                     
MA6 40 0.667 0.599 1.591 0.292 0.310 1.495 4.961 21.307 0.000 
MA12 40 0.751 0.650 1.630 0.328 0.323 1.183 3.873 10.608 0.005 
MA18 39 0.798 0.720 1.511 0.344 0.319 0.891 2.884 5.178 0.075 
ARIMA(0,1) -
GARCH(1,1) 
40 0.792 0.589 2.430 0.246 0.527 1.458 4.410 17.477 0.000 
EGARCH(1,1) 40 0.798 0.659 2.218 0.304 0.455 1.820 5.757 34.743 0.000 
Great Britain 
(GB) 
                    
MA6 38 1.384 1.259 2.595 0.669 0.504 0.670 2.573 3.130 0.209 
MA12 38 1.561 1.495 2.950 0.752 0.543 0.781 3.048 3.869 0.144 
MA18 37 1.629 1.574 2.806 0.787 0.511 0.398 2.319 1.694 0.429 
GARCH(1,1) 38 3.405 2.843 6.713 1.968 1.390 1.018 2.891 6.588 0.037 
EGARCH(1,1) 38 3.345 2.920 6.417 1.942 1.261 0.831 2.428 4.889 0.087 
Ireland (IE)                     
MA6 40 1.085 0.990 2.524 0.284 0.517 0.969 3.574 6.804 0.033 
MA12 40 1.181 1.024 2.497 0.335 0.540 0.851 3.130 4.855 0.088 
MA18 39 1.237 1.188 2.501 0.408 0.510 0.718 2.946 3.357 0.187 
GARCH(1,2) 40 2.106 1.603 6.502 0.430 1.601 1.588 4.660 21.401 0.000 




































































































Italy (IT)                     
MA6 40 0.836 0.651 2.754 0.177 0.615 1.952 5.974 40.148 0.000 
MA12 40 0.954 0.779 3.027 0.232 0.675 1.850 5.746 35.372 0.000 
MA18 39 1.026 0.768 2.861 0.295 0.677 1.348 3.535 12.280 0.002 
ARIMA(0,1) -
GARCH(1,1) 
40 1.797 0.880 10.140 0.308 2.532 2.299 6.874 60.256 0.000 
EGARCH(1,1) 40 1.759 0.860 11.061 0.197 2.482 2.474 8.076 83.756 0.000 
Japan (JP)                     
MA6 40 1.920 1.830 3.086 0.883 0.579 0.315 2.289 1.502 0.472 
MA12 40 2.137 2.138 3.686 0.953 0.617 0.362 2.785 0.950 0.622 
MA18 39 2.246 2.137 3.626 1.145 0.596 0.314 2.401 1.223 0.542 
ARIMA(0,1) -
GARCH(1,1) 
40 5.145 5.169 8.083 1.950 1.555 -0.165 2.167 1.340 0.512 
EGARCH(1,1) 40 5.975 5.595 8.265 4.735 0.950 0.882 2.839 5.231 0.073 
Netherlands 
(NL) 
                    
MA6 40 0.741 0.753 1.231 0.326 0.208 0.259 2.563 0.764 0.683 
MA12 40 0.811 0.778 1.476 0.438 0.221 0.741 3.539 4.141 0.126 
MA18 39 0.847 0.822 1.434 0.521 0.199 0.672 3.283 3.067 0.216 
ARIMA(0,1) -
GARCH(1,1) 
40 0.764 0.753 1.267 0.440 0.154 0.694 4.502 6.973 0.031 
EGARCH(1,1) 40 0.845 0.817 1.169 0.462 0.162 0.093 2.815 0.114 0.945 
Netherlands 1                     
MA6 31 0.755 0.775 1.231 0.326 0.213 0.153 2.704 0.234 0.889 
MA12 31 0.828 0.798 1.476 0.438 0.231 0.660 3.438 2.498 0.287 
MA18 30 0.867 0.828 1.434 0.521 0.200 0.720 3.458 2.858 0.240 
ARIMA(0,1) -
GARCH(1,1) 
31 0.765 0.756 1.057 0.625 0.098 1.030 3.904 6.536 0.038 
EGARCH(1,1) 31 0.852 0.824 1.144 0.657 0.131 0.665 2.667 2.430 0.297 
Netherlands 2                      
MA6 8 0.0003 0.0003 0.0008 0.0001 0.0002 1.7152 4.9665 5.2115 0.0738 
MA12 8 0.0004 0.0002 0.0012 0.0001 0.0003 2.0687 5.6765 8.0937 0.0175 
MA18 7 0.0111 0.0098 0.0201 0.0055 0.0048 0.9568 2.9865 1.0680 0.5862 
GARCH(1,1) 7 0.0128 0.0130 0.0223 0.0069 0.0051 0.7730 2.7976 0.7090 0.7015 
EGARCH(1,1) 8 0.0084 0.0080 0.0140 0.0053 0.0030 0.6993 2.4747 0.7439 0.6894 
Norway (NO)                     
MA6 40 0.934 0.785 2.071 0.258 0.414 0.746 3.037 3.713 0.156 
MA12 40 1.042 1.037 2.340 0.274 0.407 0.877 4.342 8.133 0.017 
MA18 39 1.087 1.063 2.136 0.342 0.388 0.610 3.245 2.520 0.284 
GARCH(1,2) 40 1.456 1.245 3.341 0.843 0.547 1.595 5.632 28.504 0.000 
EGARCH(1,2) 40 1.491 1.352 3.056 0.597 0.614 0.943 3.162 5.969 0.051 
New Zealand 
(NZ) 
                    




































































































MA12 40 1.848 1.671 4.667 0.794 0.880 1.440 5.056 20.870 0.000 
MA18 39 1.940 1.715 4.686 0.849 0.908 1.343 4.460 15.178 0.001 
GARCH(1,1) 40 4.941 3.884 15.572 2.100 3.096 2.094 7.339 60.629 0.000 
EGARCH(1,1) 40 4.903 4.359 14.342 1.229 2.799 1.335 4.965 18.321 0.000 
Portugal (PT)                     
MA6 40 1.084 0.830 4.089 0.244 0.834 1.648 5.699 30.244 0.000 
MA12 40 1.189 0.921 4.019 0.346 0.887 1.473 4.791 19.815 0.000 
MA18 39 1.229 0.919 3.980 0.404 0.897 1.361 4.343 14.965 0.001 
GARCH(1,1) 40 2.557 1.124 15.237 0.239 3.496 2.314 8.190 80.571 0.000 
EGARCH(2,2) 40 2.211 1.258 12.986 0.237 2.715 2.350 8.856 93.986 0.000 
Sweden (SE)                     
MA6 40 1.066 1.011 2.459 0.386 0.477 0.952 3.846 7.233 0.027 
MA12 40 1.197 1.054 2.902 0.422 0.588 1.066 3.787 8.613 0.013 
MA18 39 1.259 1.089 2.760 0.432 0.587 0.918 3.247 5.575 0.062 
ARIMA(0,1) -
GARCH(1,1) 
40 1.987 1.846 3.508 1.639 0.419 2.256 7.780 72.003 0.000 
EGARCH(1,1) 40 2.110 1.749 7.513 0.763 1.372 2.080 7.854 68.102 0.000 
United States 
(US) 
                    
MA6 40 1.064 1.075 1.765 0.444 0.357 0.045 2.140 1.247 0.536 
MA12 40 1.177 1.171 1.920 0.459 0.366 0.025 2.208 1.048 0.592 
MA18 39 1.230 1.256 1.907 0.494 0.339 -0.050 2.407 0.588 0.745 
ARIMA(0,1) -
GARCH(1,1) 
40 1.675 1.563 2.906 0.663 0.572 0.553 2.477 2.492 0.288 
EGARCH(1,1) 40 1.861 1.838 3.153 0.607 0.658 0.266 2.311 1.263 0.532 
Please note volatility measures and all relevant analysis are estimated using EViews 7.0 except for Netherlands 2 that has been estimated 
using EViews 8.0. 
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4.2 Exchange rate volatility effect on labour market performance. 
 
Based on literature review in Chapter 2, it is expected that exchange rate volatility will have a negative 
effect on labour market performance. Belke and Setzer (2003) find a link between exchange rate volatility 
and unemployment. They show that volatility of the exchange rate lowers job creation within industry. 
Low supply of jobs in the labour market increases unemployment, intensifies competition for jobs, creates 
additional discouraged labour force, and prolongs unemployment spells. Empirically, adverse effects of 
exchange rate volatility on labour market performance has been proven by studies of Belke and 
Gross(1996), Buscher and Mueller(1999), Belke and Setzer(2003), Belke and Kaas(2004), Chang 
et.al.(2007), Demir (2010), and Feldmann (2011).   
 
Labour market performance and its determinants are modelled using a number of panel estimation 
techniques. Choice of the appropriate methods was guided by technical econometric characteristics 
without omitting practical implications.  Particular emphasis is done on the panel time series nature of the 
macroeconomic model that distinguishes itself from the wealth of microeconomics based estimation 
instruments (Eberhardt (2012)). However, sensitivity analyses for the robustness of the model are not 
limited only by the technical aspects, but furthermore include additional variables of interest, alternative 
variable estimates to the existing ones and sample size manipulations.  
 
On the technical side, please note that for all econometric analysis in this section the STATA SE 13.1 
software has been used.  
  
4.2.1 Baseline model derivations 
 
Baseline specification is aimed at defining determinants of the labour market performance for the overall 
population sample of those who are 15 years and over. Here, core labour performance indicator is chosen 
to be the unemployment rate and exchange rate volatility indicator is chosen to be moving standard 
deviation with lag length of 6 months. Further choice of the determinants of the labour market 
performance is done in such a way as to retain a maximum attainable number of observations per panel 
group. After all adjustments and permutations have been done, it has resulted in unbalanced panel of 
equally spaced observations ranging from 1985 to 2010.  Baseline specification in OLS form is: 
 
𝑈𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 
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where Uit is Unemployment Rate, Xit is a vector of explanatory variables, αi is country fixed effects, that 
vary only between countries but not over time, dt is time dummies for years in the regression sample 
except one and uit is idiosyncratic error term that varies over time and between countries.   
 
As a starting point, a pooled OLS model has been fitted, with fixed time effects and clustered by 
countries. Yearly dummies are included for years 1986-2010. Results are reported in Table 4-8. 
According to regression results, exchange rate volatility is inversely related to unemployment rate, but 
relationship is highly insignificant with corresponding p value of 0.631. Theoretically results are 
unexpected, but could be explained by currency arbitrage creating extra work places. This would 
characterise decision makers as risk takers.  
 
What about other variables result in the regression? Positive highly significant relationship has been 
found between output gap and unemployment. This is in line with the previous literature (e.g. 
Elmeskov(1998), Nicoletti and Scarpetta(2004)).      
 
It has been found that tax wedge has positive impact on unemployment, 10% increase in tax rate is 
associated with 1.4% increase in unemployment rate. This result is in line with previous studies. Belot 
and Van Ours (2001) found that 10% increase in tax rate is accompanied by a 1.2% rise in unemployment 
rate in 18 OECD countries during the period of 1960-1994.  Overall, significance and direction of the 
result is tolerant with previous studies of Bassanini and Duval (2006a), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), 
Daveri and Tabellini(2000), and  Elmeskov et.al. (1998).  
 
According to the regression results, tightening of product market regulation results in higher 
unemployment rates. However, the result is insignificant. This is in line with previous studies of 
Feldman(2012) and Bassanini and Duval(2009). Similarly, coefficient of the employment protection 
legislation variable is insignificant in the estimated regression equation. Still, results suggest that stricter 
employment protection policies are characterised by lower unemployment rates. Results of previous 
studies in the area have been split on the significance and direction of the effect. Even though Bassanini 
and Duval (2006 a) found no significant result, their estimates suggest that strict employment protection 
legislation is associated with higher unemployment rate. Studies of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) found 
that employment protection legislation has a significant positive effect on unemployment. Elmeskov et.al. 
(1998) found that EPL always has significantly positive impact on structural unemployment in all of the 
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regressions for OECD 19 countries during 1983-1995. Furthermore, Furceri and Morougane (2009) found 
that in countries with high EPL, rise in unemployment as a consequence of a severe downturn could be 
doubled in comparison to countries with weak EPL policies. Nickel (1998) found no significant 
relationship between EPL policy strictness and unemployment in 20 OECD countries during 1983-1994. 
However, in the short-run it tends to decrease unemployment rate, but in the long-term it tends to increase 
it. 
 
Belot and Van Ours(2001) estimated a negative relationship between EPL and unemployment level. 
Introduction of the EPL into regression equation reduces unemployment by almost 3%. Daveri and 
Tabellini(2000) confirmed a negative effect of the EPL on unemployment in the study of 14 OECD 
countries during the years of 1965-1995.  However, in the reduced form regression, first difference of the 
EPL variable becomes insignificant.  
 
Regression results are indicative of a positive insignificant relationship among average benefit 
replacement rates and unemployment rate. Direction of the relationship is in line with previous studies of 
Bassanini and Duval (2006), Blanchards and Wolfers(2000), Bone and Van Ours(2004), Belot and Van 
Ours(2001), Daveri and Tabellini(2000), and IMF (2003). However in most of the studies concerned with 
OECD countries the relationship has been found of high significance.  
 
Previous studies of Belot and Van Ours (2001), Blanchard and Wolfers, Boone and Van Ours(2004), IMF 
(2003), Nickel (1998), Nunziata(2002) and Scarpeta (1996) found positive relationship between union 
density and unemployment rate. Not in all of the studies relationship was significant. Our regression 
results contradict the studies as it looks as if higher unionisation is associated with smaller unemployment 
rates.  
 
Most coefficients in the regression equation are in line with the previous studies, except for exchange rate 
volatility and trade union density variables. Standard errors in the model are very large, without exception 
of exchange rate volatility, their biasness is suspected. If there is one, then coefficient estimates are 
unreliable and R squared values are artificially high. It has been decided to run diagnostic checks of the 
residuals of the OLS model. Correlation matrix obtained is evident of serial correlation present in the 
model as coefficients range from 0.27 to 0.99. For additional checks of serial correlation in panel data 
Wooldridge’s (2002) test is used.  It tests the null hypothesis of no serial correlation against alternative of 
first order autocorrelation of the error term. This test is robust to within panel correlation i.e. data 
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clustering within groups thus produces heteroskedasticity consistent estimates.  Estimated F-test value 
statistic of 118.286 and its corresponding p value of 0.000 provide strong evidence in favour of 
autocorrelated idiosyncratic error terms. 
 
It is clear that pooled OLS model does not represent a reliable tool to estimate this labour market case. A 
more advanced panel data models are needed to cope with unobservable elements of the regression, 
namely country effects.   
 
Next step is to estimate model using Fixed Effects (FE) or Random Effects (RE) models. Regression 
results based on FE and RE models have been estimated (Table 4-8). Contrary to pooled OLS technique, 
estimation of the equation using FE and RE derived a highly significant positive relationship between 
exchange rate volatility and unemployment rate. Corresponding coefficients and p values are for RE 
model 0.524(0.018) and for FE model 0.511(0.022). Standard errors have been reduced dramatically once 
alternative estimation methods have been used. Both techniques account for unobservable country effects 
but address the issue differently. Main distinction in ways to tackle the problem of unobservable term lies 
in the presumptions of its statistical behaviour in relationship to other variables in the regression. FE 
model proposes demeaning the data that eliminates the unobservable part from the resulting regression 
equation. Theoretical advantage of the above is that it does not need to restrict collinearity between 
country effects term and other explanatory variables in the equation. It is being a disadvantage of the RE 
model that presumes zero collinearity. Advantage of the RE model over FE is its capability to estimate 
categorical dummy variables that do not vary over time. Demeaning of the data in FE model eliminates 
not only unobservable element of the equation but all time-invariant variables. This does not seem to be a 
problem for baseline specification, as no time invariant variables are included in the explanatory variables 
vector. FE method appeals more to the model, as assumption of no collinearity practically seems to be too 
restrictive. Hausman test is done to aid with the choice between the RE and FE models. Chi squared value 
of 6.01 with its corresponding value of 0.5387 leads to conclude that difference in coefficients is not 
systematic so RE estimator is consistent and efficient. 
 
For the assurance of RE model’s econometric dominance over pooled OLS, Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
Multiplier test is run for the null hypothesis of no significant difference across countries in the sample. 
Resulting test statistic  (chi squared) of 3138.67 and its associated p value of 0.0000 are indicative of RE 
method providing a better estimate of the model than pooled OLS due to the country specific effects 
being present.  
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-0.426 0.511** 0.524** 
 
   
Exchange rate 
volatility (EV2)    
0.593***    
Exchange rate 
volatility (EV3)     
0.560***   
Exchange rate 
volatility (EV4)     
 0.126  
Exchange rate 
volatility (EV5)     
  0.154** 
Output Gap -0.509*** -0.526*** -0.536*** -0.534*** -0.533*** -0.546*** -0.538*** 
Tax Wedge 0.146** 0.137*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.129*** 0.126*** 0.130*** 
Product Market 
Regulation 








0.009 0.103*** 0.088*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.084*** 0.086*** 
Union Density -0.043 -0.021 -0.397* -0.042* -0.041* -0.037* -0.038* 
Time Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard Error 
of Exchange Rate 
Volatility 
0.852 0.223 0.221 0.202 0.202 0.079 0.078 
R2 within 
 
0.599 0.597 0.600 0.599 0.594 0.596 
R2 between  
 
0.049 0.073 0.069 0.069 0.077 0.073 





















      





















   
Average Number 
of Years2 
24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 
Number of 
Countries 
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Number of 
Observations 
482 482 482 482 482 482 482 
Baseline specification: 𝑈𝑟𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡
1 
1 Hausman test results reported are based on regressions without time effects. 
2 Average number of years is used as panel is unbalanced 
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* result is significant at 10% significance level 
** result is significant at 5% significance level 
*** result is significant at 1% significance level 
 
 
4.2.2 Exchange rate volatility measures 
 
Five alternative exchange rate volatility measures have been built for the purpose of this research. Three 
of the measures are based on moving average behavioural model of the exchange rate series and only 
differ by the time span of intervals. The other two measures are GARCH based volatility measures that 
differ only by the symmetry of response assumptions. Baseline specification of unemployment 
determinants inclusive of different volatility indicators has been estimated using Random Effects model.  
Results are reported in Table 4-8. Time effects have been included for all regressions as has been 
suggested by F-tests that are reported.  
 
Estimated coefficients in the regressions for exchange rate volatility are clustered by the nature of 
technique used. Parametric models’ volatility yields smaller coefficients than the non–parametric one. For 
moving average based estimations volatility coefficients range from 0.524 to 0.593, and results are highly 
significant even at 1% significance level. In case of GARCH based models, coefficients range from 0.126 
to 0.154 with the first result being insignificant and second being significant at 5% significance level.  
Absolute values of coefficients among the groups are not perfectly comparable. Moving average based 
indicator and unemployment rate are in percentages and log-linear levels whereas GARCH based 
measures are hard to translate into units.  
 
Standard errors of the exchange rate volatility variable are reported in the table. Smallest standard errors 
are for the mixed parametric measure of exchange rate volatility. Usually smaller standard errors 
represent the more robust results. Largest standard errors are for the baseline specification with volatility 
measure based on moving standard deviation with the smallest lag length of 6 months.  Larger standard 
errors create larger confidence intervals and less reliable estimates. These findings are in line with the 
expectations outlined in Chapter 2 of this research. However, higher standard errors in moving average 
models are accompanied by longer lag length and this could be a signal that exchange rates and volatility 
have longer memories than expected.  According to analysis probably the best performing measures of 
volatility are for the parametric – mixed GARCH model and for the non-parametric ones the largest lag 
length produces better estimate.  
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As for the other explanatory variables in the regressions they are within the range despite the type of 
volatility measure used in the regression. For the output gap, tax wedge, average benefit replacement rate 
coefficients appear to be highly significant at 1% significance level, for union density variable 
significance of the relationship is smaller at 10% significance level. Employment protection legislation 
has no significant impact on unemployment rate according to all of the regressions discussed here.  
Significance of product market regulation on unemployment formation varies across regressions from 
weakly significant 10% to significant level of 5%. Overall results are in line with the previous findings 
reported in this research. 
 
4.2.3 Labour market performance dynamics 
 
A significant amount of evidence has been gathered in favour of a positive linear relationship among 
exchange rate volatility and unemployment rate. However, unemployment rate is only a tip of an iceberg 
among labour market indicators available. This subsection aims to find how exchange rate volatility 
affects labour market performance by the means of different indicators that hopefully would help in 
drawing up a bit more detailed mechanism of interrelationships. 
 
The standard deviation of exchange rate variable is used for all specifications, but also drawing on 
previous section conclusions, exchange rate volatility indicator based on longer lag length is chosen 
(m=18 months). All results are reported in Table 4-9.  Baseline specification for unemployment rate 
where EV3 indicator has been used was carried forward from Table 4-8 to Table 4-9 for comparison 
reasons.   
 
The employment indicator of labour market performance is a complementary indicator to the 
unemployment rate. One would expect an inverse relationship between the two. This is not the case here, 
where according to results exchange rate volatility and employment rate sustain a positive relationship. 
Moreover reported result is highly significant even at 1% significance level.  Concluding from above, 
exchange rate volatility increases both unemployment and employment rates.  These results have not been 
expected contemporaneously and it was decided to use alternative unemployment rate indicator in the 
analysis.  
 
Harmonised unemployment rate variable is superior to a standard unemployment rate collected from 
Annual Labour Force Surveys.  The later one is suited for a cross-country comparison, but comes at a cost 
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of fewer available observations. Still it is expected it will produce more reliable results. Once 
unemployment rate has been substituted by an alternative in baseline specification, results responded to it 
as well.  It was found that exchange rate volatility lowers unemployment rate, so the direction of the 
relationship between the two variables has undergone coordinal change. Relationship is highly significant 
as before, but the coefficient of the exchange rate volatility has increased in absolute terms by almost 
50%.  These contrary results could be a consequence of either unemployment rate variable having poor 
performance for cross-section data analysis, econometric issues with the model, or exchange rate 
volatility affecting unemployment through transitional mechanisms that have spill over effects to both 
variables. Despite how contradictory these findings are, further analyses indicate that exchange rate 
volatility increases labour force participation rates and decreases inactivity rates.  Logically it 
accomplishes these results based on harmonised unemployment rate. However things are not as smooth as 
they look. Exchange rate volatility increases number of discouraged workers. Result is not just highly 
significant but is large in magnitude – could be explanation for the contradictory results. As number of 
discouraged workers increases pool of unemployment decreases in size giving mixed misleading signals 
of lower unemployment and higher employment rates. Similarly can have mixed effect on activity and 
inactivity rates.  Furthermore it has been shown to have no significant effect on short-term unemployment 
duration of less than six months.  
 
Non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment is another alternative variable to unemployment rate. It 
is indicator of structural unemployment and tracks long-term unemployment rate. According to regression 
analysis, exchange rate volatility increases structural unemployment rate in the long run. This fits to 
overall picture as well to support hypothesis of exchange rate volatility increasing unemployment rate, 
while mimicking the opposite effect through its discouraged workers link. 
 












































































































































Exchange rate volatility (EV3) 0.560*** 0.580*** -0.775*** 0.508** -0.506** 0.222** 0.297** 0.349 
Output Gap -0.533*** 0.326*** -0.518*** 0.076** -0.077** -0.167*** -0.079* 1.407*** 












































































































































Product Market Regulation 0.618* -0.565 2.407*** -1.033* 1.026* 0.114 1.244*** -0.878** 
Employment Protection 
Legislation 
0.419 2.933*** -0.536*** 1.803*** 1.786*** -0.538** 0.038 -3.221** 
Average Benefit Replacement 
Rate 
0.090*** -0.000 -0.008 0.019 -0.019 0.077*** -0.016** -0.150* 
Union Density -0.041* -0.084*** -0.030*** -0.042 0.042 -0.051*** 0.021*** 0.117 
Time Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard Error of Exchange 
Rate Volatility 
0.202 0.245 0.290 0.022 0.199 0.111 0.008 0.942 
R2 within 0.599 0.568 0.502 0.434 0.4307 0.519 0.573 0.436 
R2 between  0.069 0.014 0.193 0.099 0.099 0.003 0.501 0.317 
R2 overall 0.224 0.028 0.324 0.096 0.096 0.021 0.658 0.351 
Average number of years 24.1 13.1 22 13.1 13.1 24.1 11.9 23.2 
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 15 20 
Number of observations 482 262 440 262 262 482 178 465 
Specification: 𝑦 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑦 𝑖𝑠 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 
  1 HUR =Harmonised unemployment rate 
 2 NAIRU = Non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment 
3 Dummy variables are included for the years of 1991, 2000 and 2008 
* result is significant at 10% significance level 
** result is significant at 5% significance level 
*** result is significant at 1% significance level 
 
If it is indeed omitted variable bias that has created autocorrelation in the residuals, then it is possible to 
remedy it. All regressions have been re-run using random effects model with standard errors that are 
robust to autocorrelation. Results are indicative that autocorrelation is to be blamed for the previously 
achieved spurious results.  
 
First of all there is consensus between unemployment indicators that are used here. According to the 
results, exchange rate volatility creates additional unemployment rates increase, and now it is not only the 
sign of prediction, but the coefficients’ values are very close too. Results are significant at 10% level. For 
both regressions, composite exchange rate volatility indicator has been used, as it is most significant.   
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There is a balancing counter relationship between volatility and employment rate. Exchange rate volatility 
decreases employment rate as was predicted theoretically, but practically this result is insignificant so 
volatility has no impact on employment levels. What about structural unemployment? It looks like 
exchange rate volatility causes some structural disturbances but insignificant result and value of the 
coefficient (0.001) suggest the opposite. There is no relationship between NAIRU and ERV.  Similarly, 
no evidence has been found for the existence of relationship between ERV and activity, inactivity rates 
and unemployment duration. However estimated coefficients’ direction of proposed relationship is in line 
with initial expectations. 
 
The most surprising result still has been for regressions where discouraged workers numbers are 
explained. It appears that ERV is still significant in regressions for all ERV indicators. Once again, results 
for composite indicator of volatility are reported as they produce most significant estimates.  So it appears 
that the highest impact exchange rate volatility has on discouraged workers, more precisely it increases 
the numbers of them.  
 
Table 4-11 Determinants of labour market performance for OECD countries (1985-2011), where estimation 












































































































































volatility (EV1)  
-0.025  -0.032 0.022 0.001  0.094 
Exchange rate 
volatility (EV5) 
0.061*  0.063*    0.146***  
Output Gap -0.328*** 0.239*** -0.334*** 0.083*** -0.086*** -0.060*** -0.092** 0.709*** 
Tax Wedge 0.028** -0.075*** 0.028*** -0.051*** 0.051*** 0.012** 0.032*** -0.176** 
Product Market 
Regulation 
-0.094 0.201 -0.397 -0.144 0.106 -0.181 1.182*** 2.305 
Employment 
Protection Regulation 
0.034 0.628 -0.337 -0.034 0.042 -0.410** -0.135 -2.779 
Average Benefit 
Replacement Rate 
0.011 0.008 0.012 0.021 -0.022 0.004 -0.003 0.019 
Union Density 0.053** -0.045 0.040* -0.020 0.020 0.046*** 0.009 -0.079 
Time Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard Error of 
Exchange Rate 
Volatility 












































































































































R2 within 0.509 0.456 0.557 0.296 0.295 0.332 0.590 0.382 
R2 between 0.006 0.012 0.034 0.185 0.183 0.006 0.315 0.122 
R2  overall 0.081 0.033 0.077 0.177 0.175 0.002 0.582 0.175 
Average Number of 
Years 
24.1 13.1 22 13.1 13.1 24.1 11.9 23.2 
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 15 20 
Number of 
observations 
482 262 440 262 262 482 178 465 
  1 HUR =Harmonised unemployment rate 
 2 NAIRU =Non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment 
* result is significant at 10% significance level 
** result is significant at 5% significance level 
*** result is significant at 1% significance level 
 
This result fits into previous studies conclusions from literature review.  In particular with results of 
Belke and Setzer (2003) and Belke and Kaas (2004), who proposed that exchange rate volatility increases 
displacement rates, and thus causes a decline in unemployment. Previously stated hypothesis has not been 
tested here due to a lack of displacement rates data. However, it has been found that exchange rate 
volatility provokes unemployed to withdraw from labour force. Contemporaneous effect of volatility on 
unemployment and discouraged workers implies that it is larger than estimated.  So to conclude estimates 
reported in regressions (1) and (3) are smaller than theoretically projected due to discouraged workers 
effect. 
 
4.2.4 Minimum wage legislation 
 
Minimum wage legislation is another important labour market policy indicator. However, it has not been 
added to the baseline regression as it requires special econometric treatment of the model. This is because 
minimum wage legislation has not been passed in every country in the data sample but only in 12 out of 
20.  
 
Starting with the baseline specification where the minimum wage indicator in relation to median wages is 
used. Once additional variable is included in the regression it absorbs all the significance from the output 
gap, the exchange rate volatility and the union density variables. The nature of the relationship between 
volatility and exchange rate remains the same – positive. When the unemployment rate is substituted for 
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harmonised unemployment rate indicator, the nature of the relationship changes but it becomes highly 
significant.  What is even more remarkable is that minimum wage level results are mixed for both 
regressions: higher minimum wage increases harmonised unemployment rate, but decreases 
unemployment rate. Contradictory results are confusing, as based on R squared results, within countries 
effect is better explained by the first model whereas between countries effect is better explained by the 
second. 
 
It has been decided to define a new Minimum wage indicator (“minw_d”) to preserve as many countries 
as possible in the sample and to achieve a higher number of total observations. A binary variable has been 
created that takes a value of 0 if country does not have minimum wage and 1 if it has minimum wage for 
this year.  The new variable is a mixed variable, as for some countries it is time invariant where minimum 
wage has not been set, whilst for others it is time variant where minimum legislation has been passed.  
Minimum wage indicator has been substituted back to baseline regression that was estimated using RE 
method. Regressions have been run for both unemployment rate and harmonised unemployment rate. 
Directionally there were no changes for exchange rate volatility impact on unemployment indicators 
however both results became highly significant. In unemployment rate regression, exchange rate volatility 
coefficient magnitude has decreased slightly whereas in harmonised unemployment regression it has been 
reduced dramatically from 1.995 to 0.788. Overall, the power of the models is very weak in contrast to 
the first two regressions. After a closer look one may see that according to R squared value of within 
effects regressions with a binary variable outperform the other ones. It is the between effect that is poorly 
explained by the regressions. One of the possible reasons for that is inappropriate technique used for 
estimation. After minimum wage variable has been transformed to binary it became a mixed variable of 
level 1 and level 2 properties.  
 
Alternative to RE modelling is FE, but binary minimum wage is a categorical variable and for some 
countries where it is time-invariant FE model will produce no estimate for it.  There is a class of models 
that is similar to RE but less restrictive, they are hybrid (Allison (2009)) and correlated RE models 
(Mundalak(1978)). From the name of technique one could guess that it relaxes restrictive assumption of 
RE model of no correlation between country effects and vector of explanatory variables.  
 
Correlated RE effects model has been fitted to baseline specification with hybrid levels 1 and 2 indicator 
of minimum wage for both cases where dependant variable is unemployment rate and harmonised 
unemployment rate. Fitting of hybrid and correlated random effects model together with the Wald tests 
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has been done in STATA based on Schunck (2013) proposed methodology. For both regressions, 
exchange rate volatility increases the unemployment rate.  But also it loses its high significance and 
becomes weakly significant and even insignificant at 10% significance level for unemployment rate. For 
mean values of exchange rate volatility direction of relationship is opposite, given an increase in between 
country volatility decreases unemployment rate in both cases.  Still despite the loss of significance, the 
results have finally reached a consensus on the directional aspect of the relationship. Similarly, minimum 
wage indicator decreases unemployment but the results are weakly significant.  R squared values have 
substantially improved for the between effects going from 0.077 to 0.43 and from 0.099 to 0.388. Such an 
improvement was expected as correlated RE model includes “between” term –mean values of explanatory 
variables- to account for the between effects. Model choice between RE and correlated RE depends on 
the Wald test parameter of the mean values coefficients being equal to 0. If the mean value coefficient is 
equal to 0 then our model is reduced to RE model, and if not – then the correlated RE is a better fit.  
 

















































































































































































































































0.650 -1.995*** 0.566*** -0.788***  0.288  0.310* 
Output Gap -0.017 -0.380*** -0.535*** -0.519***  -0.514***  -0.489*** 
Tax Wedge -0.287*** 0.022 0.135*** 0.075***  0.129***  0.093*** 
Product Market 
Regulation 




2.650*** -0.709*** 0.432 -0.505***  0.826*  1.15*** 
Average Benefit 
Replacement Rate 
-0.171*** -0.028 0.091*** -0.010  0.092***  0.090*** 
Union Density -0.023 -0.075*** -0.38* -0.023**  -0.039  0.017 
Minimum Wage -0.398 5.354       
Minimum Wage 
(binary indicator) 
  0.287 0.381 -0.264 -0.261 -0.950* -0.988* 
Demeaned Output 
Gap   
  -0.514***  -0.490***  
Demeaned Tax 
Wedge   
  0.129***  0.093***  
Demeaned EV3 
  
  0.288  0.311*  
Demeaned Product 
Market Regulation   












  0.092***  0.090***  
Demeaned Union 
Density   
  -0.39  0.017  
Mean Output Gap 
  
  2.294* 2.814* 2.373** 2.886* 
Mean Tax Wedge 
  
  0.040 -0.088 0.038 -0.053 
Mean EV3 
  
  -0.570 -0.842 -0.204 -0.457 
Mean Product 
Market Regulation   










  0.002 -0.091 0.005 -0.083 
Mean Union 
Density   
  -0.019 0.020 -0.032 0.050 
Time Effects YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Year dummies3 NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Wald Parameter 
Test2 









R2 within 0.4904 0.352 0.599 0.434 0.573 0.573 0.591 0.591 
R2 between  0.3588 0.412 0.077 0.099 0.430 0.430 0.388 0.388 
R2  overall 0.3878 0.373 0.230 0.096 0.472 0.472 0.457 0.457 
Average Number of 
Years 
21.3 21.2 24.1 13.1 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 
Number of 
countries 
12 12 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Number of 
observations 
256 254 482 262 440 440 440 440 
Specification: y =  β0 + β1Xit + αi + dt + uit, where y is unemployment rate
 
  1 HUR =Harmonised unemployment rate 
2 Hybrid and correlated RE methods and Wald test statistics have been adapted from Schunck (2013) 
3 Dummy variables are included for the years of 1991, 2000 and 2008 
* result is significant at 10% significance level 
** result is significant at 5% significance level 
*** result is significant at 1% significance level 
 
Wald parameter test is indicative of distinctive between and within effects that supports correlated RE 
modelling.  
 
Hybrid model is also built on the RE model by a matter of simple mathematical permutation – addition 
and subtraction of mean explanatory variables vector. Mean values subtracted from its original values 
vector produce “within” effects estimator and additional mean values variable provides a good “between” 
effects estimator.   Increase in exchange rate volatility over time within countries increases 
unemployment rate for both indicators (ALFS and HUR).  But once again an increase in the average 
exchange rate volatility between countries decreases. Here once again R squared values for between and 
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overall have improved substantially. Furthermore Wald test for the distinction of between and within 
effects, coefficients of mean value being equal to within proves for the need of hybrid modelling.  
 
Minimum wage variable indifferent to technique used appeared to have no significant effect on 
unemployment in most regressions. However minimum wage based regression put some clarity on the 
question of exchange rate volatility effect on unemployment. One can conclude that effect is different for 
between and within data estimators. Once it is split into two it becomes clear that for within country data 
exchange rate volatility increases unemployment. But across countries higher average exchange rate 
volatility deceases unemployment level. This paradox could be explained by Central Banks interventions 
and increased economics integrity when facing external risks. Government actions aimed to protect 
against increased exchange rate volatility are a more effective option than intervening into the foreign 
exchange market. As a consequence, one may get an illusion of increased exchange rate volatility 
accompanied by an increase in activity rates and higher employment rates.   
 
4.2.5 Sensitivity analysis for the baseline model 
 
4.2.5.1 Time effects  
 
Further diagnostic tests of the model have to be done so as to ensure that the assumptions of the models 
are not violated and the results are not misleading.  Time series wise data sample is long covering 25 
years of observations. Large time span can result in outliers being present in the sample due to one off 
historical events that are not in the scope of this study. In order to control for those time fixed effects 
yearly dummies have been used in all of the regressions with one exception for the analysis using 
Hausman test. Use of yearly dummies has been supported F tests results reported in Table 4-8. Omission 
of the yearly dummies in Hausman test regressions has been done to avoid artificially high chi squared 
statistic and overly high significant corresponding p values. For example, in our latest choice of RE 
versus FE model (Table 4-8) inclusion of time dummies would increase chi squared statistic to 6.54 and 
corresponding p value to 1.000.   


























































































































Exchange rate volatility (EV1) 0.423** 0.511** 0.417** 0.455** 
Output Gap -0.519*** -0.536*** -0.517*** -0.526*** 
Tax Wedge 0.136*** 0.137*** 0.136*** 0.129*** 
Product Market Regulation 0.435*** 0.629* 0.391*** 0.462*** 
Employment Protection 
Legislation  
0.270 0.922* 0.284 0.201 
Average Benefit Replacement 
Rate 
0.086*** 0.103*** 0.087*** 0.089*** 
Union Density -0.033* -0.021 -0.034* -0.035* 
Time Effects NO YES NO NO 
Time Dummies1 NO NO YES NO 
Standard Error of Exchange 
Rate Volatility  
0.204 0.223 0.206 0.224 
R2 within 0.549 0.599 0.553 0.534 
R2 between  0.072 0.049 0.071 0.078 
R2 overall 0.212 0.167 0.211 0.213 
Average number of years2 24.1 24.1 24.1 21.2 
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 
Number of observations 482 482 482 424 
Baseline specification: Urt =  β0 + β1Xit + αi + dt + uit, Urt – unemployment rate for over 15 years old. 
1 Dummy variables are included for the years of 1991, 2000 and 2008 
* result is significant at 10% significance level 
** result is significant at 5% significance level 
*** result is significant at 1% significance level 
 
Sample data range manipulations could help to perform robustness checks of whether time effects still 
have impact on regression results. There are a number of historical dates in the data sample that 
potentially could have caused outlier effects in the analysis. They are – East and West Germany 
unification of 1989 and the collapse of USSR in 1991, the introduction of the Euro in 1998 and its 
circulation in 2000, and the latest financial crisis of 2008. So three dummy variables have been used to 
account for those potential structural breaks for the years - 1991, 2000 and 2008. As an alternative to time 
effects it has been decided to use three dummy variables to control specifically only for those events. 
Results are present in Table 4-12. It has been shown that regardless of how the time effects are addressed, 
the results are robust and exchange rate volatility has significant relatively small contribution to 
unemployment. This result has been confirmed by both the inclusion of specific yearly dummies or the 
removal of associated year’s observations from the data. Results for regression without time effects and 
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for those that are modified have exchange rate volatility in close range of 0.417 to 0.511 and 
corresponding p-values are within 5% significance level.   
 
4.2.5.2 Country effects 
 
There are only 20 countries present in the data sample. As every country contributes roughly 5% of all 
observations, one country can potentially bias the overall result. Results robust to specific country mix 
can be obtained by rolling country-by-country exclusion from the data sample and further reassessment of 
the results. Results of the regression manipulations are reported in Table 4-13.  
 
Most of results have suggested that there is no single country spill over in the sample. Exchange rate 
volatility coefficient ranges for most of the regressions within the interval of 0.418 to 0.643. Results are 
highly significant with p-values in a range of 0.06 to 0.044. The only exception is Finland and Sweden. 
These Scandinavian countries have an overwhelming effect on the whole of the analysis of 
unemployment rate determination. For example in case for Sweden, once corresponding observations are 
removed from the sample, exchange rate looses double of its coefficient value and drops its significance 
level to 27.5%. This could be indicative that our results misrepresent the overall labour market picture, 
but instead show more a Swedish economy case that has higher weights in the sample.  One of the ways 
to avoid this bias is to include a large number of world economies and re-run the regressions. 
Unfortunately this is out of the scope of this analysis, but could serve as a suggestion for further research.    
 
Table 4-14 Individual country's effects in baseline model of unemployment determination that includes exchange rate 
volatility 
Country1 
EV1 p-value of EV1 R squared within 
R squared 
between 




Australia 0.571 0.014 0.599 0.07 0.228 467 
Austria 0.532 0.019 0.606 0.072 0.227 456 
Belgium 0.540 0.017 0.592 0.054 0.207 456 
Canada 0.643 0.006 0602 0.112 0.265 456 
Denmark 0.536 0.018 0.592 0.064 0.202 456 
Finland 0.214 0.317 0.614 0.100 0.219 456 
France 0.526 0.019 0.597 0.062 0.221 465 
Germany 0.517 0.021 0.604 0.066 0.224 462 
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Country1 
EV1 p-value of EV1 R squared within 
R squared 
between 




Ireland 0.502 0.027 0.535 0.132 0.241 461 
Italy 0.632 0.006 0.620 0.059 0.201 456 
Japan 0.626 0.008 0.612 0.046 0.212 456 
Netherlands 0.570 0.010 0.595 0.094 0.251 456 
New 
Zealand 
0.643 0.007 0.592 0.078 0.229 461 
Norway 0.562 0.018 0.598 0.099 0.247 456 
Portugal 0.522 0.019 0.609 0.091 0.235 456 
Spain 0.418 0.025 0.662 0.036 0.239 456 
Sweden 0.248 0.275 0.607 0.094 0.241 456 
Switzerland 0.537 0.018 0.600 0.055 0.235 456 
United 
Kingdom 
0.474 0.044 0.593 0.072 0.219 456 
United 
States 
0.485 0.035 0.610 0.066 0.229 458 
1Country excluded from the observations in the data sample 
Baseline specification: Urt =  β0 + β1Xit + αi + dt + uit 
 
It has been found that baseline model results are sensitive to the country’s composition in the data. In 
particular it has been established that once observations for Finland and Sweden are dropped, the 
volatility of exchange rate looses in its significance and value. In order to see whether this result is valid 
for alternative volatility estimators, regressions where Sweden has been excluded form the data sample 
has been re-run.  Instead of a more crude measure of unemployment rate (by ALFS) it has been decided 
to substitute it with harmonised unemployment rate due to its better between country comparability. All 
results are reported in Table 4-14. 
 





















   
Exchange rate volatility 
(EV2) 
 -0.565**    
Exchange rate volatility 
(EV3) 
  -0.511*   
Exchange rate volatility 
(EV4) 
   -0.541  
Exchange rate volatility 
(EV5) 
    -0.249*** 
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Output Gap -0.515*** -0.507*** -0.509*** -0.513*** -0.514*** 
Tax Wedge 0.081*** 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.087*** 0.070*** 
Product Market 
Regulation 
1.685*** 2.030*** 1.918*** 1.275*** 2.087*** 
Employment Protection 
Legislation 
-0.327 -0.395* -0.374* -0.233 -0.397** 
Average Benefit 
Replacement Rate 
-0.006 -0.010 -0.008 0.002 -0.013 
Union Density -0.025* -0.023** -0.024** -0.027** -0.023** 
Time Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 within 0.585 0.567 0.573 0.600 0.564 
R2 between  0.176 0.185 0.182 0.151 0.195 
R2  overall 0.323 0.328 0.326 0.308 0.335 
Average Number of years 21.8 21.8 21.8 21.8 21.8 
Number of observations 414 414 414 414 414 
Baseline specification: 𝑈𝑟𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, where Urt is harmonised unemployment rate 
* result is significant at 10% significance level 
** result is significant at 5% significance level 
*** result is significant at 1% significance level 
 
Results for alternative measures suggest that there is significant relationship between exchange rate 
volatility and unemployment rate even in the absence of the Swedish observations. However, as can be 
seen from the results, direction of relationship between ERV and harmonised unemployment rate is 
orthogonal to that derived by the ALFS unemployment rate indicator. As sensitivity of the results to 
Swedish economy observations has been established, this issue will be addressed again in further 
robustness checks. A similar case holds for Finland’s economy.  
 
4.2.5.3 Econometric foundations of the model: correlation and heteroskedasticity 
 
Assumptions of no serial correlation and heteroskedasticity of idiosyncratic error make RE estimates best 
linear and unbiased. Validity of the assumptions has to be checked in more detail using diagnostic tests to 
make sure that results are reliable.  
 
Serial correlation in panel data can take a number of forms. Presence of autocorrelation in panel data error 
terms has been confirmed earlier by the means of Wooldridge’s test in the discussion of the pooled OLS 
estimates. Thus RE model with robust autoregressive residuals of order one is estimated, and the results 
are reported in Table 4-15. The estimated autocorrelation coefficient for the model appears to be close to 
unity, in particular 0.91.  The introduction of autocorrelation robust standard errors into the model has 
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diminished the coefficient of exchange rate volatility to 0.136, and the variable became insignificant in 
the unemployment formation, with the corresponding p value of 0.177.  This novelty has not only reduced 
standard errors of the model, but also decreased the R squared values.  
 
A modified Wald test is used to check for the group-wise heteroskedasticity in the residuals of the model. 
Here STATA uses residuals of the fixed effects to perform the test. This should give reliable results to 
indicate whether the issue of heteroskedasticity should be accounted for.  Chi squared test statistic of 
633.68 rejects the assumption of homoscedasticity of the error terms. This gives a clear foundation to run 
a regression with serial correlation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.  RE model with 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors is reported in Table 4-15.   
 
It has been shown how serial correlation and heteroskedasticity affects regression results, even though the 
direction of the relationship between exchange rate volatility and unemployment rate has not changed, but 
its nature has. The effect became smaller in magnitude as well as lost its significance in both cases. With 
the coordinal change of regression outcomes, one would question the reliability of Hausman test results. 
Schaffer and Stillman (2010) created user written option “xtoverid” in STATA that can be used as an 
alternative for robust Hausman test. This option is a test of over-identifying restrictions with RE having 
two restrictions on the initial model. Test is ruled by the instrumental variables concept and results 
produce Sargan-Hansen statistic of 13.281. Its interpretation is highly dependent on benchmark critical 
level chosen for the analysis. Standard critical value for this work is 5% significance level. This critical 
value is very close to the test-estimated value of 0.0655.  Here it has to be acknowledged that at 10% 
significance level FE model is preferred over alternatives, and at 5% significance level RE model will 
still be chosen.  
 
However autoregressive serial correlation, as it has been noticed previously, can have many different 
forms – autoregressive (as it has been previously discussed), panel, or spatial. Further diagnostic tests are 
needed to identify the nature of serial correlation in the model. However panel techniques or STATA 
developed programs currently do not permit this. For example, let’s consider the case where testing for 
autocorrelation in panel RE and FE models is needed. Panel data estimator with autocorrelation robust 
standard errors provided by STATA, has optional values of Baltagi and Wu (1999) statistic and Bhargava 
et. al. (1982) modified Durbin-Watson statistic that are reported alone without associated p values. 
Furthermore, corresponding research papers do not provide critical value tables for comparison, which 
unfortunately makes the values of test statistics of no use for the current research.    
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Exchange rate volatility (EV1) -0.426 0.511** 0.524** 0.136 0.524 -0.265 0.417 
Output Gap -0.509*** -0.526*** -0.536*** -0.329*** -0.536*** -0.496*** -0.510*** 
Tax Wedge 0.146** 0.137*** 0.130*** 0.030** 0.130*** 0.155*** 0.140*** 
Product Market Regulation 2.188 0.629* 0.657** -0.062 0.657 0.687*** 0.269 
Employment Protection 
Legislation 
-0.630 0.922* 0.440 -0.340 0.440 -0.438*** 0.758 
Average Benefit Replacement 
Rate 
0.009 0.103*** 0.088*** 0.012 0.088*** 0.013 0.103*** 
Union Density -0.043 -0.021 -0.397* 0.053 -0.040 -0.049** -0.016 
Time effects YES YES YES YES YES NO NO 
Time dummies1      YES YES 
Standard error of Exchange 
Rate Volatility 
0.852 0.223 0.221 0.101 0.413 0.353 0.287 
R2 within 
 
0.599 0.597 0.510 0.597   
R2 between  
 
0.049 0.073 0.004 0.073   
R2  overall 0.358 0.167 0.226 0.084 0.226   
Wooldridge test (2005) 
118.296 
(0.0000) 
      























   
Average Number of Years3 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 
Number of observations 482 482 482 482 482 482 482 
Baseline specification: Urt =  β0 + β1Xit + αi + dt + uit, where Urt is ALFS Unemployment Rate 
1Time dummies for years 1991, 2000 and 2008  
2 Hausman test results reported are based on regressions without time effects. 
3 Average number of years is used as panel is unbalanced 
4Estimation of Hausman test has been done using Schaffer and Stillman (2010) written command “xtoverid” for STATA 
5Wooldridge(2002) alternative to Hausman test has been estimated in STATA using the codes adapted from Hoechle(2007) 
6Adapted Wooldridge (2002) test by Hoechle (2007) based on Driscoll-Kraay S.E.  has been estimated in STATA using the codes adapted from 
Hoechle (2007) 
* result is significant at 10% significance level 
** result is significant at 5% significance level 
*** result is significant at 1% significance level 
 
Another econometric issue that is common in macroeconomics datasets is cross-sectional dependence. 
This arises due to a number of reasons. First of all, all countries in the data set are developed industrial 
 101 
countries with strong economic ties relative to other world countries. Secondly, some countries are not 
only similar in economic attributes, but have common geo location characteristics as well, implying there 
are neighbouring countries. Lastly, most of the countries (15 out of 20) in the dataset belong to European 
Union and currently are strongly economically integrated.  So I believe it is a necessity to test model for 
cross-sectional dependence and remedy it if needed.  
 
Three tests have been used for testing cross-sectional dependence in the sample. All of the tests are based 
on the RE model estimates and residuals, which has been chosen as the optimal so far. Please note that 
time effects are not included, because it is the between-groups correlation that is of interest, and 
additional variables only spur the results with contradictory conclusions. The Pesaran (2004) test for the 
null hypothesis of cross sectional independence produced statistic of 5.575 that gives foundations for the 
rejection of the null hypothesis. Accompanying absolute value of the off-diagonal elements of 0.321 
indicates high cross-sectional correlation of the residuals.  Additionally, Free’s and Friedman’s tests 
support the previous results of Pesaran test with corresponding test values of 3.953 (significance at 1% 
level) and 57.731 (p-value of 0.000). All of the statistics suggest the presence of cross-sectional 
dependence.  One way to remedy for the cross-sectional dependence in the panel is to use Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors. Contemporaneously they account not only for cross-sectional dependence, but also for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Pooled OLS and Fixed effects model have been both estimated 
with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. Models draw contradictory conclusions on exchange rate volatility 
on unemployment rate, so, which one is the reliable one? Following Hoechle (2007) it has been decided 
to run two alternative tests to the Hausman test. The first one is based on Wooldridge (2002) auxiliary 
regression run with country’s clustered residuals and is very similar to the over identifying restrictions 
Sargan test discussed earlier. Second version is essentially Wooldridge test adapted by Hoechle (2007), 
where auxiliary regression is run with Driscoll-Kraay residuals. Both results suggest that FE model 
should be chosen over the alternative pooled OLS method.   
 
Once the appropriate model has been chosen it has been decided to re-run FE model with Driscoll and 
Kraay standard errors for all five volatility measures. The results are reported in Table 4-16. Exchange 
rate volatility significantly contributes to unemployment level formation for three volatility measures out 
of five. GARCH based volatility estimated coefficients are significant at the 5% significance level and 
increase in ERV of 1 % is associated with 0.145 percentage points increase in the unemployment rate. 
The effect of EV variables based on rolling standard deviation is much bigger in magnitude, but is less 
significant. Results are much less sensitive to country variation than previously thought, in particular to 
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the inclusion of Swedish economy. If observations of Sweden are removed from the sample, coefficient 
of EV4 reduces from 0.140 to 0.121 with corresponding p value increase of 0.0047 to 0.082. Similarly for 
other volatility measures results became weaker, meaning partial loss of significance and magnitude, but 
do not vanish. In contrast to previous findings reported in Table 4-14, it should be noted that the direction 
of the relationship remains the same once correlations and heteroskedasticity have been addressed 
contemporaneously. 
 
When the ALFS unemployment variable is substituted for the Harmonised Unemployment Rate, the 
result still holds for the GARCH based volatility measures at the 10% significance level. The magnitude 
is within the range here, and direction of the relationship is as predicted by ALFS unemployment rate 
based regressions, in contrast to previous studies.   
 
The employment rate based regressions indicate that volatility increases the employment rate. However, 
these results are mostly insignificant and weakly supported only by rolling standard deviation measures of 
volatility based on 12 and 18 months lag length.  
 
Activity rates, inactivity rates and structural unemployment variables are not affected by exchange rate 
volatility variations. The direction of the relationship of the variables with exchange rate volatility is as 
initially predicted in the Data Chapter. 
 
Another significant link in EV relationship with labour market is Discouraged Workers indicator channel. 
Exchange rate volatility increases the number of discouraged workers. This result is supported by both 
GARCH and rolling standard deviation measures volatility. In magnitude ERV has bigger effect on 
discouraged labour force than on unemployment rates. 
 
Table 4-17 Exchange rate volatility effect on labour market performance for OECD countries, using fixed effects with 




































































































































Baseline specification: 𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, where y  is labour market performance indicator, estimated using FE model with Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors. 
1Here Sweden’s observations are excluded from the regression analysis 
 
 
4.2.5.4 Baseline regression: error correction model 
 
The stationarity of the series affects the regression outcomes and gives basis for long-run and short-run 
behavioural models. Before any models are to be estimated, stationarity of the series has to be 
established.  
 
Unit root tests will be used for the assessment of series stationarity nature. Even though STATA offers a 
rich variety of panel unit root tests, the only one applicable in the unbalanced case is the Im-Pesaran-Shin 
(2003) test. Demeaned version has been used in the tests, and results are reported in Table 4-17.  
 





Z-t-tilde bar for 
First Difference of 
the Variable 
P-value for Z-t-tilde 
bar for First 
Difference of the 
Variable 





















-10.3748 0.0000 - - I(1) 
Unemployment 
Rate  
0.3189 0.6251 -13.8286 0.0000 I(1) 
Output Gap -2.5537 0.0053 - - I(0) 













1.3056 0.9042 -10.7730 0.0000 I(1) 
Union Density 
(UD) 
0.0499 0.5199 -14.7132 0.0000 I(1) 
H0: All panels contain unit root, H1: Some panels are stationary 
 
Stationarity of the series has been established only for EV and Output gap variables. While output gap is 
an I(0) variable, EV variables are I(1), as during variable constructions they have been differenced to 
achieve stationarity. Similarly the rest of the variables are integrated of order one.  
 
To account for omission variable bias and endogeneity, it has been decided to use heterogeneous panel 
estimator of Pesaran (2006) – Common Correlated Effects Mean Estimator. Its advantage lies in its 
robustness to common factors that could take non-stationary or even non-linear forms (Eberhardt (2012)). 
This is particularly beneficial in this case due to the fact that contemporaneously all of the variables of 
interest do not build a cointegrating relationship according to Westerlund (2007) tests.  Most of the 
variables have been first differenced before inclusion in the regression for first differenced unemployment 
rate. The only variable that has not experienced any permutations is exchange rate volatility that has been 
differenced prior (i.e. during indicator construction). Results are reported in Table 4-18.  
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Table 4-19 Mean group estimators of unemployment determinants for OECD countries (1985-2011) 
First differenced 
variables 
Pesaran and Smith (1995) 
Mean Group Estimator, 
outlier robust 
(1)1 
Pesaran and Smith (1995) 
Mean Group Estimator, 
outlier robust 
(2)1 
Pesaran (2006) Common 
Correlated Effects Mean 
Group Estimator3, outlier 
robust 
(1) 
Pesaran (2006) Common 
Correlated Effects Mean 





0.667*** 0.598*** -0.164* -0.222** 
Tax Wedge 0.051** 0.0415* -0.029 0.043*** 
Product Market 
Regulation 




-0.742 -0.948 0.516 -0.934 
Average Benefit 
Replacement Rate 
0.010 0.029 -0.076** -0.044 
Union Density -0.487*** 0.382*** 0.146** 0.101 
RMSE 0.7811 0.7511 0.3765 0.3566 
1(1) refers to model where dependent variable is first difference of unemployment rate indicator from ALFS 
2(2) refers to model where dependent variable is first difference of Harmonised Unemployment Rate, 
3 Results of averages for Pesaran (2006) model are not present in the table as are not essential for the discussion. 
 
Exchange rate volatility is significant in all of the Mean Group estimators’ regressions. According to 
Pesaran and Smith (1995) estimator there is a positive linear relationship between unemployment and 
exchange rate volatility. According to Pesaran (2006) relationship is negative linear, i.e. change in 
volatility is associated with the drop in unemployment rate change.  Root mean square error statistic is the 
smaller in Pesaran (2006) models that could indicate it is a better quality. Adding the fact that Pesaran 
(2006) model is more robust to common factors, as has been previously discussed, it has to be concluded 
that in the short run, volatility has a negative effect on unemployment. This could be explained by the 
sticky wages, barriers to adjust labour costs instantly. Other reason than unemployment lagging could be 
arbitrage. Companies learn how to use it as an advantage and yield more revenues on it or those who do 
not know how to manage volatility risk hedge against it. So volatility of exchange rate creates a whole 
industry that sells different financial instruments to hedge against those risks.  
 
Causality between unemployment rate and exchange rate is another issue that has to be addressed in 
sensitivity analysis. Following methodology of Bassanini and Duval (2009) and IMF (2014, pp.107-108), 
it has been decided to use Granger causality tests. In order to perform tests, series should be cointegrated.  
Variables of interest are integrated of order one, so here again first differenced variables are to be used for 
the purpose of the test. Westerlund (2007) four cointegration tests are used. All of statistics results reject 
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null hypothesis of no cointegration.  Taking into account that in small datasets results are sensitive to lag, 
lead length and kernel width, Westerlund (2007) tests have been re-estimated for variation of those. 
Results still are in support of rejecting null hypothesis of no cointegration.  So to conclude there is 
cointegrating relationship between the two variables. This gives basis for Granger causality tests. 
 
Table 4-20 Granger causality tests for exchange rate volatility and unemployment rate 
 
Dependent Variable is unemployment rate. Dependent Variable is exchange rate volatility 
Exchange Rate Volatility First Lag 0.195** 0.353*** 
Exchange Rate Volatility Second Lag -0.048 0.099*** 
Unemployment Rate First Lag 0.525*** 0.029* 
Unemployment Rate Second Lag -0.140*** 0.002 
Joint F-test 3.26 1.96 
Probability > F 0.0389 0.1418 
Number of observations 776 756 
1All variables here, dependent and explanatory are in first differences. 
 
First, number of lags has to be defined. Lag length of two has been chosen relying on auto regression t-
test values. Next, unemployment rate and exchange rate determining regressions have been estimated 
using fixed effects model. Time dummies and country effects are included into regression analysis. 
Results are reported in Table 19.  
 
According to results there is one Granger causal impact. Exchange rate volatility has causal impact on 
unemployment rate, but there is no reverse causality to it. So unemployment rate does not Granger cause 
exchange rate series. These results have to reject the hypothesis of endogeneity within the system that has 




Initial results of the baseline random effects model suggest that there is a positive linear relationship 
among the exchange rate volatility and unemployment level. This relationship is significant for all 
standard deviation based volatility measures and asymmetric GARCH model. Additionally,  it has been 
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found that exchange rate volatility (based on standard deviation with lag length of 18 months) is 
positively associated with employment rates, activity rates, structural unemployment, and indicator of 
discouraged workers.   
 
Model misspecification has been suspected and sensitivity analysis has been performed. Results have 
been robust to time and country effects variations. Once serial correlation, heteroskedasticity in the 
residuals and cross-sectional dependence have been addressed in the baseline model, results returned 
weaker than previously thought. Only for three out of five variables there has been found positive 
significant relationship among exchange rate volatility and the unemployment level. Once ALFS defined 
unemployment is substituted by the harmonised unemployment, the picture changes. Relationship holds 
exclusively for parametric models of exchange rate, but not for standard deviation based ones. Moreover, 
the exchange rate volatility is not associated with other labour performance indicators except for number 
of discouraged workers. 
 
Mean group estimators have been used to account for omission variable bias. Pesaran (2006) estimator 
indicates that exchange rate volatility is inversely related to unemployment level (both HUR and ALFS). 
Causality has been addressed by the means of Granger causality tests. Results are suggestive of exchange 
rate volatility having Granger causal impact on unemployment. Furthermore no reverse causality has been 
found.  Granger causality does not cover all the causality issues, and thus Granger tests alone are not 
sufficient to make conclusions on the causal relationships. Therefore, it is necessary to stress that results 
in this chapter represent simple correlation among variables, and should not be discussed in the context of 
causal impact. 
 




Chapter 5. Inflation volatility effect on labour market performance 
5.1 Derivation of inflation volatility measures 
 
Similar to exchange rate series volatility, a number of inflation volatility models are estimated for the 
analysis. GARCH based measures and rolling standard deviation measures will be considered, as 
previously. However, there are expected differences in estimation. In particular distinct property of 
inflation series is long memory process that has be accounted for the volatility models chosen, so 
ARFIMA-GARCH models will be used (Cheung and Chung (2011)). 
 
Before any tests are conducted, the data series have to be described in more detail. As has been discussed 
in the data and methodology chapter, quarterly GDP deflator series are employed for the purpose. Series 
have been tested for seasonality and no significant evidence has been detected to support the need to 
seasonally adjust the series. Furthermore, inflation series has been defined as percentage change in 
logarithm of GDP deflator series  - 100dlog GDPdef.  
   
5.1.1 Unit root tests 
 
Autocorrelation function for inflation series has been estimated at different lag length up to an order of 
36. Results are presented in Table 5-1.  Autocorrelation function values are quite large in magnitude and 
do not die out geometrically with an increase in lag length, but rather vary randomly. Orderless behaviour 
has been noticed in the cases of the following countries – Austria, Germany, Finland, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Norway and New Zealand. In the case of Austria, the initial value of the function at lag 
length of 1 is very small (0.003), and this could be a signal of no correlation present in the series. 
Furthermore, Ljung-Box Q-statistics result (0.0015) and its associated p-value (0.000) support the 
hypothesis of no serial correlation at first order lag.  This is an exceptional case of no serial correlation 
detected in the analysis, as for the rest of the series, Ljung-Box Q-statistics results have been evident of 
serial correlation in the series. Autocorrelation functions for Belgium and Switzerland look like a 
quadratic hyperbola that is steadily declining up to lags of 24 and 20 respectively, after which they grow 
in value. The remainder of the series have an overall declining trend. However, high persistence in the 
series is very noticeable as function values decline very slowly with lag length increase.   Autocorrelation 
coefficient for some series varies not only in value but also in direction. This is the case for 
autocorrelation functions for Germany, Ireland, Norway and New Zealand. Autocorrelation function 
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observations together with the Q-statistics results indicate that series are non-stationary and persistent to a 
high order.  
 
Appropriate unit root tests need to be carried out to establish the time series nature of the data. Starting 
with Augmented Dickey Fuller Test where only constant exogenous variable is assumed in structural 
equation. Test results of all applicable unit root tests are reported in Table 5-2.  Only for 12 out of 20 
series do ADF test results provide unambiguous answers on the nature of the series, for the rest of the 
series the answer varied dramatically depending on the significance level. Such inconclusive results have 
been reached for inflation series of Australia, Switzerland, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, United 
Kingdom and the United States. Further non-parametric tests of Philips-Perron (PP) are conducted based 
on similar assumptions of ADF tests. This test is an improved version of ADF test where t-statistic does 
not suffer from serial correlation bias. As has been underlined in the analysis of autocorrelation functions 
for the series, one would expect PP tests to be a more appropriate unit root test.  ADF test results have 
been supported by PP tests only for Germany, Ireland, Japan, Norway and Portugal. Previous 
inconclusive results has been improved in their sensitivity to significance level, this applies to series of 
Australia, Switzerland, Finland, New Zealand and UK, which appear to be stationary in their nature. The 
US series test results have not been clarified by PP tests and still results are sensitive to significance level. 
 
However PP tests gave co-ordinally opposite results from ADF tests in cases such as Austria, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden and the US. Robustness of ADF tests results to significance 
level for Belgium and Spain have been distorted, creating inconclusiveness in determination of 
stationarity.  Both of the tests used so far have common formulation of null and alternative hypothesis. A 
good alternative to potentially minimise Type I and Type II errors in the results would be to use a test that 
has inverse formulation of the null hypothesis.  For this purpose Kwiatkowski – Phillips – Schmidt – Shin 
(KPSS) tests were chosen. Tests were run under similar conditions to previous ones, i.e. assuming 
constant exogenous variable in structural equation. Test results have not brought clarity to the main 
question of whether the series contain unit roots or not. They have brought mixed results based on 
sensitivity to significance level and determined outcomes in many cases are opposing what PP tests have 
derived. Only in the case of inflation series for Norway, may we suggest that stationarity of the series has 
been confirmed by all of the tests that have been run and robustness of the result to significance level has 




Table 5-1 Autocorrelation function of inflation series 
Lag  AT AU BE CA CH DE DK ES FI FR IE IT JP NL NO NZ PT SE UK US 
1 0.003 0.55 0.859 0.681 0.815 0.393 0.568 0.909 0.383 0.784 -0.093 0.685 0.721 0.329 0.288 -0.133 0.936 0.843 0.601 0.888 
2 0.318 0.519 0.831 0.543 0.741 0.402 0.727 0.878 0.451 0.782 0.165 0.678 0.678 0.325 -0.016 -0.293 0.906 0.824 0.609 0.843 
3 0.202 0.461 0.739 0.502 0.623 0.405 0.565 0.841 0.376 0.691 0.153 0.619 0.579 0.309 0.073 0.380 0.849 0.764 0.635 0.814 
4 0.338 0.474 0.685 0.444 0.585 0.410 0.684 0.808 0.502 0.718 0.200 0.710 0.562 0.439 0.082 -0.101 0.832 0.714 0.513 0.785 
5 0.286 0.452 0.638 0.529 0.511 0.258 0.502 0.805 0.308 0.740 0.087 0.600 0.500 0.428 -0.021 0.033 0.801 0.674 0.485 0.721 
6 0.32 0.431 0.605 0.487 0.462 0.220 0.670 0.786 0.304 0.718 0.089 0.600 0.520 0.366 0.005 0.313 0.803 0.631 0.458 0.683 
7 0.191 0.379 0.56 0.436 0.441 0.193 0.522 0.766 0.331 0.703 0.265 0.562 0.517 0.341 -0.012 -0.075 0.783 0.629 0.437 0.634 
8 0.176 0.366 0.547 0.396 0.438 0.234 0.644 0.736 0.372 0.655 -0.105 0.606 0.455 0.319 0.008 0.015 0.792 0.600 0.400 0.612 
9 0.42 0.398 0.482 0.314 0.390 0.154 0.520 0.706 0.355 0.639 0.209 0.561 0.490 0.336 0.067 0.127 0.765 0.585 0.426 0.576 
10 0.114 0.39 0.487 0.335 0.353 0.062 0.651 0.682 0.316 0.624 0.121 0.536 0.443 0.309 0.051 0.003 0.750 0.565 0.388 0.552 
11 0.232 0.324 0.424 0.376 0.293 0.143 0.424 0.664 0.268 0.598 0.007 0.540 0.513 0.229 -0.013 0.120 0.730 0.552 0.399 0.531 
12 0.183 0.311 0.418 0.308 0.316 0.080 0.538 0.645 0.310 0.598 0.017 0.546 0.468 0.315 0.035 -0.070 0.718 0.526 0.366 0.524 
13 0.275 0.285 0.379 0.296 0.265 0.030 0.468 0.627 0.305 0.555 0.143 0.537 0.534 0.307 0.016 0.037 0.686 0.512 0.339 0.509 
14 0.198 0.301 0.351 0.306 0.272 0.078 0.469 0.600 0.179 0.602 0.024 0.479 0.439 0.297 0.052 0.275 0.657 0.519 0.356 0.496 
15 0.249 0.277 0.327 0.27 0.252 -0.017 0.463 0.576 0.299 0.555 -0.042 0.491 0.474 0.237 0.102 -0.002 0.619 0.492 0.315 0.481 
16 0.049 0.177 0.313 0.268 0.245 -0.020 0.460 0.556 0.248 0.542 0.128 0.451 0.408 0.232 0.128 -0.122 0.601 0.509 0.362 0.468 
17 0.26 0.253 0.275 0.300 0.191 -0.001 0.460 0.531 0.321 0.516 0.027 0.408 0.422 0.224 -0.017 0.160 0.585 0.513 0.362 0.455 
18 0.274 0.28 0.308 0.274 0.134 -0.107 0.451 0.497 0.176 0.511 0.069 0.383 0.431 0.229 -0.091 0.031 0.574 0.494 0.392 0.434 
19 0.087 0.262 0.283 0.283 0.086 -0.169 0.444 0.478 0.235 0.529 0.062 0.401 0.352 0.233 0.032 -0.004 0.552 0.528 0.393 0.414 
20 0.182 0.194 0.294 0.266 0.065 -0.12 0.429 0.441 0.297 0.506 0.05 0.412 0.321 0.258 0.094 0.254 0.547 0.495 0.33 0.406 
21 0.04 0.231 0.274 0.28 0.091 -0.022 0.414 0.418 0.229 0.519 0.062 0.395 0.308 0.195 0.131 -0.054 0.539 0.512 0.377 0.377 
22 0.269 0.194 0.252 0.29 0.118 -0.109 0.402 0.395 0.226 0.472 -0.113 0.362 0.403 0.227 0.063 -0.072 0.528 0.475 0.266 0.365 
23 0.132 0.234 0.239 0.274 0.158 -0.066 0.415 0.381 0.257 0.485 0.121 0.349 0.34 0.17 0.082 0.163 0.518 0.461 0.27 0.381 
24 0.148 0.26 0.232 0.275 0.185 -0.085 0.353 0.369 0.358 0.435 -0.086 0.374 0.419 0.261 0.093 0.011 0.505 0.437 0.235 0.357 
25 0.107 0.204 0.24 0.268 0.206 -0.069 0.422 0.348 0.313 0.461 -0.02 0.325 0.376 0.177 0.05 -0.034 0.482 0.419 0.19 0.331 
26 0.128 0.195 0.274 0.256 0.22 -0.063 0.363 0.338 0.262 0.415 -0.069 0.307 0.382 0.158 -0.085 0.133 0.438 0.405 0.128 0.302 
27 0.131 0.191 0.274 0.255 0.247 -0.167 0.376 0.312 0.311 0.409 0.041 0.28 0.339 0.135 -0.011 0.056 0.403 0.365 0.149 0.288 
28 0.198 0.203 0.317 0.301 0.258 -0.097 0.339 0.308 0.277 0.386 -0.081 0.283 0.338 0.178 0.148 -0.041 0.374 0.367 0.104 0.262 
29 0.15 0.157 0.309 0.337 0.248 -0.167 0.36 0.293 0.238 0.357 -0.157 0.272 0.306 0.184 0.04 0.04 0.374 0.352 0.074 0.233 
30 0.092 0.112 0.32 0.278 0.244 -0.107 0.332 0.289 0.18 0.339 0.054 0.19 0.29 0.175 -0.022 0.068 0.362 0.351 0.084 0.196 
31 0.189 0.178 0.307 0.232 0.25 -0.129 0.313 0.281 0.233 0.295 -0.135 0.185 0.318 0.117 0.073 0.047 0.359 0.348 0.061 0.17 
32 0.135 0.118 0.311 0.19 0.243 -0.144 0.301 0.257 0.219 0.279 -0.121 0.172 0.246 0.123 0.143 -0.056 0.344 0.335 0.078 0.162 
33 0.134 0.106 0.309 0.169 0.25 -0.128 0.267 0.252 0.194 0.257 0.028 0.182 0.272 0.103 -0.042 0.052 0.324 0.339 0.052 0.146 
34 0.127 0.077 0.301 0.129 0.259 -0.036 0.26 0.244 0.19 0.229 -0.061 0.123 0.215 0.051 -0.061 0.118 0.285 0.287 0.086 0.113 
35 0.172 0.039 0.277 0.108 0.297 -0.071 0.248 0.241 0.165 0.214 -0.088 0.117 0.246 0.132 -0.031 -0.02 0.255 0.294 0.021 0.094 
36 0.155 0.01 0.283 0.122 0.293 -0.135 0.224 0.23 0.194 0.163 -0.005 0.08 0.23 0.14 -0.082 0.032 0.22 0.268 0.065 0.106 
Autocorrelation function values have been derived using EViews 8.0, where lag refers to function’s lag length.  Inflation series represent 100dlogGDPdef. 
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Regarding the rest of the series - a mixed picture has been drawn. One may conclude that 
results are evident of series being non-stationary as has been observed not only from test 
results, but also from level correlogram of the series. On the other side, evidence of series 
containing unit root has been mixed and not that powerful. For additional checks of non-
stationarity, it has been decided to build autocorrelation function of the first difference of 
the series to see whether differencing had eliminated serial correlation. Results are 
presented in Table 5-3. 
 




ADF PP KPSS 
Result Statistic 
value 








No. of unit 
roots 





   
0 
 
5% -3.189469 0 -8.978099 0 0.524183 1 0/1 
10%  0    1  
Belgium 
1% 
   
0 
   5% -2.473809 1 -3.421039 1 0.750625 1 0/1 
10%    1    
Canada 
1% 
     
0 
 
5% -2.543089 1 -5.980422 0 0.64768 1 0/1 
10%      1  
Switzerland 
1%  1      
5% -3.293803 0 -4.153002 0 1.137816 1 0/1 
10%  0      
Germany 
1% 
     
0 
 
5% -7.512849 0 -7.507719 0 0.407459 0 0/1 
10%      1  
Denmark 1%, 5%, 10% -1.445584 1 -9.144467 0 1.233846 1 0/1 
Spain 
1%    1    
5% -1.982914 1 -2.847562 1 0.867405 1 0/1 
10% 
   
0 





     
5% -2.920647 0 -12.08613 0 1.0651 1 0/1 
10%  0      
France 1%, 5%, 10% -1.468602 1 -4.339996 0 0.875282 1 0/1 
Ireland 
1%      0  
5% -10.4917 0 -10.61139 0 0.56568 1 0/1 
10% 




1%      0  
5% -1.944434 1 -7.265825 0 0.681034 1 0/1 
10%      1  
Japan 1%, 5%, 10% -3.880802 0 -5.971401 0 1.492616 1 0/1 
Netherlands 1%, 5%, 10% -2.381693 1 -12.47156 0 1.063249 1 0/1 
Norway 1%, 5%, 10% -10.83312 0 -10.78879 0 0.309839 0 0 
New Zealand 
1%  1    0  
5% -3.298388 0 -16.867 0 0.548175 1 0/1 
10%  0    1  
Portugal 
1%      0  
5% -1.685197 1 -2.31602 1 0.536901 1 0/1 
10% 
     
1 
 
Sweden 1%, 5%, 10% -2.553063 1 -3.668251 0 0.896461 1 0/1 
United 
Kingdom 
1%  0    0  
5% -2.860617 1 -8.289685 0 0.648538 1 0/1 



















Unit root test statistics have been estimated using Eviews 8.0. In cells where only one result being represented against different significance 
level implies that this is unique result for all significance levels.    




Table 5-3 Autocorrelation function of first difference of inflation series 
Lag  AT AU BE CA CH DE DK ES FI FR IE IT JP NL NO NZ PT SE UK US 
1 -0.659 -0.464 -0.413 -0.284 -0.304 -0.442 -0.688 -0.358 -0.558 -0.506 -0.616 -0.491 -0.428 -0.491 -0.286 -0.43 -0.246 -0.436 -0.509 -0.307 
2 0.218 0.028 0.261 -0.16 0.111 -0.073 0.376 0.027 0.12 0.212 0.127 0.081 0.104 0.005 -0.277 -0.368 0.195 0.124 -0.025 -0.081 
3 -0.129 -0.075 -0.153 0.032 -0.207 0.062 -0.325 0.011 -0.163 -0.27 -0.033 -0.236 -0.154 -0.111 0.056 0.509 -0.312 -0.031 0.187 0.002 
4 0.097 0.04 -0.026 -0.227 0.092 0.128 0.348 -0.197 0.263 0.005 0.08 0.322 0.085 0.112 0.079 -0.27 0.107 -0.028 -0.114 0.165 
5 -0.045 -0.006 -0.053 0.202 -0.06 -0.091 -0.406 0.111 -0.156 0.115 -0.056 -0.183 -0.148 0.029 -0.092 -0.065 -0.271 -0.011 -0.008 -0.121 
6 0.082 0.04 0.042 0.009 -0.09 0.012 0.372 0.002 -0.025 -0.021 -0.077 0.067 0.037 -0.025 0.03 0.295 0.117 -0.113 -0.003 0.054 
7 -0.058 -0.046 -0.086 -0.01 -0.038 -0.076 -0.315 0.064 -0.012 0.083 0.25 -0.128 0.112 0.004 -0.024 -0.211 -0.216 0.085 0.019 -0.112 
8 -0.13 -0.052 0.165 0.07 0.113 0.073 0.287 0.014 0.045 -0.077 -0.317 0.146 -0.17 -0.036 -0.027 -0.01 0.294 -0.051 -0.081 0.038 
9 0.277 0.046 -0.255 -0.166 -0.025 0.107 -0.304 -0.048 0.017 -0.01 0.185 -0.035 0.149 0.035 0.05 0.104 -0.061 0.018 0.083 -0.043 
10 -0.214 0.063 0.259 -0.029 0.068 -0.11 0.421 -0.018 0.009 0.032 0.014 -0.045 -0.214 0.037 0.036 -0.107 0.014 -0.022 -0.063 -0.01 
11 0.084 -0.057 -0.208 0.174 -0.219 -0.006 -0.399 0.007 -0.07 -0.065 -0.038 0.004 0.202 -0.106 -0.08 0.136 -0.034 0.045 0.058 -0.063 
12 -0.071 0.012 0.125 -0.09 0.209 0.102 0.22 -0.009 0.039 0.117 -0.087 0.016 -0.203 0.04 0.048 -0.132 0.149 -0.028 -0.01 0.032 
13 0.085 -0.047 -0.022 -0.039 -0.166 -0.096 -0.086 0.052 0.098 -0.225 0.123 0.073 0.294 0.017 -0.039 -0.057 0.01 -0.076 -0.055 -0.016 
14 -0.065 0.05 0.004 0.07 0.045 0.121 0.021 -0.019 -0.202 0.216 -0.021 -0.103 -0.234 0.043 -0.009 0.227 0.025 0.09 0.072 0.038 
15 0.126 0.08 -0.062 -0.052 0.018 -0.103 -0.002 -0.029 0.14 -0.076 -0.107 0.078 0.185 -0.034 0.016 -0.07 -0.154 -0.117 -0.108 -0.033 
16 -0.206 -0.195 0.066 -0.04 0.093 -0.057 -0.009 0.037 -0.102 0.025 0.117 0.005 -0.15 -0.005 0.12 -0.177 -0.003 0.026 0.058 -0.006 
17 0.098 0.05 -0.23 0.085 0.016 0.193 0.014 0.049 0.174 -0.043 -0.062 -0.033 0.013 -0.019 -0.049 0.182 -0.051 0.076 -0.038 0.036 
18 0.101 0.048 0.189 -0.058 -0.063 -0.033 -0.019 -0.084 -0.168 -0.06 0.023 -0.061 0.157 0.005 -0.138 -0.042 0.094 -0.173 0.035 -0.006 
19 -0.142 0.057 -0.121 0.021 -0.057 -0.104 0.002 0.114 0.004 0.097 -0.01 0.01 -0.089 -0.025 0.035 -0.129 -0.121 0.218 0.08 -0.04 
20 0.118 -0.113 0.108 -0.056 -0.115 -0.026 0.012 -0.082 0.103 -0.082 0.006 0.038 -0.022 0.085 0.021 0.25 0.003 -0.136 -0.136 0.092 
21 -0.186 0.086 0.03 0.031 -0.004 0.17 0.01 0.005 -0.051 0.14 0.086 0.024 -0.201 -0.076 0.079 -0.129 0.048 0.161 0.196 -0.07 
22 0.185 -0.089 -0.042 0.054 -0.043 -0.165 -0.037 -0.043 -0.028 -0.142 -0.197 -0.022 0.294 0.061 -0.06 -0.111 -0.011 -0.084 -0.143 -0.124 
23 -0.078 0.014 -0.023 -0.025 0.017 0.094 0.092 -0.024 -0.058 0.157 0.195 -0.072 -0.27 -0.101 0.006 0.171 0.026 0.044 0.05 0.191 
24 0.03 0.092 -0.073 0.01 0.024 -0.004 -0.152 0.071 0.117 -0.179 -0.111 0.124 0.22 0.118 0.038 -0.047 0.091 -0.007 0.011 0.005 
25 -0.033 -0.056 -0.101 -0.006 0.016 -0.04 0.147 -0.076 0.006 0.163 0.045 -0.049 -0.083 -0.05 0.061 -0.093 0.175 -0.049 0.02 0.022 
26 0.01 -0.006 0.128 -0.012 -0.031 0.118 -0.086 0.107 -0.083 -0.088 -0.063 0.014 0.091 0.011 -0.146 0.107 -0.074 0.103 -0.103 -0.072 
27 -0.032 -0.011 -0.134 -0.066 0.038 -0.143 0.067 -0.126 0.071 0.035 0.107 -0.047 -0.082 -0.054 -0.062 0.01 -0.046 -0.125 0.083 0.058 
28 0.057 0.06 0.17 0.004 0.056 0.053 -0.087 0.053 0.007 0.015 -0.026 0.022 0.063 0.033 0.188 -0.078 -0.264 0.049 -0.019 -0.001 
29 0.006 0.005 -0.074 0.15 -0.01 -0.077 0.074 -0.059 0.017 -0.021 -0.12 0.107 -0.035 0.01 -0.031 0.02 0.11 -0.06 -0.049 0.058 
30 -0.079 -0.13 0.079 -0.017 -0.02 0.069 -0.014 0.01 -0.092 0.048 0.185 -0.119 -0.082 0.028 -0.111 0.024 -0.098 0.011 0.04 -0.043 
31 0.076 0.137 -0.065 -0.009 0.03 0.053 -0.007 0.096 0.056 -0.061 -0.102 0.009 0.184 -0.039 0.021 0.036 0.088 0.043 -0.05 -0.081 
32 -0.027 -0.042 0.057 -0.032 -0.037 -0.093 0.026 -0.109 0.006 0.026 -0.06 -0.03 -0.173 0.013 0.178 -0.095 0.071 -0.06 0.053 0.035 
33 0.003 0.01 0.01 0.035 -0.01 -0.038 -0.029 0.015 -0.019 0.02 0.102 0.104 0.144 0.027 -0.117 0.024 0.188 0.179 -0.076 0.081 
34 -0.027 0.009 0.062 -0.034 -0.08 0.126 0.003 -0.029 0.015 -0.035 -0.017 -0.083 -0.159 -0.099 -0.035 0.087 -0.082 -0.191 0.123 -0.057 
35 0.033 -0.01 -0.106 -0.053 0.108 0.077 0.017 0.041 -0.045 0.091 -0.06 0.055 0.093 0.064 0.054 -0.088 0.051 0.102 -0.136 -0.151 
36 -0.008 -0.052 0.164 0.154 -0.011 -0.246 0.007 0.066 0.04 -0.193 0.054 -0.088 -0.101 0.041 -0.09 -0.001 -0.03 -0.033 0.02 0.124 
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Diagram  1 Long-run spectral densities of ARMA (0,0) and ARFIMA (0,d,0) models 
 
 
Common property of autocorrelation functions for all of the series first differences is that it 
starts with a large negative value at lag one. This could be evidence of series being over 
differenced, as a result of misleadingly assuming series containing one unit root when they 
do not.  Further, Bailie et. al. (1996) conclude that if KPSS and PP tests give contradicting 
results, based on rejecting null hypothesis in both tests, this would be evident of some 
process that is not well described by either I(0) nor I(1). Further one could assume that 
series are fractionally integrated.  
 
Spectral density analysis compares long run ARFIMA model fitting to analogous ARMA 
model fitting, results are plotted in diagram 1. Please note, that we have compared values 
of spectral density only in the long run. Short-run results are not reported here as for both 
ARMA and ARFIMA, spectral density function is the same, because autoregressive and 
moving average parts have not been included in specifications.   
 
From the graphs in Diagram 1, it can be observed that in long run ARFIMA model is a 
better fit for inflation series, as it better describes long memory process. In fractionally 
integrated model historical values effect is decaying exponentially rather than being 
linearly carried forward, as being described by the flat spectral density plot implied by 
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ARMA model. For most of the series we expect difference parameter d to be positive as 
spectral density function diverges to infinity when d approaches zero value. However, the 
case of New Zealand is a standout from the diagram due to its spectral density function 
appearing as inverted exponential line in contrast to the rest. Its value is converging to zero 
when d approaches zero – it is the case when d parameter is negative. The estimation of 
parameter d is different to the usual ARIMA estimation steps. In fractionally integrated 
models parameter d is derived simultaneously with autoregressive and moving average 
parts (Doornik and Ooms (2004)).  So for different combination of ARMA terms there will 
be different d parameters, thus further d estimation analysis is carried out in appropriate 
model estimation sub-sections. Parameter derivation procedure by default is based on the 
iterative methods of Maximum Likelihood. Robustness of the results obtained from ML, 
where possible has been confirmed by the maximum modified profile likelihood function 
(MPL). MPL technique is advanced to the default ML instrument and is used for 
exogenous bias correction.  
 
5.1.2 Rolling standard deviation model of inflation volatility  
 
For rolling standard deviation model ARFIMA(0,d,0) model will be used. In table 5-4 
estimation results for parameter d are present. For most of the series parameter values lay 
within the open interval of 0 to 0.5. Its corresponding p values of 0.000 indicate that d 
parameter explains a long-run variation in the series. However this is not true for all series.  
 
Maximum likelihood estimation has derived a relatively small d parameter value for the 
Ireland’s inflation series. Validity of the finding is very doubtful and is rejected at 1%, 5% 
and 10% significance level. ARFIMA modelling is unsuitable here so we have to establish 
whether series are stationary or non-stationary. For additional stationarity tests ARFIMA 
modelling is used. Further d estimation procedure using both ML and MPL consequently 
on differenced Ireland’s inflation series has yielded similar result of d parameter 
approaching the limit of -1. This is evident that if differencing of the series will yield an 
unpleasant result of “over differencing”, implying that initial series are stationary. This is 
in line with the unit root KPSS and PP test results.  
 
Table 5-4 Parameter d results obtained by iterative methods for ARFIMA (0,d,0) model 
Country  
Maximum Likelihood Modified-Profile-Likelihood 
D value* 
d p d p 
Austria AT 0.142 0.000 0.149 0.000 0.149 
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Australia AU 0.369 0.000 0.387 0.000 0.387 
Belgium BE 0.495 0.000 - - 0.495 
Canada CA 0.452 0.000 - - 0.452 
Switzerland CH 0.491 0.000 - - 0.491 
Germany DE 0.393 0.000 0.450 0.000 0.450 
Denmark DK 0.354 0.000 0.367 0.000 0.367 
Spain ES 0.496 0.000 - - 0.496 
Finland FI 0.280 0.000 0.292 0.000 0.292 
France FR 0.470 0.000 - - 0.470 
Ireland IE 0.061 0.358 0.082 0.247 0 
Italy IT 0.425 0.000 0.446 0.000 0.446 
Japan JP 0.449 0.000 0.482 0.000 0.482 
Netherlands NL 0.254 0.000 0.265 0.000 0.265 
Norway NO 0.194 0.001 0.217 0.001 0.217 
New Zealand NZ -0.033 0.432 -0.024 0.579 0 
Portugal PT 0.497 0.000 - - 0.497 
Sweden SE 0.491 0.000 - - 0.491 
United Kingdom UK 0.392 0.000 0.410 0.000 0.410 
United States US 0.495 0.000 - - 0.495 
d values together with its corresponding p values have been derived using STATA 13 software. 
* D value in the final column is the values that we assume and carry forward for the further analysis, where it is equal 0 we assume that 
series are stationary, where possible we prefer d value that has been derived by MPL technique as it is less bias. 
 
As expected New Zealand’s inflation difference parameter appeared to be negative in the 
region of 0 to -0.5.  This result is hard to interpret, but its interpretation is not the aim of 
this research as the result is highly insignificant with the corresponding p value of 0.579. 
ARFIMA model is not an adequate measure of description for the Netherlands inflation 
processes.  Similar to the previous case ARFIMA iterative estimation method for 
differenced inflation series is used to determine stationarity of the series. Here difference 
parameter is approaching -1 value that is evident of series being over differenced. This 
result comes in line with the large negative ACF value of -0.43 at lag 1 of first difference 
of the series.  Combining these results with previous unit root tests’ results, stationarity of 
the series becomes evident.  
 
Next rolling standard deviation of the series is derived. For New Zealand and Ireland 
primary data is used. For the rest of the countries prior to any transformations inflation 
series will be fractionally differenced using applicable d parameter (Table 5-4). This is 
achieved in STATA 13 using “fracdiff” command. In the cases, where it is possible to do 
so, fractional difference parameter derived by MPL is used, where there is no such a 
possibility, d parameter derived by default ML technique is used. Then rolling standard 
deviation of the series is estimated by assuming optimal lag length of 4, since the series are 
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of quarterly frequency. Statistical properties of the series are described in the next section 
together with the rest of the measures.  
 
5.1.3 GARCH based measures of inflation volatility  
 
Following Bailie et. al. (1996), it has been decided that ARFIMA (0,d, 1) - GARCH (1,1) 
model is to be fitted for the parametric modelling of the inflation series. One of the reasons 
is that fractionally integrated models better describe series in both short-run and long-run 
in contrast to analogous ARMA and ARIMA models. Diagram 2 illustrates these 
differences in model estimates, where top graph depicts spectral densities of ARMA and 
ARFIMA long run parameters, and bottom diagram depicts the short run dynamics. 
 
Looking at the top graph for all countries, one common feature arises. All graphs are 
evident of difference parameter d being positive, as there is no inverted curve for ARFIMA 
long-run spectral density. This result is in contrast to previous study of spectral density 
functions depicted in Diagram 1, where for New Zealand ARFIMA(0,d,0) model, the 
graph was of inverted shape in relation to others. Here for all of the inflation series spectral 
density functions are approaching infinity once frequency approaches zero value. For most 
of the series ARFIMA spectral density function resembles hyperbolic shape with minor 
adjustments in cases of Ireland, Norway and New Zealand.  
 
Ireland inflation’s spectral density values derived by ARMA and ARFIMA parameters 
diverge at the end, where frequency decreases to zero. At the opposite end, where 
frequency values aim to reach infinity, both spectral densities graphs diverge to unique 
value that is steadily increasing after frequency value of two. New Zealand’s spectral 
density’s graph behaviour in the long run is very similar to that of Ireland’s. The only 
difference is that the rate of change is higher after the density function reaches its minimal 
value. Please note, comparing ARFIMA (0,d,1) to ARFIMA (0,d,0) models for New 
Zealand, addition of moving average part removed changed the difference parameter to a 
positive value.  
 
Norway’s spectral density functions’ graphs for both long run and short run are almost 
identical. The only difference is that ARMA spectral density function’s value at 0 is finite 
and for ARFIMA models it is in the limit approaching infinity, so there is no fixed value. 
As parameters for both models draw a very similar behavioural picture for the series then 
there is a question arising if ARFIMA model is a better fit for the series? As from the 
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glance on the graph, it looks as if moving average part describes the majority of the 
variation in the series.  
Diagram  2 Long-run spectral densities of ARMA(0,1) and ARFIMA(0,d,1) models 
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ARFIMA (0,d,1) is being fitted to the inflation series using Maximum Likelihood Iteration 
method in STATA 13.0. Only for Canada and Norway inflation series it was possible to 
use alternative MPL procedure. For the rest of the series Broyden – Fletcher – Goldfarb - 
Shanno stepping becomes contracted and iteration technique does not converge.  
Difference parameter has been estimated by default technique, where possible it has been 
substituted by a less biased one, derived using the MPL method.  
 
Observations of spectral density graphs for Norway have been confirmed by the ARFIMA 
modelling. It appeared that d parameter is highly insignificant and that moving average 
part accounts for the series in time dynamics.  Its impact on the series is comparatively 
large with coefficient value of 0.327 and highly significant (corresponding p value of 
0.000). So all of the analysis are confirming the hypothesis that ARFIMA modelling is not 
the best fit for the Norway inflation series model, the only remaining question to answer is 
what model is better fit ARIMA (0,1,1) or ARMA (0,1)? ARFIMA modelling of 
differenced Norway series can help us here to define the stationarity of the series. 
Fractional difference parameter approaching limit of -1 is indicative of series being over 
differenced and not suitability of ARIMA (0,1,1) for series modelling.  This is in line with 
all the unit root tests where Norway inflation series appeared to be stationary. 
 
Table 5-5 Parameter d results obtained by iterative methods for ARFIMA (0,d,1) model 
Country  
Maximum Likelihood Modified-Profile-Likelihood 
D value* 
d p d p 
Austria AT 0.462 0.000 - - 0.462 
Australia AU 0.449 0.000 - - 0.449 
Belgium BE 0.492 0.000 - - 0.492 
Canada CA 0.402 0.000 0.454 0.000 0.454 
Switzerland CH 0.482 0.000 - - 0.482 
Germany DE 0.466 0.000 - - 0.466 
Denmark DK 0.484 0.000 - - 0.484 
Spain ES 0.494 0.000 - - 0.494 
Finland FI 0.451 0.000 - - 0.451 
France FR 0.487 0.000 - - 0.487 
Ireland IE 0.360 0.004 - - 0.360 
Italy IT 0.483 0.000 - - 0.483 
Japan JP 0.463 0.000 - - 0.463 
Netherlands NL 0.467 0.000 - - 0.467 
Norway NO 0.019 0.777 0.039 0.577 0 
New Zealand NZ 0.417 0.000 - - 0.417 
Portugal PT 0.495 0.000 - - 0.495 
Sweden SE 0.489 0.000 - - 0.489 
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United Kingdom UK 0.477 0.000 - - 0.477 
United States US 0.491 0.000 - - 0.491 
d values together with its corresponding p values have been derived using STATA 13 software. 
* D value in the final column is the values that we assume and carry forward for the further analysis, where it is equal 0 we assume that 
series are stationary, where possible we prefer d value that has been derived by MPL technique as it is less bias. 
 
Concluding from the ARFIMA estimation analysis, for all the countries inflation series 
fractionally integrated moving average is a better-fit model. The only exception is Norway 
inflation series where ARMA (0,1,) gives a better approximation.  
 
Second step is fitting parametric model GARCH(1,1) to the series. Before any fittings will 
be done Lagrange Multiplier residual test for the presence of ARCH effects will be run. 
Lag length for the series is defined at 1, 6 and 12 in order to capture autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity at different levels. Tests results are reported in Table 5-6. 
 
Table 5-6 ARCH LM test results for ARFIMA (0,d,1) specification 
 
K=1 K=6 K=12 
 
F stat TR^2 
Presence of ARCH 
effects 
F stat TR^2 
Presence of ARCH 
effects 
F stat TR^2 
Presence of ARCH 
effects 
AT 28.31 25.05 YES 14.24 61.11 YES 9.65 75.26 YES 
AU 70.36 52.57 YES 13.75 59.65 YES 6.95 60.96 YES 
BE 38.51 32.62 YES 8.36 41.13 YES 5.49 51.61 YES 
CA 1.34 1.34 NO 0.56 3.41 NO 0.34 4.26 NO 
CH 42.62 34.84 YES 16.60 65.39 YES 2.70 29.07 YES 
DE 0.04 0.04 NO 0.31 2.03 NO 0.43 5.90 NO 
DK 8.48 8.18 YES 5.10 26.92 YES 3.34 34.52 YES 
ES 13.58 12.85 YES 7.92 39.41 YES 3.77 38.74 YES 
FI 40.19 33.80 YES 13.40 58.56 YES 8.00 66.91 YES 
FR 12.77 12.13 YES 7.33 37.03 YES 4.28 42.80 YES 
GB 11.98 11.42 YES 5.85 30.72 YES 3.19 33.80 YES 
IE 0.27 0.27 NO 0.24 1.55 NO 0.38 5.20 NO 
IT 6.42 6.28 YES 2.78 15.88 YES 3.41 35.68 YES 
JP 27.98 24.79 YES 9.22 44.42 YES 5.57 52.13 YES 
NL 2.30 2.30 NO 3.92 21.68 YES 1.54 17.98 NO 
NO 21.99 20.12 YES 3.99 22.14 YES 2.00 22.73 YES 
NZ 79.23 57.31 YES 17.23 69.41 YES 8.56 73.60 YES 
PT 83.70 59.59 YES 14.48 61.81 YES 8.35 68.77 YES 
SE 65.72 49.96 YES 12.44 55.58 YES 5.90 54.32 YES 
US 9.49 9.15 YES 5.49 29.11 YES 3.79 38.84 YES 
F-stat and TR2  statistics have been estimated in EViews 8.0 
K corresponds to lag length of the model, and tests are done at 5% significance level. 
 
ARCH effects have been detected in most series residuals, except for inflation series of 
Canada, Germany and Ireland. ARCH LM test is not a powerful test so despite the ARCH 
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test result we still going to fit the parametric volatility part to all the series. For the 
robustness checks of volatility rolling standard deviation will be used, where parametric 
model efficiency will be in doubt.  
 
A second parametric measure will be derived for the robustness checks – GARCH (1,1) 
model.  For this measures ARFIMA (0,d,0) specification will be used, where d parameter 
values can be found in Table 5-4. Lagrange Multiplier tests for the ARCH effects have 
been run for the data. Results are reported in Table 5-7.  
 
Table 5-7 ARCH LM test results for ARFIMA (0,d,0) specification 
 
K=1 K=6 K=12 
 
F stat TR^2 
Presence of 
ARCH effects 
F stat TR^2 
Presence of ARCH 
effects 
F stat TR^2 
Presence of ARCH 
effects 
AT 84.28 59.88 YES 24.43 85.79 YES 12.56 87.58 YES 
AU 79.71 57.57 YES 15.57 64.93 YES 7.79 65.76 YES 
BE 41.06 34.41 YES 9.24 44.49 YES 5.68 52.86 YES 
CA 1.35 1.35 NO 0.55 3.35 NO 0.33 4.12 NO 
CH 35.46 29.95 YES 11.52 51.16 YES 4.01 39.89 YES 
DE 4.08 3.97 YES 0.78 4.82 NO 0.79 9.98 NO 
DK 21.19 19.13 YES 6.64 33.48 YES 3.90 38.89 YES 
ES 15.61 14.63 YES 8.01 39.77 YES 3.97 40.33 YES 
FI 38.07 32.30 YES 10.96 50.64 YES 6.06 55.42 YES 
FR 14.01 13.22 YES 7.52 37.80 YES 4.38 43.56 YES 
GB 9.42 9.08 YES 5.55 29.37 YES 2.94 31.63 YES 
IE 0.80 0.81 NO 0.28 1.78 NO 0.64 8.21 NO 
IT 4.20 4.16 YES 2.50 14.42 YES 3.53 36.75 YES 
JP 20.32 18.63 YES 6.78 34.72 YES 4.52 44.64 YES 
NL 0.49 0.50 NO 4.54 24.69 YES 1.43 16.79 NO 
NO 21.26 19.41 YES 3.68 20.50 YES 1.77 20.38 NO 
NZ 14.06 13.31 YES 7.18 36.73 YES 3.54 37.07 YES 
PT 92.47 63.87 YES 18.92 73.67 YES 10.32 78.37 YES 
SE 64.53 49.27 YES 12.21 54.81 YES 5.77 53.47 YES 
US 15.23 14.30 YES 6.82 34.93 YES 4.73 46.19 YES 
F-stat and TR2  statistics have been estimated in EViews 8.0 
K corresponds to lag length of the model, and tests are done at 5% significance level. 
 
ARCH effects have been detected for all countries data series at all lag length or at some 
lag length except for Canada and Ireland. As before due to low power of the ARCH LM 
test, GARCH (1,1) model based on ARFIMA(0,d,0) specification will be derived for all 
countries’ series. 
 
5.1.4 Volatility measures descriptive statistics.  
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Estimated volatility measures have been averaged from monthly to yearly frequency. 
Descriptive statistics describing final estimated volatility models of inflation series are 
present below in Table 5-8, additionally graphs of inflation volatility measures by country 
have been plotted in Appendix A4.  
 
By observing the graphs in Appendix A4 it becomes obvious that rolling standard 
deviation produces volatility measures with the smallest range (scaling of the graphs is 
evident of this). It can be supported with comparative data description from Table 3-1 
where rolling standard deviation measure has smallest mean, range and standard deviation 
values. Even though GARCH based measures have smallest minimal values, they have 
largest maximum values. Both GARCH based measures have similar mean and minimal 
values. However, GARCH based measure with moving average part has highest range of 
the series together with the largest maximum value. Thus, it has largest standard deviation 
value meaning it is the most volatile. 
 
Within the countries picture might look a bit different. For most of the countries GARCH 
based volatilities have higher values range and standard deviation. For Germany, Spain 
and the United States volatility measure based on rolling standard deviation measure has 
wider range and, thus, higher standard deviation value.  Overall, peak values are usually 
larger with GARCH based measures for all countries excluding the countries listed above 
(Germany, Spain and the United States). For all countries except Austria, Australia, 
Finland, France, Italy and Norway, GARCH based volatility with moving average part 
yields higher peak values, range and consequently, higher standard deviation.  
 



































































































Austria (AT)                     
ARFIMA(0,d,0) - 
MA4 
50 0.45 0.27 2.56 0.03 0.54 1.95 7.27 69.59 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,0) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 0.99 0.36 9.03 0.01 1.77 3.05 12.75 275.65 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,1) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 0.85 0.33 7.94 0.01 1.56 3.21 13.71 324.85 0.00 
Australia (AU)            
ARFIMA(0,d,0) - 
MA4 
50 0.68 0.53 2.52 0.20 0.45 1.92 7.50 72.86 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,0) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 0.97 0.66 5.90 0.32 0.95 3.25 15.77 427.41 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,1) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 0.94 0.66 5.31 0.32 0.88 3.03 13.83 321.06 0.00 






































































































50 0.20 0.19 0.66 0.02 0.15 0.81 3.19 5.48 0.06 
ARFIMA (0,d,0) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 0.14 0.09 0.85 0.02 0.15 3.00 13.93 323.99 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,1) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 0.15 0.08 1.13 0.03 0.19 3.09 14.59 359.22 0.00 
Canada (CA)           
ARFIMA(0,d,0) - 
MA4 
50 0.50 0.48 1.63 0.12 0.25 2.24 10.03 144.80 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,0) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 0.49 0.37 3.18 0.19 0.44 4.91 30.39 1763.64 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,1) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 0.49 0.37 3.26 0.19 0.45 4.92 30.44 1770.22 0.00 
Switzerland (CH)           
ARFIMA(0,d,0) - 
MA4 
50 0.24 0.20 1.14 0.04 0.18 2.89 14.22 10.80 0.49 
ARFIMA (0,d,0) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 0.15 0.09 0.94 0.04 0.17 2.87 11.66 6.93 0.34 
ARFIMA (0,d,1) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 0.15 0.08 1.28 0.04 0.21 4.03 20.17 6.75 0.01 
Germany (DE)           
ARFIMA(0,d,0) - 
MA4 
19 0.25 0.23 0.60 0.08 0.14 1.02 3.46 3.45 0.18 
ARFIMA (0,d,0) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
19 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.05 0.04 0.89 3.09 2.54 0.28 
ARFIMA (0,d,1) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
19 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.01 1.75 5.77 15.77 0.00 
Denmark (DK)           
ARFIMA(0,d,0) - 
MA4 
44 0.47 0.29 1.60 0.03 0.43 0.92 2.59 6.54 0.04 
ARFIMA (0,d,0) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
44 0.78 0.38 3.87 0.04 0.85 1.53 5.32 26.93 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,1) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
44 1.02 0.30 6.94 0.04 1.46 1.98 7.34 63.40 0.00 
Spain (ES)           
ARFIMA(0,d,0) - 
MA4 
50 0.32 0.25 1.04 0.05 0.23 1.10 3.57 10.84 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,0) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 0.29 0.18 1.01 0.10 0.22 1.61 4.79 28.36 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,1) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 0.29 0.18 0.94 0.11 0.21 1.53 4.28 22.94 0.00 
Finland (FI)           
ARFIMA(0,d,0) - 
MA4 
50 0.83 0.56 3.08 0.17 0.67 1.56 5.05 29.00 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,0) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 1.66 0.89 10.23 0.34 2.07 2.69 10.15 166.85 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,1) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 1.58 0.96 8.77 0.27 1.91 2.59 9.51 144.28 0.00 
France (FR)           
ARFIMA(0,d,0) - 
MA4 
50 0.34 0.28 1.25 0.07 0.27 1.30 4.66 19.84 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,0) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 0.48 0.16 1.83 0.01 0.63 1.14 2.65 11.15 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,1) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 0.47 0.16 1.80 0.01 0.61 1.15 2.67 11.24 0.00 
Great Britain (GB)           
ARFIMA(0,d,0) - 
MA4 
50 0.71 0.63 2.20 0.24 0.40 2.18 8.31 98.43 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,0) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 1.02 0.61 4.84 0.36 0.95 2.28 8.04 96.23 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,1) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 1.02 0.57 5.34 0.31 1.03 2.39 8.79 117.66 0.00 
Ireland (IE)           
MA4 23 0.93 0.80 2.48 0.20 0.62 0.89 3.15 3.07 0.22 




































































































ARFIMA (0,d,1) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
20 1.52 1.22 3.17 0.40 0.91 0.44 1.73 1.97 0.37 
Italy (IT)           
ARFIMA(0,d,0) - 
MA4 
50 0.71 0.55 2.55 0.17 0.54 1.58 5.21 31.03 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,0) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 1.35 0.70 8.51 0.22 1.60 2.42 9.72 143.05 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,1) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 1.28 0.59 8.28 0.22 1.58 2.45 9.65 142.27 0.00 
Japan (JP)           
ARFIMA(0,d,0) - 
MA4 
50 0.51 0.38 1.90 0.06 0.36 1.85 6.59 55.38 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,0) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 0.57 0.27 3.06 0.11 0.70 2.35 7.88 95.46 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,1) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 0.56 0.27 4.08 0.12 0.76 2.97 12.30 254.01 0.00 
Netherlands (NL)           
ARFIMA(0,d,0) - 
MA4 
50 0.58 0.52 1.80 0.13 0.31 1.37 5.97 33.95 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,0) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 0.67 0.42 4.63 0.22 0.80 3.46 15.55 427.76 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,1) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 0.64 0.40 5.13 0.21 0.84 3.96 19.53 699.89 0.00 
Norway (NO)           
ARFIMA(0,d,0) - 
MA4 
50 1.20 1.26 4.19 0.05 0.86 0.77 4.22 8.08 0.02 
ARFIMA (0,d,0) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 3.98 3.48 22.77 0.08 3.82 2.53 12.97 260.45 0.00 
ARMA (0,1) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
53 4.15 3.73 21.21 0.02 3.85 1.72 8.33 88.83 0.00 
New Zealand (NZ)           
MA4 53 2.18 1.03 14.69 0.27 2.83 2.79 11.17 216.06 0.00 
GARCH (1,1) 53 20.72 3.31 260.36 0.48 43.84 3.84 19.48 730.13 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,1) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 20.39 2.35 262.88 0.43 45.13 3.76 18.79 637.07 0.00 
Portugal (PT)           
ARFIMA(0,d,0) - 
MA4 
50 0.39 0.34 1.05 0.04 0.26 0.71 2.80 4.30 0.12 
ARFIMA (0,d,0) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 0.47 0.34 1.72 0.20 0.32 2.34 8.86 117.26 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,1) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 0.50 0.30 2.51 0.14 0.49 2.38 9.02 122.79 0.00 
Sweden (SE)           
ARFIMA(0,d,0) - 
MA4 
50 0.28 0.23 1.05 0.01 0.24 1.10 4.09 12.49 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,0) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 0.30 0.16 1.35 0.05 0.31 1.77 5.53 39.52 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,1) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 0.31 0.14 2.08 0.05 0.39 2.73 11.50 212.90 0.00 
United States (US)           
ARFIMA(0,d,0) - 
MA4 
50 0.18 0.16 0.44 0.04 0.10 0.88 3.28 6.65 0.04 
ARFIMA (0,d,0) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 0.08 0.06 0.29 0.02 0.06 1.48 4.91 25.84 0.00 
ARFIMA (0,d,1) - 
GARCH (1,1) 
50 0.08 0.06 0.26 0.02 0.06 1.31 4.18 17.22 0.00 
Please note volatility measures and all relevant analysis are estimated using EViews 8.0. 
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5.2 Inflation Volatility effect on labour market performance. 
 
The effect of inflation volatility on labour market performance has been estimated using a 
wide range of panel data models. Similarly to the last chapter, the choice of optimal 
estimation technique has been done with the assistance of the diagnostic testing of the 
models. In contrast to the previous chapter, panel time series aspect of the macroeconomic 
model could not have been exploited here, as inflation volatility series are fractionally 
integrated.  This violates the cointegrating relationship assumptions and undermines the 
use of error correction model and Granger causality. Instead Corrected Least Square 
Dummy models have been used instead, as proposed by Bruno (2005).  
 
General expectation is that inflation volatility will have adverse effect on labour market 
performance. There is no previous theoretical literature binding the two variables in one 
context, however, our hypothesis is based on previous empirical research. Feldmann 
(2012), based on 20 industrial countries, has found an adverse effect of inflation volatility 
on the unemployment rate.  
 
5. 2.1 Baseline model derivations: inflation volatility effect on unemployment. 
 
The choice of unemployment rate from Annual Labour Force Statistics (ALFS) for the 
baseline model is not random. It provides the longest time coverage of the series. The same 
principle has been applied for the choice of optimal explanatory variables model among its 
alternatives in construction of the baseline model.  Baseline model for the analysis is: 
 
𝑈𝑟𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, 
 
where Urt is Unemployment Rate from ALFS , Xit  is a vector of explanatory variables, αi 
is country fixed effects, dt is yearly time dummies and uit is an idiosyncratic error term. 
Vector of explanatory variables includes variables measuring inflation volatility, tax 
wedge, output gap, employment protection legislation, product market regulation, average 
benefit replacement rate and union density.  
  
The Wooldridge (2002) test has been run to test the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. 
Alternative of first-order serial correlation in the error terms is not rejected due to the large 
F-test statistic value of 116.169 (corresponding p value of 0.000). For further diagnostic 
checks three models have been derived to assist with the tests – pooled OLS (country 
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clustered), RE and FE. The results are presented in Table 5-9. Use of time effects has been 
confirmed for all models by the relevant F-tests. Overall, all models suggest that inflation 
volatility has an insignificant effect on unemployment rate. The validity of the results has 
to be examined. Pooled OLS provides comparatively large values of variables’ 
coefficients, R2 and standard errors.  It might be a consequence of autocorrelation in 
residuals as indicated by Wooldridge (2002) test.  Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test 
is evident of distinctive country effects implying pooled OLS is a poor derivation method.  
Left with two alternatives of random and fixed effects panel estimation techniques, 
Hausman test is used to make the choice for modelling.  So far the choice has been made in 
favour of Fixed Effects model, as its estimator is consistent. Next question lays in the 
power of models assumption.  Homoscedasticity in fixed effects model is checked by the 
means of the Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity.  Results are indicative 
of presence of heteroskedasticity.  Violation of models fundamental assumptions leads to 
misleading results.  
 













































































































































Output Gap -0.503*** -0.541*** -0.552*** -0.541*** -0.552*** 
Tax Wedge 0.158** 0.125*** 0.118*** 0.125*** 0.118*** 
Inflation volatility (pv1) 0.836 0.196 0.207 0.196 0.207 
Product Market 
Regulation 
2.513* 0.957*** 0.989*** 0.957 0.989 
Employment Protection 
Legislation 
-0.640* 0.758 0.228 0.758 0.228 
Average Benefit 
Replacement Rate 
0.009 0.091*** 0.074*** 0.091*** 0.074*** 
Union Density -0.049 -0.017 -0.038* -0.016 -0.038 
Time Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard Error of 
Inflation Volatility 
1.067 0.226 0.225 0.296 0.311 
R2 within 
 
0.593 0.591 0.593 0.591 
R2 between 
 
0.057 0.095 0.057 0.095 
R2 overall 0.365 0.179 0.252 0.179 0.252 











Wooldridge test (2005) 
116.169 
(0.0000) 
    























Pesaran  (2004) cross-
sectional dependence 
test 





Average absolute value 
of the off-diagonal 
elements 
















Average Number of 
Years2 
24.6 24.6 24.6 24.6 24.6 
Number of Countries 20 20 20 20 20 
Number of 
Observations 
492 492 492 492 492 
Baseline specification: Urt =  β0 + β1Xit + αi + dt + uit 
1 Hausman test results reported are based on regressions without time effects. 
2 Average number of years is used as panel is unbalanced 
* Result is significant at 10% significance level 
** Result is significant at 5% significance level 
*** Result is significant at 1% significance level 
 
Presence of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the error term might be liable not 
only for adverse results, but may bias Hausman test statistics as well. In search of the 
answers, fixed and random effects models corrected for the presence of autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity have been estimated. As can be seen from the results in Table 5-9, even 
though introduction of robust standard errors has decreased standard errors, it has still left 
inflation volatility effect on unemployment insignificant. Does variation in standard errors 
have enough power to alteration of Hausman test results?  Following Schaffer and Stillman 
(2010), it was decided to use “xtoverid” command in STATA for the heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation robust Hausman test.   
 
Table 5-10 Determinants of unemployment for OECD countries (1985-2011): comparison of inflation 
volatility indicators 
 
Pooled OLS with 
Driscoll-Kraay SE 
Fixed Effects with 
Driscoll and Kraay SE 
Fixed effects with 
Driscoll-Kraay SE where 
inflation volatility is 
measured as pv1  
Fixed effects with 
Driscoll-Kraay SE where 
inflation volatility is 
measured as pv2  
Fixed effects with 
Driscoll-Kraay SE where 
inflation volatility is 
measured as pv3  
Output Gap -0.490*** -0.530*** -0.540*** -0.539*** -0.539*** 
Tax Wedge 0.162*** 0.128*** 0.121*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 
Inflation volatility 0.634** 0.022 0.242 0.027 0.023 
Product Market 
Regulation 
0.770*** 0.365 0.418* 0.435* 0.429* 
Employment Protection 
Legislation 
-0.436*** 0.575 0.625 0.668 0.671 
Average Benefit 
Replacement Rate 
0.013 0.095*** 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.092*** 
Union Density -0.053*** -0.019 -0.036 -0.0039 -0.038 
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Time Effects   YES YES YES 
Time dummies1 YES YES    
Standard Error of 
Inflation Volatility 
0.273 0.206 0.239 0.055 0.055 
Wooldridge(2002) 





   
Hoechle(2007)  





   
R2 within  0.547 0.588 0.567 0.587 
R2 between   
   
R2 overall 0.325  
   
Average Number of 
Years2 
24.6 24.6 24.6 24.6 24.6 
Number of Countries 20 20 20 20 20 
Number of 
Observations 
492 492 492 492 492 
Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects models with Driscoll-Kraay Standard Errors, where unemployment rate is provided 
by the indicator from Annual Labour Force Statistics. 
1 Time dummies included are for years 1991, 2002 and 2008 
2Hausman test results reported are based on regressions without time effects. 
3 Average number of years is used as panel is unbalanced 
 * Result is significant at 10% significance level 
 ** Result is significant at 5% significance level 
*** Result is significant at 1% significance level 
 
 
Test of over-identifying restrictions produces a Sargan test value of 10.807. Corresponding 
p-value is indicative of RE model being the most suitable one for the further analysis of the 
model. This result has been supported by Hoechle (2007) adapted Wooldridge (2002) test. 
 
Diagnostic checks for cross-sectional dependence have been run.  Free’s, Friedman’s and 
Pesaran tests indicate its presence. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are to be used to avoid 
bias of autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional dependence. Alteration to 
the Hausman test should be done as well as to chose among pooled OLS or fixed effects. 
Adapted Wooldridge (2002) test offers us a chance to do robust Hausman test when 
residuals are independently and identically distributed. This test prefers pooled OLS 
method to fixed effects modelling. However, results should be interpreted with care, as test 
results are sensitive to degree of cross-sectional dependence. Hoechle (2007) proposes 
alternative test that uses Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. This test is robust to spatial and 
cross-sectional dependence. Results of the test suggest superiority of the fixed effects 
model over pooled OLS.  Consideration of both tests provides mixed result, however 
Hoechle (2007) test is stricter than its analogues when errors are not independently and 
identically distributed.  So fixed effects model has been chosen as the technical framework 
for the case where Driscoll-Kraay errors are used.  
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Results of Fixed Effects model with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors indicate that inflation 
volatility and unemployment are positively correlated.  However, this relationship is not 
significant. This result holds even if alternative GARCH model based volatility measures 
are being used.  Is there enough evidence gathered to formally state that inflation volatility 
has no significant impact on unemployment rate? No. As we have to check the consistency 
of the result under dynamic panel model and in the presence of causality concerns.  
 
One of the ways to solve for unobserved endogeneity is to use dynamic model. In previous 
chapter to address same issues panel time series methods have been used (e.g. Pesaran 
(2006) Common Correlated Effects Mean Estimator). The use of these methods is 
unattainable here, because inflation volatility is a fractionally integrated variable. It 
violates one of the fundamental assumptions for the model for all variables to be integrated 
of order one.  
 
Static and dynamic models produce distinctive results for the analysis of inflation volatility 
on unemployment rate. So far it has been shown that first difference inflation volatility has 
significant effect on unemployment rate. Dynamic models tend to describe model 
behaviour from the short run perspective rather than long-run. So do our results suggest 
that inflation volatility effects unemployment only in the short-run?  Or fixed effects model 
results are biased due to unobserved heterogeneity in the model?  
 
The way to solve this dilemma has been described by Bruno (2005), where least square 
dummy variable approach is used with variance corrected by approximations derived from 
Arellano-Bond estimator. The choice of Arellano-Bond estimator among alternatives 
(Blundell-Bond (1998) or Anderson-Hsiao (1982)) is guided by a better fit for models as 
has been shown by Sargan and autocorrelation tests. Inclusion of lagged unemployment 
rate variable still removes all the relevant endogeneity bias associated with wages 
sluggishness. Advantage of the technique is that it is a fixed effects model at the heart of it.  
Thus it avoids major critique of Arellano-Bond modelling of “too many instruments” 
(Roodman (2009)). Another issue of no smaller importance is that this model is generally a 
good fit for both micro and macroeconomic panels (Bruno 2005).   
 
Fixed effects model with bias corrected (order of 
1
𝑁𝑇2
) bootstrapped standard errors (1000 
iterations) has been estimated for all volatility measures. Results (Table 5-11) in magnitude 
are similar to GMM estimators, but corrected fixed effects models suggest weaker 
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significance of the effect with only one volatility measure being significant among three.  
How does this result compare with previous research? Feldmann (2012) results suggest 
that inflation volatility has increasing effect on unemployment. In the article, 
unemployment rate has been approximated by Harmonised unemployment rate variable. 
For more efficient comparison as to minimise the possible differences between the models, 
ALFS derived unemployment rate has been substituted by Harmonised unemployment rate 
and results being reported in Table 5-11a.  
 
Table 5-11 Determinants of unemployment for OECD countries (1985-2011): dynamic model 
 
Least Square Dummy Variable Corrected Estimator with bootstrapped SE2 with 





Baseline specification  
Baseline specification 
where volatility is 
measured as pv2 
Baseline specification 
where volatility is 
measured as pv3 
Lagged unemployment 
rate 
0.806*** 0.808*** 0.806*** 
Output Gap -0.257*** -0.250*** -0.256*** 
Tax Wedge -0.043*** -0.049*** -0.043*** 
Inflation volatility  0.152 0.060* 0.044 
Average Benefit 
Replacement Rate 
0.011 0.014 0.014 
Employment Protection 
Legislation 
-0.055 -0.055 -0.022 
Product Market 
Regulation 
0.120 0.136* 0.117 
Union Density -0.015 -0.018 -0.016 
Standard Error of  
Inflation Volatility 
0.112 0.036 0.036 
Average Number of 
Years1 
23.6 23.45 23.6 
Number of Countries 20 20 20 
Number of 
Observations 
472 469 472 
1 “Average number of years” is reported, as panel is unbalanced 
2 For SE bootstrap the step is 1000 
* Result is significant at 10% significance level 
 ** Result is significant at 5% significance level 
*** Result is significant at 1% significance level 
 
Once alternative measure of unemployment rate has been used, general significance of the 
inflation volatility has gained more power.  Directionally, results are in line with previous 
studies. However, the use of different volatility measures makes it harder to compare the 
magnitude of the effects. Feldmann (2012) approximates volatility by using two rolling 
standard deviation measures – long-run (with lag length from 6 to 10) and short-run (lag 
length from 1 to 5). Whereas in this study one general rolling standard deviation measure 
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has been used that combines short–run and long-run aspects in it with lag length of 12.  
Crude approximation for the combined effect of inflation volatility on unemployment can 
be achieved by coefficients summation. This will amount to 0.26, whereas in our study 
rolling standard deviation volatility measure has yielded coefficient of 0.205. The 
coefficients difference is small taking into account different lag structure, nature of 
approximation for LSDVC model, as well as the fact that current study measure is taking 
stationarity of the series into account.  Moving on to GARCH based measures. It is hard to 
compare them to standard deviation based measures, due to different nature of estimation. 
Lack of studies on the direct link between inflation volatility based on GARCH measures 
contributes to novelty aspect of the research, however disability to compare research 
results to previous studies limits our estimates discussion.   
 
Table 5 -11a Alternative inflation volatility measures effect on harmonised 
unemployment rate for OECD countries   
 
Baseline specification  
Baseline specification 
where volatility is 
measured as pv2 
Baseline specification 
where volatility is 
measured as pv3 
Unemployment Rate 
Indicator  
Harmonised Unemployment Rate 
Lagged unemployment 
rate 
0.772*** 0.774*** 0.773*** 
Output Gap -0.263*** -0.256*** -0.263*** 
Tax Wedge -0.463*** -0.052*** -0.047*** 
Inflation volatility  0.205* 0.071** 0.057 
Average Benefit 
Replacement Rate 
0.013* 0.017* 0.017* 
Employment Protection 
Legislation 
0.078 0.085 0.113 
Product Market 
Regulation 
0.055 0.071 0.048 
Union Density -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 
Standard Error of  
Inflation Volatility 
0.110 0.033 0.036 
Average Number of 
Years1 
22.4 22.2 22.4 
Number of Countries 20 20 20 
Number of 
Observations 
425 422 425 
1 “Average number of years” is reported, as panel is unbalanced 
2 For SE bootstrap the step is 1000 
* Result is significant at 10% significance level,  ** Result is significant at 5% significance level 
*** Result is significant at 1% significance level 
 
Previously time effects have been included into all of the regression analyses here. 
Nevertheless, please note that time effects (dummy variables for every year less one) have 
not been included into Arellano-Bond and LSDVC models. This is due to software limited 
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options for the modelling that restricts use of factor variables and time-series operators. 
However, panel of twenty countries in the research includes EU15 countries. Such an event 
as Euro introduction should have not passed unnoticed for economies and labour market 
performance of the countries involved. Directly it affects only some countries from the 
sample, but the proportion of those countries to the whole sample is large. So it has been 
decided to see if the results are still robust, if this event is taken into account.  Dummy 
variable for the year 2002 has been generated and regressions have been re-run inclusive of 
this variable.  
 
In Table 5-12, results have been reported only for the inflation volatility coefficients and 
corresponding p-values. Browsing through the previous and current results, it should be 
concluded that controlling for euro currency introduction has not changed our results 
significantly.   
 
Table 5-12 Determinants of unemployment for OECD countries (1985-
2011): inclusion of time dummy for introduction of common currency 
(EURO) 
 












 Unemployment Rate (ALFS) 







 Harmonised Unemployment Rate 







1In LSDVC model for SE bootstrap number of iterations is 1000 
 
A country effect is another important feature that has to be addressed to establish 
robustness of the results to country composition of the panel data.  Regressions have been 
re-run with the rolling exclusion of one individual country data one by one from the 
sample. Analysis has been done using Arellano-Bond (1991) heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors and corrected Least Squares Dummy variables distinctively for all three 
measures of inflation volatility. Arellano-Bond tests together with Sargan tests approve the 
choice of modelling the unemployment rate. In the case of harmonised unemployment rate 
they are weaker. So to check validity of the model tests have been run on 
heteroskedasticity robust model and second order autocorrelation has been detected.  
Results are presented in Table 5-13.  
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Table 5-13 Determinants of unemployment for OECD countries (1985-2011): 
country effects 
 




























































































































































1In LSDVC model for SE bootstrap number of iterations is 100 
2In this example countries indicated are the ones excluded from the sample 
* Result is significant at 10% significance level 
 ** Result is significant at 5% significance level 
*** Result is significant at 1% significance level 
 
Results are relatively robust to country composition of the data. GARCH based measure of 
volatility (pv2) has positive impact on unemployment rate despite the country composition. 
This statement is always significant at least at 10% significance level.  Conclusions are less 
powerful for harmonised unemployment rate case, where significance of the outcome 
reduces to 0.147 and 0.176 respectively once Ireland or Portugal countries are out of the 
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sample. This is logical as effect of volatility on labour market depends on individual 
countries’ economies. Some countries are better equipped with government and labour 
market polices and can deflect negative follow-ups of uncertainty better. Some countries’ 
economies are more fragile and bear the burden of volatilities to the full extent. Portugal 
and Ireland look as relatively weaker economies on the overall picture of today’s EU15.  
So it is expected that they will have higher costs to volatilities. So what model provides 
more reliable results? ALFS unemployment rate results are more reliable as the 
econometric model to estimate them is a good fit and it has the highest number of 
observations.  Harmonised unemployment based conclusions are sensitive to what 
volatility measure is being used. Looking at alternative volatility measures such as 
standard deviation based – PV1, Portugal looses its less “equipped for volatility” status, 
but Ireland retains it. 
 
Similar to this study’s previous findings, third volatility measure is the least significant 
among all regressions, the lesser insignificant is rolling standard deviation variable. The 
most significant variable is GARCH based measure of (0,d,0)-GARCH (1,1). Second 
measure of volatility (pv2) looks the most appealing as it captures significant effect of 
inflation volatility on labour market performance more often that the other measures.  So it 
has been decided to alter baseline specification to make it inclusive of (0,d,0)-GARCH 
measure as it is a better performer.  
 
5.2.2 Inflation volatility effect on Labour Market Performance: other indicators. 
 
Volatility effect on unemployment rate has been established, but what about other labour 
market performance indicators? Baseline specification has been assumed for the purpose of 
answering this question and Arellano-Bond Corrected Least Square Dummy Variable 
estimator has been used. Results are present in Table 5-14.  
 
 As expected, volatility has a dampening effect on employment rate and this is a significant 
result at 10% significance level. However, in magnitude the result is not symmetrical to the 
unemployment rate. Inflation volatility increases unemployment rate by a greater value 
(0.011) in proportion to its depressing effect on employment rate.   It is not a surprise as 
inflation volatility hampers labour market participation. For example, a one percent 
increase in volatility decreases labour market activity rates by 0.038 percentage points. 
This inhibiting effect of volatility on labour market indicators has been translated to other 
performance variables. The number of discouraged workers and the duration of 
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unemployment of those unemployed for less than 6 months increases together with 
volatility. However, this result for the later two variables looses its significance even at 
10% level.  
 
From the first looks at the data analysis results volatility disturbs structural rate of 
unemployment ( measured by NAIRU). However this result legitimacy is questionable as 
validity of Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator is questionable, so as the LSDV model that has 
been corrected by Arellano-Bond Standard errors.  
 
Table 5-14 Determinants of labour market performance for OECD countries (1985-2011): dynamic 
model 
 
Employment rate Activity rate 





than 6 months 
Lagged dependent 
variable 
0.824*** 0.973*** 0.976*** -0.163** 0.841*** 
Output Gap 0.224*** 0.096*** -0.045*** -0.101*** 0.908*** 
Tax Wedge 0.008 0.001 -0.027*** 0.003 0.072 
Inflation volatility  -0.049* -0.038** 0.019* 0.005 0.008 
Average Benefit 
Replacement Rate 
0.004 0.007 -0.002 0.007 0.034 
Employment Protection 
Legislation 
0.636 -0.235 -0.041 1.791*** -0.081 
Product Market 
Regulation 
0.704*** 0.306*** 0.116*** 0.030 -0.245 
Union Density -0.072*** -0.0217** -0.042 0.058** -0.054 
Standard Error of 
Inflation Volatility 



































































Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Countries 20 20 20 14 20 
Number of 
Observations 
241 241 469 160 448 
1In LSDVC model for SE bootstrap number of iterations is 100 
* Result is significant at 10% significance level 
 ** Result is significant at 5% significance level 






Regressions based on pooled, random or fixed effects with or without corrections of 
heteroskedasticity, spatial and temporal dependence, have not been evident of any 
significant relationship between inflation volatility and unemployment. However, in 
dynamic modelling using least square dummies with variance corrected by Arellano-Bond 
estimator (1991), inflation volatility coefficients gain significant power. 
 
In baseline specification using different volatility measures and LSDVC method results in 
findings of significant positive relationship between inflation volatility and unemployment 
rate (ALFS definition). But this is true only in the case of GARCH based volatility 
measure without the moving average part. However, once harmonised unemployment rate 
is used in the baseline regression instead of ALFS one, then additionally rolling standard 
deviation based measure coefficient gains significance.  
 
When looking at the other components of labour market, according to baseline 
specification, where volatility measure is based on rolling standard deviation, inflation 
volatility is negatively associated with employment and activity rates. It is also positively 
correlated with structural unemployment rates. 
 
It should be noted that inter variable relationships described here should not be viewed as 
causal impacts because of methodology limitations, but should be viewed more as 
correlations.   
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Chapter 6. Interest rate volatility effect on labour market performance. 
6.1 Volatility measures. 
 
Volatility of interest rate series is to be described by a variety of non-parametric and 
parametric models. In particular, the computation of rolling standard deviation and 
GARCH based measures is the focus of this section. Distinctive property of interest series 
is its asymmetrical reaction to economic booms, shocks and crises. This is explained by 
Central Bank intervention into interest rate formation ruled by desire to track inflation and 
money flows (e.g. Fed, Bank of England and ECB holding interest rates at low of 0.5%). 
How to model volatility of asymmetric response models? Based on previous research and 
software availability, choice will be made among GARCH, GJR-GARCH (Glosten et.al. 
(1993)), QGARCH (Sentana(1995)), and PARCH (Engle and Bollerslev (1986)). These 
models have been used before in previous analysis of interest rate volatility (e.g. Bali 
(2007)).   
 
In order to capture volatility, it has been decided to use money market rate, rather than 
alternatives, because it is a more sensitive measure. Money market rate (MMR) series that 
are used for the purpose have been obtained on monthly basis, but have already been 
averaged to annual frequency. Using monthly data gives an advantage of a large number of 
observations to start with and smaller observations loss due to iterative techniques used.  
Disadvantage of the high frequency data is seasonality, so we have constructed seasonality 
tests by using monthly dummies. Results suggest no seasonal adjustment is required. 
  
6.1.1. Unit root tests 
 
Stationarity of the series needs to be established before any model fittings are performed. 
We will start with classical Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Test where optimal lag 
length has been chosen by the Schwarz Information Criteria. Regression equation has 
exogenous structure – constant added. Trend has not been added as series do not look like 
trended and to avoid over specification of the model that decreases power of the test.  
Results of the Unit Root Tests are reported in Table 6-1.  
 





















1%, 5% , 
10% -2.440248 1 -1.743356 1 1.408951 1 1 AT 
Australia 
1%, 5% , 
10% -1.832894 1 -1.921123 1 0.948601 1 1 AU 
Belgium 
1% -1.803154 1 -2.033876 1 0.619694 0 
1 BE 5% -1.803154 1 -2.033876 1 0.619694 1 
10% -1.803154 1 -2.033876 1 0.619694 1 
Canada 
1%, 5% , 
10% -0.865329 1 -1.311193 1 1.842874 1 1 CA 
Switzerland 
1%, 5% , 
10% -1.558616 1 -2.441944 1 0.791005 1 1 CH 
Germany 
1% -2.720918 1 -2.862288 1 0.809339 1 
1 DE 5.05% -2.720918 1 -2.862288 1 0.809339 1 
10% -2.720918 0 -2.862288 0 0.809339 1 
Denmark 
1% -1.451946 1 -3.013181 1 1.947964 1 
1 DK 5% -1.451946 1 -3.013181 0 1.947964 1 
10% -1.451946 1 -3.013181 0 1.947964 1 
Spain 
1%, 5% , 
10% -1.588452 1 -1.527099 1 2.006951 1 1 ES 
Finland 
1%, 5% , 
10% -1.550742 1 -1.551529 1 2.048697 1 1 FI 
France 
1%, 5% , 
10% -1.465265 1 -1.436948 1 1.583275 1 1 FR 
Ireland 
1%, 5% , 
10% -1.615835 1 -1.371399 1 2.082326 1 1 IE 
Italy 
1%, 5% , 
10% -2.009675 1 -1.48587 1 1.859323 1 1 IT 
Japan 
1%, 5% , 
10% -2.135208 1 -1.442833 1 2.016307 1 1 JP 
Netherlands 
1% -2.849552 1 -3.281771 1 0.898908 1 
1 NL 5% -2.849552 1 -3.281771 0 0.898908 1 
10% -2.849552 1 -3.281771 0 0.898908 1 
Norway 
1%, 5% , 
10% -2.129171 1 -2.19794 1 1.445042 1 1 NO 
New Zealand 
1%, 5% , 
10% -1.40975 1 -1.313635 1 1.44314 1 1 NZ 
Portugal 
1%, 5% , 
10% -1.605298 1 -0.63182 1 1.918611 1 1 PT 
Sweden 
1% -2.173369 1 -2.628851 1 1.304636 1 
1 SE 5% -2.173369 1 -2.628851 1 1.304636 1 
10% -2.173369 1 -2.628851 0 1.304636 1 
United 
Kingdom 
1%, 5% , 
10% -2.509148 1 -2.405217 1 0.822712 1 1 UK 
United States 
1%, 5% , 
10% -0.322426 1 0.185989 1 0.795613 1 1 US 
Unit root tests are done assuming exogenous constant to regression equation, lag length has been chosen in guidance with Schwarz 
Information Criteria.  
All the unit root tests have been estimated using Eviews 8.0 software. Interest series are represented by log(MMR) 
 
ADF test results for all countries’ interest rate series are evident in favour of null 
hypothesis for series containing one unit root at 5% significance level. For the robustness 
checks of the results it has been decided to run Phillips-Perron unit root test as it corrects 
for serial correlation bias.   The of all ADF tests have been supported by the Phillips-
Perron tests at 5% significance level except for interest rates of Denmark and Netherlands.  
For these countries, the test results of interest rates are suggestive of stationarity of the 
series.  Additional Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) unit root tests have been 
run. The null hypothesis of the test is reverse of that of ADF and Phillips-Perron tests – 
stationarity of the series is assumed. Running tests with inverse null hypotheses helps to 
minimise associated Type I and Type II errors. KPSS tests results are suggestive of series 
containing one unit root for all countries except Belgium where stationarity of the series 
has been detected. 
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Need for most series differencing has been indicated by all tests run. For countries interest 
rates where no unique result has been identified by the various tests run, it has been 
decided to “settle with the majority”.  From that concluding that all the series are 
differenced to become stationary.  
 
6.1.2 Data descriptive statistics and normality tests. 
 
Interest rate series that are used for further volatility estimation are differenced logarithm 
of money market rate.  Logarithm transformation together with the induced stationarity 
resulted with observation loss. The drawback of missing values has been experienced for a 
number of countries - Switzerland (9 observations loss), Denmark (4), France (4), Ireland 
(21), Japan (2) and Norway (3). As data samples for those countries ranges from 430 to 
648 overall observations, number of missing data is negligible. So it has been decided not 
to alter any derivation techniques used so far. Instead to make series of continuous 
frequency and to compensate for missing values generated it has been decided to 
interpolate them. The continuity of the series is essential for further volatility estimations, 
for both parametric and non-parametric techniques.   
 
Linear interpolation has been applied to the series of Switzerland, Denmark, France, 
Ireland, Japan and Norway. Linear interpolation has been done using EViews 8 software, 
where the missing value is obtained by the means of average from the appropriate end 
points. Linear interpolation has been chosen as optimal technique as it should smooth 
series and avoids any misspecification problem in further tests.  
 
One of the simplest measures of volatility is the standard deviation.  Standard deviation for 
the series is reported in Table 6-2 together with the rest of the descriptive statistics and 
normality test results.  We are not using standard deviation measure in our analysis, as it is 
too primitive from an econometrics point of view (for further discussion please see 
Measuring exchange rate volatility section). However, for illustrative purposes of volatility 
it is a good indicator. Series with the largest standard deviation of interest rate are those of 
Switzerland (51.67 level points) and the smallest of Finland (6.66 level points). 
Comparatively large standard deviation value for Switzerland’s interest rate series could be 
consequence of outliers present in the data. As most of the results are distributed within the 
range of -170.29 to -248.49, the global maxima and minima of the series could be outliers 
and not representative of the day-to-day volatility of the series. Removal of observations 
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for December 1980 (-364.55) and January 1981 (279.12) would have reduced standard 
deviation measure to the level of 46.8 points.  
 
Not surprisingly, Switzerland’s data range is the largest among interest rate series and is of 
643.67 level points. Removal of endpoints would have reduced it to 418.76 level points. 
Smallest data range for interest rate series belongs to Italy with the value of 63.79 point, 
which is more than 10 times less than that of Switzerland.  
 
























































Austria -0.30 0.00 44.18 -66.88 9.34 -0.37 11.60 1667.04 0.00 
Australia 0.01 0.00 65.22 -73.97 8.15 -0.55 25.14 10380.51 0.00 
Belgium -0.42 0.00 71.38 -71.33 12.23 0.16 13.54 2044.07 0.00 
Canada -0.15 0.00 73.89 -100.55 15.54 0.14 9.01 977.60 0.00 
Switzerland -1.90 0.00 279.12 -364.55 51.67 -0.83 13.27 1939.52 0.00 
Germany -0.24 0.00 165.17 -93.99 17.50 1.23 23.68 11219.82 0.00 
Denmark -0.35 -0.28 175.35 -239.68 24.00 -1.15 33.37 18438.72 0.00 
Spain -0.39 0.00 125.73 -102.76 18.67 -0.26 13.09 1925.56 0.00 
Finland -0.66 -0.07 34.33 -41.31 6.66 -0.72 10.51 990.29 0.00 
France -0.15 -0.30 33.16 -30.63 6.77 0.20 7.92 581.34 0.00 
Ireland -0.44 0.00 105.96 -100.91 12.76 0.16 30.04 14475.90 0.00 
Italy -0.17 -0.11 45.63 -28.57 7.07 1.14 11.27 1499.16 0.00 
Japan -0.66 0.00 230.01 -167.43 24.89 1.84 36.15 30034.67 0.00 
Netherlands -0.27 0.00 226.75 -144.69 23.98 2.14 34.67 26422.66 0.00 
Norway -0.16 0.00 62.84 -100.22 15.39 -1.32 13.52 2371.62 0.00 
New Zealand -0.58 0.00 119.88 -135.13 12.90 -1.04 62.14 46842.40 0.00 
Portugal -0.74 -0.58 60.84 -66.88 12.00 0.21 10.24 755.29 0.00 
Sweden -0.19 0.00 184.18 -160.25 20.79 0.83 37.23 26922.22 0.00 
United 
Kingdom 
-0.40 0.00 168.64 -167.96 24.93 0.83 26.75 11262.78 0.00 
United States -0.60 0.17 81.09 -91.11 11.50 -1.41 23.19 11216.45 0.00 
All the data descriptive statistics and normality tests have been estimated using Eviews 8.0 software 
Interest rate series are approximated by 100D[log (MMR) t ] 
 
Negative mean values for most of the series indicate that on average over the past five 
decades money market rate has decreased, with the only one exception. Interest rate for 
Australia has slightly increased over the period of August 1969 to October 2011 by 0.01 
level points. Median for most of the series is zero with a few exceptions for Denmark, 
Finland, France, Italy, Portugal and the United States. Still their values are very close to 
zero.  
 
Large Jarque-Bera Statistics are suggestive of non-normality of series that is confirmed by 
the corresponding p-values. Followed by rejection of the Null hypothesis for the test of 
Normal distribution with third moment equal to 0 and fourth being equal to 3.   These all 
have been confirmed by the estimated third and fourth moments of the series distributions, 
where results are far from ideal. The closest skewness coefficient can get to 0 is at 0.14 
level for Canada, the smallest kurtosis can reach a value of 7.92 for France.  
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6.1.3 Rolling standard deviation model of interest rate volatility  
 
From non-parametric measures our choice has fallen onto rolling standard deviation 
measure, as it is one of the most sophisticated techniques. It is superior to usual standard 
deviation, as it is time varying (for further comparison of the volatility models please refer 
to Measuring exchange rate volatility section).  
 
Volatility measure has been estimated with a choice of 12 lags for the lag length order as 
series are in monthly frequency. Descriptive statistics of the series is present in the last 
subsection.    
 
6.1.4 GARCH(1,1) measure of interest rate volatility  
 
Before any general autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models can be fitted, we 
need to run tests for the detection of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity effects.  
The Lagrange Multiplier test is run on residuals from the general specification of the 
series, where exogenous constant variable is included. The test statistics, F-test and nR2, 
are compared to critical values of F-statistic and Chi squared distribution with one degree 
of freedom. As series are in monthly frequency, lag length for the test has been chosen at 
1, 6 and 12.  Results of the tests are reported in Table 6-3.  
 
Table 6-3 ARCH LM tests for interest rate series 
 
K=1 K=6 K=12 
 
F stat TR^2 
Presence of 
ARCH effects 
F stat TR^2 
Presence of 
ARCH effects 




AT 5.751173 5.711204 YES 8.399841 46.59112 YES 4.936356 54.44164 YES 
AU 123.8726 99.82846 YES 29.13832 130.9597 YES 15.61278 138.5515 YES 
BE 71.73695 64.7571 YES 21.31757 107.6349 YES 11.92471 118.7962 YES 
CA 44.0368 40.1965 YES 9.490904 51.08051 YES 5.258537 56.50346 YES 
CH 98.24295 79.78454 YES 22.50132 101.7096 YES 10.62126 96.96553 YES 
DE 47.16418 43.96176 YES 9.145005 50.90752 YES 5.931648 64.97271 YES 
DK 107.6556 87.9308 YES 44.57675 170.9023 YES 21.87026 168.7137 YES 
ES 36.24904 33.69583 YES 20.33857 97.05516 YES 12.39509 113.7335 YES 
FI 49.91767 44.63649 YES 7.925204 43.1743 YES 4.226292 46.2849 YES 
FR 59.12941 53.71703 YES 12.76088 68.0645 YES 6.296431 67.77742 YES 
IE 293.684 178.0302 YES 98.38237 251.8324 YES 51.77549 252.3301 YES 
IT 47.93529 43.81134 YES 17.10752 85.67875 YES 9.18688 91.57402 YES 
JP 13.37769 13.14545 YES 4.198461 24.48815 YES 5.630034 62.11208 YES 
NL 24.48697 23.62993 YES 41.07994 177.4003 YES 27.27372 215.8775 YES 
NO 29.22937 27.65716 YES 11.56543 61.24498 YES 10.74476 102.8459 YES 
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NZ 116.7315 85.92446 YES 6.626946 36.01584 YES 3.838909 41.61371 YES 
PT 2.294041 2.292082 NO 3.995757 22.83132 YES 2.434157 27.854 YES 
SE  228.1732 161.5988 YES 56.73702 211.0611 YES 28.5178 212.3017 YES 
UK 41.30961 38.15837 YES 24.62076 113.7412 YES 13.2837 121.2341 YES 
US 196.6936 151.1961 YES 43.28703 186.3614 YES 30.70037 236.3367 YES 
Conclusion to the presence of ARCH effects based on both F-test and TR^2 has been drawn at 5% significance level  
All tests were run using EViews 8.0 software 
 
Heteroskedasticity in the residuals has been detected for all countries’ series at higher lags 
of length 6 and 12. At lag length of 1 no ARCH effects have been found in interest rate 
series’ residuals for Portugal.  For the rest of the series, results are suggestive of the need 
for ARCH based measure fittings for volatility.  In the case of Portugal, we assume the 
need for conditional heteroskedasticity based volatility modelling as volatility has been 
detected at higher lag length order.  
 
There are no tests aimed at detecting GARCH effects, so to show superiority of GARCH 
(1,1) model to ARCH (1) likelihood ratio tests are run. Likelihood ratio tests have been 
previously used to compare GARCH based models in research (e.g. Wang et al. (2001), 
Grier and Grier (2006)).   ARCH (1) model is a restricted version of a more general 
GARCH (1,1) model where GARCH term’s coefficient is set equal to zero. Maximums of 
log likelihood functions are obtained from running appropriate ARCH/GARCH based 
regressions. ARCH/GARCH based regressions run under assumption of Normal–Gaussian 
distribution. Normality tests have shown that normality of the residuals series is questioned 
together with the assumption of series following Normal distribution. Bollerslev –
Wooldridge heteroskedasticity consistent covariance and standard errors have been 
specified for the robust results independently of the distribution chosen. EViews 8 software 
has been used to estimate Log likelihood statistics. Likelihood ratio test statistic is then 
constructed as difference of maximum log likelihood functions for restricted and 
unrestricted models and multiplied by a scalar of minus two.  This value is then compared 
to the appropriate Chi squared critical value with one restriction and at 1% significance 
level.  Likelihood ratio tests results are reported in Table 6-4.  
 
Table 6-4 Likelihood ratio tests 
 
Log-L Restricted Log-L Unrestricted LR statistic Chi^2(1), 1% s.l. Models Chosen 
AT -1929.134 -1838.225 181.818 6.635 GARCH(1,1) 
AU -1740.789 -1597.689 286.200 6.635 GARCH(1,1) 
BE -2618.429 -2528.079 180.700 6.635 GARCH(1,1) 
CA -1690.707 -1646.537 88.340 6.635 GARCH(1,1) 
CH -2245.432 -2185.845 119.174 6.635 GARCH(1,1) 
 142
DE -2464.043 -2264.666 398.754 6.635 GARCH(1,1) 
DK -1885.617 -1769.064 233.106 6.635 GARCH(1,1) 
ES -1826.508 -1669.433 314.150 6.635 GARCH(1,1) 
FI -1298.046 -1275.805 44.482 6.635 GARCH(1,1) 
FR -1866.627 -1856.438 20.378 6.635 GARCH(1,1) 
IE -1726.459 -1719.543 13.832 6.635 GARCH(1,1) 
IT -1524.567 -1507.131 34.872 6.635 GARCH(1,1) 
JP -2788.377 -2445.444 685.866 6.635 GARCH(1,1) 
NL -2410.793 -2319.233 183.120 6.635 GARCH(1,1) 
NO -1825.060 -1825.060 0.000 6.635 GARCH(1,1) 
NZ -1069.730 -1037.594 64.272 6.635 GARCH(1,1) 
PT -1305.705 -1236.671 138.068 6.635 GARCH(1,1) 
SE  -2263.145 -2162.980 200.330 6.635 GARCH(1,1) 
UK -2101.453 -1872.515 457.876 6.635 GARCH(1,1) 
US -2292.279 -2198.984 186.590 6.635 GARCH(1,1) 
 
Test results are evident of GARCH(1,1) superiority to the ARCH (1) model by a large 
margin. It does not come as a surprise because GARCH(1,1) model is advanced to 
ARCH(1) structurally.  
 
6.1.5 Asymmetric GARCH based interest rate volatility measures 
 
Interest rates are financial instruments that reflect elements of the financial mechanism 
such as the higher the default risk and its probability – the higher is the risk premium (the 
higher are the interest rates) and vice versa. However, interest rates are not moving freely 
in the market as they are tied in with the base rate that is predetermined by Central Bank. 
Central Banks use interest rates to track inflation by influencing money supply in the 
economy to aid in achieving monetary policy objectives. All of interest rate formation 
interventions could make volatility of the series asymmetrical dependant on the target.  
 
During recent financial crisis, for example, Central bank in the UK reduced the interest 
rate to 0.5%, in order to encourage spending and increase private consumption, and 
potentially to reduce inflation rates winding up. This creates a situation where market 
conditions were violated in the public interest. So higher interest rates, that are supposed to 
be associated with higher risk bearing, were set at lower levels. Adverse shock to economy 
created lower interest rates that have been artificially held at the same level for some time 
to avoid deflation tendencies. This comes in opposition with Central Bank policies during 
positive shocks to economy. In times of economic boom banks will be vice versa 
encouraged to increase base rates, so diverting people from increased borrowing and 
spending, thus encourage them to save more, in order to avoid an inflation rise. Financial 
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market players react to negative and positive shocks differently as well. Economic 
downturns and higher volatility create more opportunities for speculative profits. Whereas 
times of positive aftershock bear less risk and return, so create less market volatilities and 
decrease the chances of abnormal profits. The GARCH model has ignored distinction in 
response of conditional heteroskedasticity to direction and magnitude of a shock.  
 
It is not possible to account for asymmetries in the GARCH traditional model as its 
variance equation is assumed to be symmetric. In order to find whether interest rate series 
possess asymmetrical properties in conditional heteroskedasticity structure we need to 
investigate further.  
 
Engle and Ng (1993) propose joint asymmetries test for sign and size bias of the series. 
Test has been performed using EViews 8.0 software, as there is no automatic option for the 
test so test has been done manually in a few steps.  First, GARCH (1,1) model has been run 
for the interest rate series and residuals collected.  Then two dummy variables are created, 
one to indicate negative values of the previous period residual, second is restricted to 
positive values of the previous period residual. Then regression is run of squared residuals 
from the GARCH model on constant, negative dummy variable, multiple of negative 
dummy variable by previous period residual and multiple of positive dummy by previous 
period residual. Results from the regression are presented in Table 6-5, where sign bias 
represents coefficients of negative dummy variable, negative and positive size bias 
represent coefficients of negative and positive multiples of previous period residuals 
accordingly.  In parenthesis below the coefficient values – associated p-values are present. 
The LM Statistic nR2 helps to test null hypothesis of all coefficients jointly equal to zero. 
Critical test value is 11.345 and is determined by chi-squared distribution with 3 degrees of 
freedom and at 1% significance level. The non-rejection of null hypothesis indicates 
presence of asymmetries that has to be accounted for in variance modelling. Presence of 
asymmetric effects has been confirmed by the joint test for all countries.     
 
Table 6-5 Engle and Ng(1993) test for the presence of asymmetries 
 














































































































































344 0.035321 12.150424 YES 
SE  
-414.8496 





549 0.279162 153.259938 YES 
UK 
-175.2759 













647 0.314035 203.180645 YES 
 
 
Sign bias coefficient is negative for most of the series (15 out of 20) suggesting that 
negative shock is resulted in reduction of the next period squared residual subsequently 
conditional variance.  For Canada, Spain, Ireland, New Zealand and Portugal sign bias 
coefficient is positive indicating that negative shock will be pushing up conditional 
variance for the following period.  However, sign bias for interest rate residuals is rarely 
significant. Its significance at 10% level for Germany, Finland, Italy, New Zealand, 
Sweden and US is evident of asymmetries in volatility reaction to positive and negative 
shocks.  
 
Negative and positive size bias indicators measure whether positive and negative shocks 
effect on variance is differentiated according to the shock magnitude.  Negative size bias 
coefficients are highly significant with p-values of zero for most of the series except for 
Portugal, where significance level is of 1.79% and New Zealand where p-value jumps 
above 0.5. Coefficient of the indicator is negative for all countries’ series being evident of 
inverse relationship between past shock and current period variance.  For positive size bias 
relationship between variance and previous period positive shock element is less 
significant, still at 10% significance level coefficient is significant for 16 out of 20 
countries’ series. Previous period positive shocks tend to increase volatility of the series, as 
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evident from the positive coefficients estimated by regression analysis. From asymmetry 
detection analysis it can be concluded that negative size bias is the strongest driver behind 
the asymmetries.  
 
Potentially a number of asymmetric GARCH models have been chosen to fit the data. First 
of all we thought of GJR–GARCH model, because it models variance in such a way that 
negative past shocks have larger impact on volatility, as an additional term enters variance 
equation. This additional term represents a multiplication of dummy variable for negative 
last period residual and current period squared “ARCH” residual. Advantage of these tests 
is that they give more weight in variance modelling to negative past shocks, the importance 
of which has been emphasised by the results of Engle and Ng (1993) tests for the data.  
 


















































































AT -1838.225 -1831.645 -1833.026 -1831.700 13.160 10.398 13.050 6.635 
GJR-GARCH(1,1), QGARCH(1,1), 
PARCH(1,1) 
AU -1597.689 -1594.538 -1583.636 -1594.435 6.302 28.106 6.508 6.635 GARCH(1,1), QGARCH(1,1) 
BE -2528.079 -2523.159 -2522.505 -2523.074 9.840 11.148 10.010 6.635 
GJR-GARCH(1,1), QGARCH(1,1), 
PARCH(1,1) 
CA -1646.537 -1605.104 -1606.098 -1605.006 82.866 80.878 83.062 6.635 
GJR-GARCH(1,1), QGARCH(1,1), 
PARCH(1,1) 
CH -2185.845 -2167.763 -2164.882 -2168.908 36.164 41.926 33.874 6.635 
GJR-GARCH(1,1), QGARCH(1,1), 
PARCH(1,1) 
DE -2264.666 -2254.038 -2255.127 -2253.764 21.256 19.078 21.804 6.635 
GJR-GARCH(1,1), QGARCH(1,1), 
PARCH(1,1) 
DK -1769.064 -1768.682 -1762.859 -1768.686 0.764 12.410 0.756 6.635 GARCH(1,1), QGARCH(1,1) 
ES -1669.433 -1668.850 -1664.678 -1668.821 1.166 9.510 1.224 6.635 GARCH(1,1), QGARCH(1,1) 
FI -1275.805 -1273.732 -1264.752 -1273.859 4.146 22.106 3.892 6.635 GARCH(1,1), QGARCH(1,1) 
FR -1856.438 -1855.124 -1841.408 -1855.195 2.628 30.060 2.486 6.635 GARCH(1,1), QGARCH(1,1) 
IE -1719.543 -1719.466 -1714.515 -1719.458 0.154 10.056 0.170 6.635 GARCH(1,1), QGARCH(1,1) 
IT -1507.131 -1502.817 -1493.946 
-1502.892 
8.628 26.370 8.478 6.635 
GJR-GARCH(1,1), QGARCH(1,1), 
PARCH(1,1) 
JP -2445.444 -2437.778 -2435.726 -2437.820 15.332 19.436 15.248 6.635 
GJR-GARCH(1,1), QGARCH(1,1), 
PARCH(1,1) 
NL -2319.233 -2308.506 -2315.410 -2308.510 21.454 7.646 21.446 6.635 
GJR-GARCH(1,1), QGARCH(1,1), 
PARCH(1,1) 
NO -1825.060 -1813.047 -1806.508 -1813.059 24.026 37.104 24.002 6.635 
GJR-GARCH(1,1), QGARCH(1,1), 
PARCH(1,1) 
NZ -1037.594 -1037.429 -1028.398 -1037.387 0.330 18.392 0.414 6.635 GARCH(1,1), QGARCH(1,1) 
PT -1236.671 -1235.971 -1231.649 -1235.925 1.400 10.044 1.492 6.635 GARCH(1,1), QGARCH(1,1) 
SE  -2162.980 -2149.379 -2145.540 -2149.313 27.202 34.880 27.334 6.635 
GJR-GARCH(1,1), QGARCH(1,1), 
PARCH(1,1) 
UK -1872.515 -1856.449 -1845.719 -1856.540 32.132 53.592 31.950 6.635 
GJR-GARCH(1,1), QGARCH(1,1), 
PARCH(1,1) 





Second model of interest is Quadratic GARCH model. Its distinction from the traditional 
GARCH model is additional previous period residual in variance specification. This makes 
QGARCH model more flexible compared to GJR as both positive and negative previous 
period shocks will have impact on volatility of the series. Impact will be differentiable not 
only by sign of the previous shock but by magnitude as well. Thus two asymmetric models 
will be considered to model volatility of the series. As a benchmark to see that conditional 
variance is not over-fitted we will be using GARCH series as an alternative. 
 
We have seen GJR–GARCH model where only adverse shock has additional impact on 
volatility, we have seen models where positive and negative shocks have different impacts 
on volatility. But what if sign of the shock does not matter, but its magnitude does? So we 
have decided to add PARCH (1,1) model to the list with fixed parameter of 2. It gives us 
model with variance specification close to that of QGARCH except that it is not the actual 
previous residual that has been added to the equation, but its absolute value. This model 
assumes that any previous period shock, indifferent of its sign, but proportionally to its 
magnitude has cumulative effect on volatility.  
 
Likelihood ratio tests have been conducted to test what models will be better fit for the 
countries data. Overall four volatility models have been estimated in Eviews 8.0. For all 
models it has been assumed that they follow Normal distribution and Bollerslev-
Wooldridge heteroskedasticity consistent covariance has been estimated. Maximum Log-
likelihood statistics have been collected from the regression analysis. Then tests have been 
run, where it was assumed that GARCH (1,1) model is the restricted model for all three 
tests. Unrestricted models for tests 1,2 and 3 are for GJR-GARCH (1,1) model with 
threshold value of 1,and  QGARCH (1,1), PARCH (1,1) with fixed power parameter of 2. 
In contrast to the rest of the models, one less term in variance equation chi-squared critical 
value has been chosen with one degree of freedom for the GARCH(1,1) model. Results of 
the tests together with the models chosen have been presented in Table 6-6.    
 
According to the likelihood ratio tests, in particular test 2, QGARCH (1,1) model has been 
the most universal fit, as it has been chosen over GARCH (1,1) model for all the countries. 
As we can see from p-values in Table 6-5, popularity of the QGARCH series is justified 
and the magnitude of a shock is more important than the sign of it. For 12 countries out of 
20  volatility fitting of GJR-GARCH (1,1) and PARCH (1,1) has been chosen over 
GARCH (1,1) models. For conditional variance of Australia, Denmark, Spain, Finland, 
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France, Ireland, New Zealand and Portugal, GJR-GARCH (1,1) and PARCH (1,1) 
variance modelling did not appear to be a beneficial specification alteration.  
 
6.1.6 Volatility measures: summary and descriptive statistics.  
 
A number of volatility models have been chosen for interest rate series. Firstly, from non-
parametric models of volatility rolling standard deviation has been chosen with the lag 
length of 12. Secondly, from parametric series we had to make a choice of 2-3 models 
from GARCH (1,1), GJR-GARCH (1,1), QGARCH (1,1) and PARCH (1,1) according to 
the series econometric nature. Once models have been estimated their frequency has been 
converted to yearly (where on the endpoints number of observations was not sufficient, i.e. 
less than 12, those data points were trimmed off). Final measures’ choice together with its 
statistical properties is presented in Table 6-7, and the associated volatility measures have 
been plotted by country in Appendix A5.  
 
On the first glance at the graphs it is easy to notice (from their scaling) that standard 
deviation based volatility measures have smallest range. For all countries, rolling standard 
deviation has lowest mean, minimum, maximum and standard deviation values. This can 
be supported by figures in Table 3-1. From here, we can see that on average the most 
volatile of the variables is IRV2, which is a mix of GARCH and GJR-GARCH volatility 
measures. It also has highest mean and minimum and maximum values. Once we have a 
more detailed look at the measures within countries then the picture changes substantially.  
 
For Austria and the United States, GJR-GARCH volatility measure has largest mean and 
maximum values. Consequently, these models are the most volatile according to standard 
deviation values. Similarly, GARCH based models have largest mean, maximum and 
standard deviation results for Australia and Finland. For Germany, Denmark, Spain, 
France, Great Britain, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand and Portugal, measure 
with highest volatility, average and peak values is QGARCH and for the rest of the 
countries it is PARCH. 
 



































































































Austria (AT)                     
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MA12 43 0.57 0.47 1.32 0.11 0.35 0.80 2.53 4.93 0.09 
GJR-GARCH 
(1,1) 
43 8.30 4.88 69.44 0.91 11.78 3.64 18.33 515.85 0.00 
QGARCH (1,1) 43 7.96 4.73 52.93 0.88 9.66 2.83 12.44 216.91 0.00 
PARCH (1,1) 43 8.29 4.87 69.32 0.91 11.76 3.64 18.30 514.36 0.00 
Australia (AU)           
MA12 40 0.49 0.33 2.47 0.08 0.44 2.45 11.22 152.51 0.00 
GARCH(1,1) 41 6.70 2.92 80.77 0.37 12.88 4.83 28.10 1236.17 0.00 
QGARCH (1,1) 41 6.52 3.22 78.95 0.21 12.54 4.90 28.61 1284.01 0.00 
Belgium (BE)           
MA12 53 1.00 0.99 3.04 0.08 0.69 0.99 3.99 10.88 0.00 
GJR-GARCH 
(1,1) 
53 21.70 13.83 118.83 1.29 25.33 2.32 8.41 112.07 0.00 
QGARCH (1,1) 53 21.60 14.09 110.07 0.79 24.66 2.26 7.95 99.07 0.00 
PARCH (1,1) 53 21.71 14.03 118.90 1.28 25.34 2.32 8.42 112.34 0.00 
Canada (CA)           
MA12 35 0.75 0.57 2.21 0.16 0.55 1.41 3.95 12.98 0.00 
GJR-GARCH 
(1,1) 
35 14.78 7.38 146.44 1.30 25.47 4.19 21.78 616.66 0.00 
QGARCH (1,1) 35 13.35 7.45 77.41 1.14 17.25 2.25 7.50 59.08 0.00 
PARCH (1,1) 35 14.81 7.39 147.01 1.29 25.56 4.20 21.83 619.72 0.00 
Switzerland 
(CH) 
          
MA12 34 3.16 2.63 13.02 0.52 2.63 1.70 6.73 36.14 0.00 
GJR-GARCH 
(1,1) 
35 367.9 134.04 2777.7 11.15 592.37 2.55 9.61 101.62 0.00 
QGARCH (1,1) 35 313.5 133.14 2551.8 10.97 478.64 3.21 14.86 265.42 0.00 
PARCH (1,1) 35 371.7 128.08 3042.7 12.40 618.17 2.84 11.58 154.50 0.00 
Germany (DE)           
MA12 50 0.95 0.48 4.72 0.11 0.99 1.66 5.78 39.08 0.00 
GJR-GARCH 
(1,1) 
50 28.30 4.28 261.08 0.66 49.28 2.73 11.63 217.15 0.00 
QGARCH (1,1) 50 30.11 4.60 343.33 0.58 58.27 3.59 18.32 596.10 0.00 
PARCH (1,1) 50 28.30 4.29 260.38 0.66 49.24 2.71 11.55 213.78 0.00 
Denmark (DK)           
MA12 38 1.14 0.41 7.24 0.07 1.50 2.32 8.75 86.49 0.00 
GARCH(1,1) 38 62.44 5.05 824.51 0.76 162.83 3.75 16.55 379.75 0.00 
QGARCH (1,1) 38 62.74 4.92 852.13 0.80 164.81 3.83 17.30 416.82 0.00 
Spain (ES)           
MA12 36 1.00 0.47 4.56 0.10 1.08 1.67 5.38 25.28 0.00 
GARCH(1,1) 36 34.46 4.46 333.86 0.45 67.54 3.11 13.08 210.42 0.00 
QGARCH (1,1) 36 34.50 4.47 335.11 0.44 67.73 3.12 13.12 211.82 0.00 
Finland (FI)           
MA12 32 0.38 0.34 0.86 0.09 0.20 0.65 2.75 2.34 0.31 
GARCH(1,1) 33 5.49 3.40 30.46 0.95 6.77 2.83 10.55 122.34 0.00 
QGARCH (1,1) 33 5.24 3.24 27.08 0.73 6.11 2.69 9.90 105.20 0.00 
France (FR)           
MA12 46 0.42 0.43 1.06 0.09 0.23 0.59 3.13 2.70 0.26 
GARCH(1,1) 46 3.78 3.06 14.60 1.99 2.31 2.73 12.04 213.79 0.00 
QGARCH (1,1) 46 3.99 3.20 12.06 1.54 2.52 1.41 4.38 18.94 0.00 
Great Britain 
(GB) 
          
MA12 38 1.31 0.85 7.86 0.23 1.50 2.74 11.22 154.69 0.00 
GJR-GARCH 
(1,1) 
38 77.10 13.46 765.03 1.83 175.76 3.11 11.54 176.51 0.00 
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QGARCH (1,1) 38 80.43 15.51 938.80 1.24 188.02 3.36 14.10 266.82 0.00 
PARCH (1,1) 38 77.48 13.50 769.30 1.81 176.64 3.11 11.54 176.58 0.00 
Ireland (IE)           
MA12 37 0.68 0.48 4.61 0.14 0.73 4.39 24.32 819.35 0.00 
GARCH(1,1) 38 11.24 6.00 112.42 4.45 18.42 4.72 25.65 953.66 0.00 
QGARCH (1,1) 38 11.82 6.17 123.45 4.26 20.40 4.69 25.35 930.43 0.00 
Italy (IT)           
MA12 39 0.37 0.28 1.09 0.09 0.24 1.33 4.56 15.46 0.00 
GJR-GARCH 
(1,1) 
39 4.58 2.32 30.02 1.00 6.41 2.88 10.87 154.50 0.00 
QGARCH (1,1) 39 4.35 2.31 24.49 0.86 5.76 2.51 8.35 87.34 0.00 
PARCH (1,1) 39 4.58 2.33 30.04 1.00 6.42 2.87 10.86 154.05 0.00 
Japan (JP)           
MA12 53 1.11 0.45 5.88 0.08 1.53 1.92 5.29 44.08 0.00 
GJR-GARCH 
(1,1) 
53 55.59 5.12 421.65 1.13 114.74 2.23 6.60 72.41 0.00 
QGARCH (1,1) 53 850.5 71.71 6440.4 7.34 1776.89 2.13 6.04 60.39 0.00        
PARCH (1,1) 53 667.1 61.45 5058.5 13.59 1376.80 2.23 6.60 72.34 0.00        
Netherlands 
(NL) 
                 
MA12 50 1.10 0.55 8.25 0.08 1.54 2.89 12.06 240.37 0.00 
GJR-GARCH 
(1,1) 
50 57.52 5.55 860.62 0.90 165.80 4.07 18.94 667.59 0.00 
QGARCH (1,1) 50 68.64 6.06 1054.3 0.86 204.16 4.14 19.44 705.86 0.00 
PARCH (1,1) 50 57.48 5.55 859.87 0.90 165.66 4.07 18.94 667.52 0.00 
Norway (NO)           
MA12 38 0.90 0.59 3.28 0.14 0.78 1.37 4.20 14.22 0.00 
GJR-GARCH 
(1,1) 
39 29.78 7.33 160.00 1.29 41.18 1.75 5.30 28.45 0.00 
QGARCH (1,1) 39 28.22 6.65 167.66 1.53 40.75 1.97 6.21 42.03 0.00 
PARCH (1,1) 39 29.86 7.35 160.58 1.29 41.27 1.74 5.29 28.27 0.00 
New Zealand 
(NZ) 
          
MA12 25 0.53 0.42 1.64 0.09 0.42 1.01 3.16 4.31 0.12 
GARCH(1,1) 25 6.56 2.39 24.55 0.62 7.81 1.27 3.07 6.73 0.03 
QGARCH (1,1) 25 6.74 2.56 24.23 0.51 8.01 1.21 2.90 6.15 0.05 
Portugal (PT)           
MA12 27 0.69 0.40 1.81 0.12 0.54 0.80 2.21 3.60 0.17 
GARCH(1,1) 27 12.26 4.38 48.14 1.09 14.46 1.26 3.22 7.16 0.03 
QGARCH (1,1) 27 12.95 4.77 48.73 0.85 15.44 1.23 3.09 6.76 0.03 
Sweden (SE)                   
MA12 44 1.00 0.62 6.79 0.14 1.25 2.95 12.62 233.61 0.00 
GJR-GARCH 
(1,1) 
45 98.15 14.36 1131.2 3.82 261.15 3.37 12.77 263.84 0.00 
QGARCH (1,1) 45 71.64 13.93 791.30 3.92 181.72 3.38 12.88 268.42 0.00 
PARCH (1,1) 45 98.34 13.76 1133.8 3.82 261.73 3.37 12.77 263.83 0.00 
United States 
(US) 
          
MA12 53 0.58 0.41 2.96 0.11 0.58 2.34 8.48 114.81 0.00 
GJR-GARCH 
(1,1) 
53 13.99 3.67 151.34 1.47 31.54 3.39 13.44 342.38 0.00 
QGARCH (1,1) 53 12.59 3.58 133.7 1.54 27.29 3.41 13.66 353.70 0.00 
PARCH (1,1) 53 13.89 3.65 151.1 1.47 31.31 3.41 13.55 348.45 0.00 
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6.2 Interest Rate Volatility effect on labour market performance. 
 
The interest rate volatility effect on labour market performance is the least researched area 
out of the three topics that are covered by this thesis. Lack of research in the area gives 
advantage of being among the first in the field and disadvantage of not being able to 
discuss and compare this study to results in the literature. Based on literature review of 
indirect effect in Chapter 2, we believe that uncertainty has negative effect on labour 
market performance. Similarly to exchange rate uncertainty, the interest rate uncertainty 
can increase job destruction rates, however it might have impact on job creation rates as 
well. Looking back at the theoretical model Belke and Gross (2001) interest rate can be 
incorporated to the theoretical model by introducing the discount rate into present value 
analysis. Then volatility in interest rate not only will create uncertainty in production 
process, but in the alternative investment process too. This uncertainty may decrease 
opportunity cost of capital, and thus increase the job creation rates. However, we expect 
the net impact of uncertainty on labour market performance to be adverse, as positive 
effect on job destruction would be higher than possible effect on job creation.  
 
On the practical side, four volatility measures have been selected for the analysis and a 
number of alternative specification tests are outlined. First of all, optimal baseline model is 
to be derived. Here a number of alterations to fit best panel data method among those 
available have been done. Following logic of previous empirical research and the fact that 
volatility measures are integrated of order one, panel time series approach has been 
employed. Secondly, an attempt to draw a bigger picture of mechanism behind volatility 
effect on labour market performance has been made. Other than traditional measures of 
labour market performance, such as employment and unemployment rates have been used. 
Thirdly, using a number of alternative labour market indicators will test this model for 
different participating groups. Here in search of asymmetries of the volatility effect on 
labour market performance, participants have been divided into groups by age, sex, 
educational attainment and mode of employment.    
 
On the technical side, please note that for all econometric analysis in this section STATA 
SE 13.1 software has been used.  
  
6.2.1 Unemployment rate determination: Baseline Model derivations 
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Starting with the baseline model introduction, traditional and probably most common 
labour market performance indicator is to be used – the unemployment rate. On the side of 
regressors’, following models proposed by Nickell (1998) and Bassanini and Duval (2006 
a and b), a number of regressors have been chosen accordingly with volatility variable 
addition. Explanatory variables are output gap, tax wedge, interest rate volatility, product 
market regulation, employment protection legislation, average benefit replacement rate and 
union density. Regression of the model is depicted below: 
 
𝑈𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, 
 
where  Xit represents explanatory variables, 𝛼𝑖  accounts for the country effects, 𝑑𝑡 
abbreviates for time dummies, and  𝑢𝑖𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error. Please note that time 
dummies that are included in the model are for the USSR collapse (1991), introduction of 
euro currency (2002) and financial crisis (2008). Before any panel specific technique will 
be employed, one needs to make sure that simple pooled OLS is not a suitable model. 
Models’ over fitting with imposition of assumptions and restrictions will be avoided here 
and used only if it appears theoretically justifiable and supported by the relevant diagnostic 
tests. Pooled OLS model has been estimated assuming clustering of the data within panels. 
 
Table 6-8 Determinants of unemployment for OECD countries (1985-2011): 





















































































































Interest rate volatility 
(IRV1) 
-0.744*** 0.064 0.037 -0.744*** -0.088 
Standard error of interest 
rate volatility coefficient 
0.233 0.066 0.068 0.117 0.075 
Output gap -0.547*** -0.321*** -0.344*** -0.547*** -0.534*** 
Tax wedge 0.144*** 0.035** 0.038*** 0.144*** 0.136*** 
Product market regulation 0.748 0.108 0.015 0.748*** 0.279 
Employment protection 
policies 
-0.388 -0.617 -0.323 -0.388*** 0.825 
Average benefit replacement 
rate 
0.010 -0.024 -0.006 0.010 0.097*** 
Union density -0.049 0.257*** 0.055** -0.049*** 0.017 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 WITHIN 
 
0.476 0.478  0.552 
R2 BETWEEN  
 
0.030 0.000   
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AUTOCORRELATION  
COEFFCIENT 
 0.903 0.903   





























   






   
FREE’S TEST OF CROSS-
SECTIONAL 
DEPENDACE1 
 4.0604    
AV. NUMBER OF YEARS3 24.1 23.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES 20 20 20 20 20 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
482 462 482 482 482 
 Baseline specification for the regressions used is : Uit = β0 + β1Xit + αi + dt + uit 
1 Tests are done using fixed or random effects accordingly without autoregressive parts. 
 2 Hausman test results reported are based on regressions without time effects or time dummies. 
3 Average number of years is used as panel is unbalanced 
4Associated Q values and its respectful significance levels for the test are 0.1984(10%s.l.), 0.262 (5%s.l.), 
0.3901(10%s.l.). 
* result is significant at 10% significance level 
** result is significant at 5% significance level 
*** result is significant at 1% significance level 
 
A first glance at the results, which are displayed in Table 6-8, draws a very optimistic 
picture.  The coefficient of interest rate volatility variable and its respective significance 
level are very large.  If this model holds, then increase in interest rate volatility is 
accompanied by lower unemployment rate.  Shortage of the previous research on the topic 
area makes it impossible to compare or contrast this result. However, logically this 
outcome is a possibility. At the literature review chapter it has been discussed that 
uncertainty tends to lower business activities subsequently associated employment rate. 
However, possibility of arbitrage and ability to use interest rate to the benefit of business 
operations can instead lead to a drive to job creation.  Still, high significance level together 
with large value coefficient creates an urge to investigate presence of serial correlation 
within the model. Incidence of these two elements might be not coincidental. Wooldridge 
(2002) test confirms these concerns and detects first order autocorrelation at a high 
significance level.   Not only presence of autocorrelation signals about not appropriateness 
of the model for this scenario, but also there is another fundamental reason. Breusch-Pagan 
LM test result signal that there is significant difference across countries. Unfortunately, 
OLS model is too simple and does not account for that.  
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More sophisticated panel data techniques are needed here, such as fixed and random 
effects. Taking into account previous autocorrelation concerns, linear models with an AR 
(1) disturbance within error term have been estimated. Interest rate volatility losses all of 
its significance according to results.  What is more interesting, is that the results difference 
is striking when choosing between models to employ. Interest rate volatility coefficient 
produced by fixed effects techniques is twice as big as the one by random effects. 
Hausman test will help to choose between the models.  It looks like Random effects model 
is preferred as its estimator is efficient according to the test results. But are the test’s 
underlying assumptions of independently and identically distributed errors valid? And 
subsequently how it affects the optimal estimator choice? 
 
As has been previously demonstrated, the model suffers from first order autocorrelation in 
the residuals. This already violates baseline assumptions for classic Hausman test. 
Additionally modified Wald test detects heteroskedasticity in the error terms. How this 
newly obtained information changes optimal model choice? Hausman test version has been 
updated accordingly using two similar techniques.  First, it is based on Sargan instruments 
test for over identifying restrictions, and is done on demeaned data based on Wooldridge 
(2002) and Arellano (1993) proposals. This test is done using STATA module that has 
been developed and discussed by Schaffer and Stillman (2010).  A second technique is 
similar in a sense to the first one, as it is also based on Wooldridge (2002) auxiliary 
regression with demeaned data. However rather than Sargan test statistic as in the primary 
case, this test is based on simple F-statistic. Tests are united in a Fixed Effects model 
choice, as it produces consistent estimator under the model assumptions. Not all forms of 
spatial and temporal dependence within the model have been addressed however. 
 
Cross-sectional dependence is common for panel data cases.  Three standard tests for 
cross-sectional dependence have been run – Pesaran, Free’s and Friedman’s. All of the 
tests reject null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence. Pooled and fixed effects 
models have been estimated with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors that are robust to all forms 
of spatial and temporal dependence including cross-sectional dependence. Results are very 
mixed depending on the estimator chosen.  Pooled OLS results are very similar to the first 
regression result, however only standard errors change, as they are Driscoll-Kraay. What is 
surprising is that, as a consequence of such an amendment, all variables became highly 
significant except for average benefit replacement rate variable. Contrary, fixed effects 
results are suggestive of interest rate volatility being insignificant in the unemployment 
rate determination.  It applies to the rest of the explanatory variables in the regression 
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model except for output gap, tax wedge and average benefit replacement rate that are 
indeed highly significant. So which result is the most plausible?  Hoechle (2007) provides 
Wooldridge (2002) test adapted for Dricoll and Kraay standard errors as an alternative to 
Hausman in the presence of spatial and temporal dependence.  Test results are in favour of 
fixed effects estimator due to its consistency.   
 
6.2.2 Enhanced model of unemployment determination and alternative measures of interest 
rate volatility 
 
So what conclusions can be drawn so far - interest rate volatility is not related to 
unemployment rate determination? Not quite, one of the possible problems could be 
omission of the relevant variables. What is the possible treatment? It has been decided to 
enhance model with additional variables to include effects of active labour market policies 
and homeownership rates. Importance of these variables in the unemployment 
determination model has been addressed by previous research (e.g. Bassanini and Duval 
(2006a)).  Appropriate F-test and R squared statistics will be accounted for to avoid model 
over fitting. Country fixed effects with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are used for the 
estimation. 
 
Table 6-9 Unemployment determination: Enhanced specification with alternative interest rate 














































































































































































































































Interest rate volatility 
(IRV1) 
-0.088 0.243** -0.029    
Interest rate volatility 
(IRV2) 
   0.004***   
Interest rate volatility 
(IRV3) 
    0.004***  
Interest rate volatility  
(IRV4) 
     0.003*** 
Standard error of 
interest rate volatility 
coefficient 
0.075 0.114 0.126 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Output gap -0.534*** -0.503*** -0.528*** -0.507*** -0.507*** -0.508*** 
Tax wedge 0.136*** 0.052 0.132*** 0.048 0.048 0.045 
Product market 
regulation 
0.279 1.593*** 0.357 1.583*** 1.583*** 1.596*** 
Employment 
protection policies 
0.825 -2.543** 0.672 -2.473** -2.473** -2.380** 
Average benefit 
replacement rate 
0.097*** 0.026 0.089*** 0.033 0.033 0.034 
Union density 0.017 0.011 -0.015 0.010 0.010 0.011 
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Homeownership rate  0.072*  0.079** 0.079** 0.081** 
Active labour market 
policies  
 -2.137***  -2.078*** -2.079*** -2.043*** 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Joint F-test 5  
14.00 
(0.000) 
    
R2  WITHIN 0.552 0.630 0.556 0.639 0.639 0.641 
NUMBER OF 
COUNTRIES 
20 19 19 19 19 19 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
482 269 456 269 269 269 
Specification for the regressions used is : Uit = β0 + β1Xit + αi + dt + uit 
1 Enhanced model includes additional explanatory regressors: active labour market policies expenditure per 
unemployed and homeownership rates. 
2 This regression analysis includes alternative measure of interest rate volatility IV2. 
3 This regression analysis includes alternative measure of interest rate volatility IV3. 
4 This regression analysis includes alternative measure of interest rate volatility IV4. 
5F-test on validity of two restrictions in the model of homeownership and active labour market 
policies indicator both being equal zero.  
* result is significant at 10% significance level 
** result is significant at 5% significance level 
*** result is significant at 1% significance level 
 
Adding two extra regressors to explanatory variables in the regression improved the fit of 
the model. R squared statistic increased from 0.552 to 0.63. Validity of the further added 
regressors has been checked by joint F-test on restrictions of additional variables’ 
coefficients equally being zero. Null hypothesis of restrictions joint validity has been 
rejected by the F-test value 14.000.  Inclusion of the extra variables is therefore 
econometrically justifiable and adds to the model.  
 
According to the enhanced model, coefficient of exchange rate volatility is large in 
magnitude and highly significant. This is not the only contrasting feature of the variable in 
the new regression. Direction of inter-relationship between volatility and unemployment 
has changed. It has been considered negative by models based on earlier specification; here 
in later model it is positive.  Please note that because additional variables have been added 
due to shortfalls of data availability, observations for Switzerland are not included in the 
new specification. This reduces our panel size to 19 countries. Additional baseline 
regression has been run that excludes observations for Switzerland to confirm that results 
of the enhanced model are not due to country effects.  Baseline regression that has been 
altered to include 19 countries has not shown any signs of improvement. So hypothesis of 
country effects lying behind the difference in models’ estimators has been ruled out.  
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First interest rate volatility measure that is based on rolling standard deviation suggests that 
volatility has large and significant result on unemployment formation. It has been decided 
to confirm if this holds using alternative volatility measures. GARCH based volatility 
model’s estimated coefficients are within a close range of 0.003 to 0.004 and accompanied 
by high significance of 1%. Lack of previous research creates inability to compare the 
results for interest rate volatility. However, these results can be compared to previous 
volatility chapters.  
 
For analogous regressions with exchange rate volatility, standard deviation based measures 
yielded coefficient within the range of 0.417 to 0.526 and GARCH based measures 
produced estimates with in the range of 0.140-0.145 percentage points. Similarly, for 
inflation volatility, standard deviation based coefficient is equal to 0.242 and GARCH 
based estimates are within the range of 0.023-0.027 percentage points. Looking at GARCH 
based measures of volatilities - it becomes obvious that interest rate volatility has smallest 
impact on unemployment out of the three macroeconomic volatilities studied here.  What 
about its impact on overall labour market performance? This question will be answered in 
the next section, but prior to that only one volatility measure has to be chosen. R squared 
statistic will be used for this purpose. Regressions based on GARCH volatility measures 
produce higher R squared statistics despite modest interest rate volatility coefficients. 
Among them highest R squared value is for the IRV4 based volatility measure so it will be 
carried forward for further analysis. 
 
6.2.3 Labour market performance: other indicators. 
 
Harmonised unemployment rate is an alternative measure of unemployment rate. It is 
statistically a better measure for intra-country comparison.  It has not been used in baseline 
or enhanced model specifications due to the relatively small number of observations.  
However, here it has its chance to be tested.  Resulting regression (Table 6-10) coefficient 
is 0.004 and is accompanied by high significance. This suggests that results are robust and 
not sensitive to what type of unemployment rate indicator is being used. Direction of the 
result is supported by employment rate based regression as well. Here, increase in 
volatility is accompanied by decrease in employment rate. Not only does it decrease the 
employment rate, but it also affects structural unemployment. One percent increase in 
interest rate volatility is accompanied by 0.3 percentage points increase in non-accelerating 
inflation rate of unemployment. This result is very important. Despite its small magnitude, 
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effect on structural unemployment could be accumulative and in long-run could produce 
considerable disturbances. 
 






Employment rate Activity Rate 
Non-accelerating 






less than 6 months 
Interest rate volatility  
(IRV4) 
0.004*** -0.008*** -0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003* -0.021*** 
Standard error of interest 
rate volatility coefficient 
0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.005 
Output gap -0.479*** 0.187*** 0.004 -0.092*** -0.034** 0.645*** 
Tax wedge 0.026 -0.082** -0.091*** 0.038** 0.015*** -0.721*** 
Product market regulation 1.087*** -0.044 -0.142 0.356** -0.209 -0.976 
Employment protection 
policies 
-2.505** 2.993*** 0.709 -1.637** 1.187*** 12.128** 
Average benefit replacement 
rate 
0.019 -0.082*** -0.092*** 0.033 -0.031*** -0.699*** 
Union density 0.067 -0.132*** -0.046 0.093*** 0.014 -0.733** 
Homeownership rate 0.058* -0.160*** -0.142*** 0.034 0.003 -0.481*** 
Active labour market 
policies  
-1.378*** -0.524 -0.423 0.743 1.553** 6.451* 
Time dummies2 YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2  within 0.696 0.673 0.529 0.668 0.522 0.621 
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES 19 19 19 19 19 19 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
269 198 198 269 135 269 
Specification for the regressions used is: Uit = β0 + β1Xit + αi + dt + uit, where explanatory variables include 
active labour market policies indicator and homeownership rates.  Fixed effects estimator is used with Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors. 
1Top row represents labour market performance indicator used as dependant variable for the regression. 
2Time dummies used are for ussr collapse of 1991, introduction of euro in 2002, and financial crisis of 2008 
* result is significant at 10% significance level 
** result is significant at 5% significance level 
*** result is significant at 1% significance level 
 
But how does it produce disturbance to employment rate? Translated through labour 
market mechanisms, as can be seen from the other indicators. It decreases activity rates; an 
increase in volatility of 1% is followed by a decrease in activity rates by 0.3 percentage 
points.  Similarly, further statistics on number of discouraged workers supports the 
findings. It also prolongs unemployment spells, as it decreases the number of those 
unemployed for 6 months, by increasing the number of the unemployed for 6-24 months. 
Despite small coefficient values of volatility, the results are significant in all cases 
discussed.    
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6.2.4 Panel time series analysis  
 
The panel time series models path has been chosen from a wide range of dynamic models. 
This choice was guided by the macroeconomic setting of the research (Eberhardt (2012)).  
 
Analogously to time series analysis we will start with stationarity analysis. Results here are 
very similar to Chapter 3 unit root tests as models have identical explanatory variables 
vectors except for distinct volatility measures and two additional regressors. Two tests are 
available for unbalanced panels – Fischer-type test and Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) panel unit 
root test. Second method has been chosen due to asymptotics and data characteristics. For 
all tests cross-sectional means have been removed so to control for cross-sectional 
dependence (Levin, Lin and Chu (2002)).  
 
According to test results (Table 6-11), interest rate volatility series are stationary as can be 
recalled from its estimation and represent variables integrated of order one. What about the 
rest of the variables? They are all integrated of order one except for output gap indicator 
that is stationary.  In case of homeownership rates and active labour market policies, an 
adjustment to data has been made. Due to a lack of observations for Switzerland in case of 
homeownership rates, similarly for Italy in case of active labour market policies, these 
countries’ observations have been removed from the series. This aids us in performing the 
appropriate unit root tests, otherwise too few observations on one panel blocks us from 
doing the test. And the problem of observations loss is not that crucial as further modelling 
in this section is not using these countries’ together with three more countries’ 
observations for the same reason.  
 
Table 6-11 Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) panel unit root tests with crossectional means removed : 
additional variables for ALMP indicator  and homeownership rate included 
Variable Z-t-tilde bar P-value 
Z-t-tilde bar for 
First Difference 
of the Variable 
P-value for Z-t-
tilde bar for 
First Difference 
of the Variable 
Nature of the variable 
Interest Rate 
Volatility1 
- - - - I(1) 
Unemployment rate  
 
0.3189 0.6251 -13.8286 0.0000 I(1) 
Output Gap -2.5537 0.0053 - - I(0) 
Tax wedge -0.8470 0.1985 -13.0857 0.0000 I(1) 
Product market 
Regulation  





2.9996 0.9986 -11.5065 0.0000 I(1) 
Average benefit 
replacement rate 
1.3056 0.9042 -10.7730 0.0000 I(1) 




-0.1147 0.4543 -8.2843 0.0000 I(1) 
Union density  0.0499 0.5199 -14.7132 0.0000 I(1) 
H0: All panels contain unit root 
H1: Some panels are stationary 
1Interest rate volatility variables are unit root stationary, i.e. integrated of order one as by their construction. 
2Observations for Switzerland excluded from the sample 
3Observations for Italy excluded from the sample 
 
Next logical question arising is if the cointegrating relationship exists among the variables. 
Westerlund (2007) cointegrating tests have been used. All of the four tests are suggestive 
of cointegrating relationship between unemployment and interest rate volatility. However 
no cointegrating relationship has been found to include all of the unemployment 
explanatory variables in the regressions. As no cointegrating relationship exists, Pesaran 
(2006) common correlated coefficients mean group estimator has been chosen due to its 
results robustness to no cointegration present, given that all of the variables are integrated 
of order one.  
 
Table 6-12 Common Correlated Coefficients (CCE) mean group estimators of unemployment 
determinants for OECD countries (1985-2011) 
First differenced variables 
Pesaran (2006) Common 
Correlated Effects Mean 
Group Estimator 
Pesaran (2006) Common 
Correlated Effects Mean 
Group Estimator: alternative 
measure of interest rate 
volatility IV2 
 
Pesaran (2006) Common 
Correlated Effects Mean 
Group Estimator: alternative 
measure of interest rate 
volatility IV3 
Pesaran (2006) Common 
Correlated Effects Mean 
Group Estimator: alternative 
measure of interest rate 
volatility IV4 
 
Interest rate volatility (IRV1) 1.936*    
Interest rate volatility (IRV2)  0.248*   
Interest rate volatility (IRV3)   0.249*  
Interest rate volatility (IRV4)    0.303** 
Standard error of interest rate 
volatility  
1.039 0.131 0.130 0.139 
Tax wedge 0.178 0.090 0.092 -0.044 
Product market regulation -1.408** -2.817 -2.819 0.219 
Employment protection 
legislation 
3.184** 1.144 1.155 0.138 
Average benefit replacement 
rate 
0.281 0.501 0.507 0.294 
Union density 0.316 -0.299 -0.299 0.138 
Homeownership rate -0.334* -0.114 -0.110 -0.063 
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Active labour market policies 
indicator 
-0.659 0.552 0.568 -1.215 
Mean of interest rate volatility 
(IV1) 
-1.408    
Mean of interest rate volatility 
(IV2) 
 -0.022   
Mean of interest rate volatility 
(IV3) 
  -0.022  
Mean of Interest rate volatility 
(IV4) 
   -0.013 
Standard error of mean interest 
rate volatility  
1.111 0.035 0.035 0.017 
Mean of unemployment rate 0.762** 1.010** 1.00** 1.76*** 
Mean of tax wedge 0.175 -1.120 -1.113 0.268 
Mean of product market 
regulation 
0.973 1.118 1.130 0.424 
Mean of employment protection 
legislation 
-0.601 4.131* 4.107* 7.649* 
Mean of average benefit 
replacement rate 
-0.178 -0.102 -0.106 0.294 
Mean of union density 0.929 -0.128 -0.126 0.138 
Mean of homeownership rates -0.189 -0.384 -0.386 -0.063 
Mean of active labour market 
policies 
0.627 -0.958 -0.988 -1.215 
Number of groups 15 15 15 15 
Average number of 
observations 
15.4 15.4 15.4 15.2 
RMSE 0..092 0.136 0.136 0.133 
* Result is significant at 10% significance level, ** result is significant at 5% s.l., *** result is significant at 1% s.l. 
 
So model includes all the variables discussed in first differenced form except for output 
gap due to its stationarity. Dynamic model results are presented in Table 6-12 with 
alternative volatility measures. Omission of output gap variable is of no concern as Pesaran 
(2006) model corrects for that as well (Eberhardt (2012)).  For all volatility measures, 
interest rate volatility in short run has positive contributing impact on change in 
unemployment. As before, coefficients obtained from GARCH based measures are smaller 
in magnitude than the one obtained from rolling standard deviation. All of the interest rate 
volatility coefficients are significant at least at 10% significance level, with IV4 measure 
yielding higher significance level of 5%.  However, according to root mean square analysis 
volatility measure constructed as rolling standard deviation is the best performer across 
dynamic models discussed. Regression with this volatility measure has smallest root mean 
square error of 0.092. So for further research concerning short-run dynamics IV1 measure 
will be used.     
 
Further our interest is concerned with the problem of causality. Is it fluctuations in 
volatility causing fluctuations in unemployment or fluctuations in unemployment causing 
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volatilities to adjust?  Granger Causality tests will be performed based on methodology of 
IMF (2014, pp.107-108) and Bassanini and Duval (2009). 
 
Table 6-13 Granger Causality tests for interest rate volatility and unemployment rate1 
 
Dependent Variable is 
unemployment rate. 
Dependent Variable is interest rate 
volatility 
Unemployment rate first lag 0.547*** 0.054* 
Unemployment rate second lag -0.145*** -0.001 
Interest rate volatility first lag -0.056 0.644*** 
Interest rate volatility second lag 0.123*** 0.015 
Joint F-test 5.18 1.80 
Prob > F 0.058 0.1661 
Number of observations 791 771 
* Result is significant at 10% significance level, ** result is significant at 5% s.l., *** result is significant at 1% s.l. 
1All variables here, dependent and explanatory are in first differences. 
 
Previously I (1) nature of unemployment and interest rate volatility variables has been 
confirmed by the variable construction methodology and appropriate Im-Pesaran-Shin 
(2005) unit root tests. Then Westerlund (2007) tests have suggested cointegrating 
relationship between the variables. So to do Granger causality tests fixed effects 
regressions with lags order up to two have been run inclusive of time dummy variables. F-
tests for the validity of the lagged variables have been performed. In first regression, where 
unemployment rate is a dependent variable, second lag of interest rate volatility is highly 
significant at 1% significance level.  And it increases unemployment rate with the effect 
relatively smaller in magnitude comparing to previous regressions. Joint F-test, with the 
value of 5.18, rejects the null hypothesis to suggest that coefficients of lagged interest rate 
volatility are different from zero. In second regression, where interest rate volatility is a 
dependent variable, first lag of unemployment rate is significant at 10% significance level 
and is small in magnitude. Joint F-tests on lagged unemployment rate variables suggest 
that variables coefficients are not different from zero. Suggesting there is no inverse 
Granger causality between unemployment rate and interest rate volatility. So interest rate 
volatility Granger causes unemployment rate but not vice versa. 
 
6.2.5 Conclusion.  
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Significant coefficients of interest rate volatility have not been found in any variations of 
fixed or random effects regressions explaining the unemployment rate. Additional 
variables have been included to baseline specification to achieve a better labour market 
model.  
 
Here, fixed effects estimator with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors has been evident of 
highly significant relationship between interest rate volatility and unemployment rates. 
This result has been supported by all alternative volatility measures. Looking at a wider 
picture of labour market performance, it has been found that interest rate volatility is 
positively associated with structural unemployment and number of discouraged workers, 
but negatively associated with employment and activity rates. It is also negatively 
correlated with the duration of unemployment, as it is positively associated with the 
indicator of unemployment duration of more than 6 months. 
 
Robustness checks performed using Pesaran (2006) common correlated mean group 
estimator support the validity of the established results. Furthermore, Granger causality 
tests support the hypothesis that interest rate volatility Granger causes an increase in 
unemployment rate. Additionally, there was no inverse causality found. Still, I would like 
to bring the readers attention to the fact, that due to the methodology limitation, Granger 
causality is not sufficient to declare any general causal relationship between interest rate 
volatility and unemployment rate. Here, the findings should be regarded as having a 




Chapter 7. Concluding remarks 
7.1 Summary of results 
 
Results of the study suggest that there is macroeconomic volatility unemployment link. 
First of all it has been found that macroeconomic volatility has adverse effect on labour 
market performance. It has been supported using a number of labour market performance 
variables such as: activity rates, employment rate, unemployment rate, structural 
unemployment, discouraged workers, and duration of unemployment. 
 
Effect of macroeconomic volatilities on labour market performance is relatively small in 
magnitude but in most regressions is significant. Relatively to other macroeconomic 
volatilities, interest rate volatility has larger impact on labour market performance whereas 
inflation rate volatilities have the smallest. According to regressions based on fixed effects 
with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors, one standard deviation increase in exchange rate 
volatility is associated with 0.29 to 0.37 percentage points increase in unemployment rate 
dependant on the measure chosen. Similarly, if taking into the view enhanced labour 
market model inclusive of ALMP and homeownership indicators, then one percentage 
point increase in interest rate volatility is accompanied by 0.21 to 0.52 percentage points 
increase in unemployment rate dependant on volatility measure chosen. In case of inflation 
rate results, LSDVC regressions are used for the benchmark comparison. One standard 
deviation increase in inflation volatility is associated with 0.09 to 0.12 percentage points 
increase in unemployment rate. Evidence for the results is strongest for exchange rate 
volatility (higher significance in larger number of regressions) and relatively weaker 
significance for interest rate volatility.  
 
Despite the effect being small in magnitude, the economists should not ignore it instead 
they should be encouraged to take the research further. At this stage research does not 
present any suggestions to policymakers. This is because there is not enough done at the 
field yet to make any valuable conclusions. Before this area of research could become of 
any interest to policymakers, macroeconomic volatility effect has to be studied in 
conjunction with the other policies’ interactions, and only then could any practical 
implications be drawn.   
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This study extends the research field in a number of ways. Firstly, it brings in new and 
more advanced volatility measures. Secondly, it includes a number of labour market 
performance measures, rather than simply unemployment rate. Thirdly, it incorporates new 
macroeconomic volatility measure in the research that has not been studied before – the 
interest rate volatility.   
 
For the ease of comparison to previous studies popular volatility measures have been 
additionally included. They are rolling standard deviation technique and GARCH(1,1) 
models of volatility. Overall, where possible, research results have been compared to 
previous studies – it has been concluded that results of this study are in line with the 
previous research outcomes.  
 




Estimation in all of the chapters has been started with the simple panel techniques – fixed 
effects or random effects models. Estimators have been checked and corrected for all 
possible inefficiencies that arise in presence of autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity or cross-
sectional dependence. However, these techniques rely on the assumption of strict 
exogeneity by definition, i.e. zero autocorrelation between explanatory variable and the 
idiosyncratic error term (Wooldridge (2013)). 
 
Endogeneity may arise from a number of sources such as unobserved simultaneity bias, 
heterogeneity and measurement error. One of the ways to deal with the endogeneity 
problem is to use Instrumental Variables (IV) based approach. However, this approach 
doesn’t suit this research for a number of reasons. Firstly, IV techniques have drawn much 
criticism because of their fundamental assumptions. At the heart of the method lies the idea 
of finding a suitable alternative variable (instrument) to the control variable that is being 
tested for the substitute. This instrument variable should be highly correlated with the 
initial variable, but uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic term. First assumption can be easily 
tested, however the following addition of collinearity with the error term is impossible to 
test. This is not the only pitfall of the analysis. Roodman (2009) also criticises the 
technique for the problem of “instrument proliferation” that it creates.  Coming back to the 
questions that lie at the heart of this research, IV approach is not suitable, as it has been 
designed with a large number of panels in mind, as well as a short span of time series 
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observations. For a macroeconomic dataset as here it will be highly unsuitable. So what 
other options arise under current circumstances?  
 
Eberhardt (2012) proposes the use of panel time-series models in such circumstances. 
Pesaran(2006) addresses some of the issues and comes up with the new common correlated 
effects mean group estimator. Estimator is robust to endogeneity induced by variable 
omission, and “local spill over effects”  (Eberhardt (2012)). However, this alternative 
method could not be applied to all of volatility effect chapters. Inflation volatility measure 
is fractionally integrated. No answer has been found on the question of how to treat 
fractionally integrated variables in the panel time-series. Same order of integration lies at 
the basis of its assumptions.  
 
For inflation volatility series regressions microeconomic panel techniques has been used. 
Arrelano-Bond (1991) estimator has been chosen in line with Sargan tests, as well as the 
first and second order autocorrelation tests results. Still the model is not describing 
microeconomics data, and so for the robustness of the results, Bruno (2005) methodology 
has been used. He proposes using Least Square Dummy Variables approach with standard 
errors corrected by one of the dynamic models. As Sargan test for over identifying 
restrictions and Arrelano-Bond first and second order of autocorrelation tests suggest, 
Arrelano-Bond (1991) estimator has been chosen for the correction. This estimator has 
been designed to work for the models with smaller panels, but larger time-series dimension 




Questions of causality have been attempted in this research. Where possible, in particular 
in Chapters 4 and 6, Granger Causality tests have been performed using technique 
described in IMF (2014, pp.107-108) and Bassanini and Duval (2009).  However, in 
Chapter 5 because of variable of interest stationarity nature (fractionally integrated 
variable) Granger Causality techniques appeared to be of no practical use. Therefore, 
Granger causal relationship between inflation volatility and unemployment has not been 
determined. Granger causality is not a sufficient condition for being able to declare a 
causal impact between the variables however. And so, due to the methodology limitations, 
no relationships in this research should be thought of as a causal impact, but should rather 
be regarded as correlations between the variables of interest.  
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7.2.3 Collinearity of the macroeconomic volatility variables 
  
Macroeconomic volatility variables could be perfect substitutes for each other. In this case, 
it is the general macroeconomic volatility effect in all of three chapters that could have 
been studied, rather than the distinct volatility variables. In finding answers to the problem, 
collinearity matrix of the variables has to be considered (Appendix A6). There is 
collinearity of volatility measures within the variables, but there is no cross-collinearity has 
been found among volatility measures of different variables.  So based on that it can be 
concluded that volatility of exchange rate, inflation and interest rate are not correlated and 
consequently do not suffer from the associated problems described earlier. 
 
7.3 Further research suggestions 
 
Limitations of the study give rise to further research suggestions. In particular, developing 
or using alternative techniques to tackle further endogeneity and tests of causality between 
the variables would be good improvements. One of the ways to reduce the limitations of 
the research is to expand the dataset in panel dimension. So far, studies have been 
concerned with either 20 industrial countries (Feldmann (2012)), Asian Countries ( Shen 
(2011)) or solely Turkey (Demir (2009)). Creating cumulative dataset inclusive of 
industrial countries, Asian, Latin American, African and CIS economies would create a 
panel data with large N dimension and relatively small T (30 observations) dimension. 
Then Instrumental Variables approach can be used for estimation with the corrections 
described by Roodman (2009).   
 
During the work on the thesis, a number of questions and possibilities had arisen that 
unfortunately have not been in the scope of this study for different reasons.  This research 
has more potential and further research suggestions are listed below. All of the suggestions 
are concerned with dataset construction.  
 
Not all of the variables of interest have been included in the dataset. An attempt has been 
made to include macroeconomic shock variable into the dataset, but due to data availability 
and changes in data definitions, they have been left behind.  
 
Furthermore, this study has been concerned with labour market performance and a number 
of performance indicators have been looked at. However, regretfully due to time 
limitations and no readily available data, impact of volatilities on the labour market flows 
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has not been considered. This could have been a good addition however.  Advantages and 
practical aspects of the labour market flows indicators are extensively described in Davis 
et. al. (2006), Gomes (2012), Nissim (2009) and OECD (2010c).  
 
There is room for improvement in volatility measures approach as well. In particular when 
fitting volatility to the interest rate models, a good alternative to consider would be regime-
switching models. This approach to measuring volatility of interest rates has been 
overlooked by a number of previous studies, for example Gray (1996). This alternative 
measure appeared to be a good performer. This does not come as a surprise, because 
central banks use interest rate as a tool to track inflation during adverse economic 
conditions.  
 
Volatility effect on labour market performance has been considered to a great extent in this 
study in a number of specifications, and using a number of estimators. Unfortunately, 
volatility measures intersections with policy and institutional indicators’ effects on labour 
market performance have not been considered.  
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Appendix A1: Plots of macroeconomic variables 
 























Appendix A2: Plots of key labour market performance variables 
1. Comparative graph of “unemployment rate” derived from two sources. 
 
urt – Unemployment Rate (ALFS definition) 
hur – Harmonised unemployment rate 
t- time, Year 
 




3. Graph of “activity rates” variable. 
 
 



























Appendix A3: Plots of exchange rate volatilities 
1. EV1: Measure based on rolling standard deviation of 6 months lag length  
 
 



















Appendix A4: Plots of inflation rate volatilities 
1. PV1: Measure based on rolling standard deviation of lag lengths 4 
 
 









Appendix A5: Plots of interest rate volatilities 
1. IRV1: Measure based on rolling standard deviation of lag lengths 12 
 
 




3. IRV3: Measure based on QGARCH(1,1) 
 
 






Appendix A6: Collinearity of macroeconomic volatility measures 
Diagram  3 Collinearity matrix of macroeconomic volatility measures 
 
EV1 EV2 EV3 EV4 EV5 PV1 PV2 PV3 IRV1 IRV2 IRV3 IRV4 
EV1 1.00 
           
EV2 0.89 1.00 
          
EV3 0.95 0.97 1.00 
         
EV4 0.87 0.85 0.87 1.00 
        
EV5 0.90 0.86 0.89 0.94 1.00 
       
PV1 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.15 1.00 
      
PV2 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.82 1.00 
     
PV3 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.80 0.94 1.00 
    
IRV1 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.10 0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 1.00 
   
IRV2 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.02 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 0.81 1.00 
  
IRV3 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.02 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 0.81 1.00 1.00 
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